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ABSTRACT 
 
Pay for performance (PFP) has been widely studied in the Western context; however, it has 
been paid very little attention with respective to China, especially in non-public sector 
knowledge-intensive industries. Research related to PFP has been strongly controversial. It 
is argued that the controversy surrounding PFP largely reflect that a well designed PFP 
programme must accompany effective implementation over time in order to run pay 
systems effectively.  
 
This thesis explores PFP design and implementation issues from a management perspective 
within the context of China focusing on four specific areas, namely: the importance of PFP 
in the current pay system; characteristics of PFP plans; implementation and functions of 
performance appraisal (PA) and line managers’ involvement in PFP. A qualitative multi-
case study approach was applied to 12 non-public enterprises (POEs, JVs and MNCs) from 
investment, IT and pharmaceutical industries based in Shanghai consisting of more than 62 
interviews with top managers, HR and line managers.  
 
The empirical findings show that: 1) PFP was widely adopted in the non-public sector and 
performance played as a key norm in employee pay determinants. The major drivers for the 
management to use PFP were following the market practice and rewarding better 
performers. 2) PFP plans adopted were results-oriented, short term focused and poorly 
connected to further learning and development. 3) A more reward driven PA was adopted, 
however, PA served basically for salary administration and goal achievement evaluation in 
PFP; 4) line managers were more committed to the objectives they intended to achieve than 
to PFP systems. The nature of the project-based work in the cases could be a major factor 
that restricted their involvement in PFP.   
 
Overall, the thesis studied PFP at principle, policy and practice levels and explored the 
content and context changes of PFP in knowledge-intensive industries, which helped fill the 
gap in literature on PFP in China. It is also interesting to note that ownership forms strongly 
impacted on firm’s PFP taken up, however, we can not simply assume that Western MNCs 
are more progressive than domestic Chinese firm in PFP. Moreover, Chinese traditional 
culture values did not seem to have a profound and enduring influence throughout PFP 
design and implementation.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter lays the foundations of the thesis. In its broadest sense, this research is an 
enquiry into employee rewards in the context of the People’s Republic of China 
(hereafter referred to as ‘China’) after its accession to the WTO in 2001. More 
specifically, the thesis seeks to explore the practice of pay for performance (hereafter 
referred to as ‘PFP’) in knowledge-intensive industries under a variety of ownership 
systems in China. This chapter states the aims and objectives of the thesis, and defines 
the research gaps and questions. In addition, the rationale and importance of the thesis 
are indicated. Finally, the research methodology and the organisations of the thesis are 
presented.   These are all dealt with in full detail in their relevant substantive chapter. 
 
1.2 Aims and research questions 
Paying people based on performance has been a salient topic in books, newspapers and 
magazines throughout the last century. Many organisations attempt to tie pay to 
performance measured at an individual, group and organisational level as a way to 
increase employee motivation and performance. This is further illustrated by Hewitt 
Associates who reported that the percentage of American companies with PFP 
programmes in place grew from 47 per cent in 1990 to 78 per cent in the year 2000 
(Kuhn and Yockey, 2003). With the widespread use of PFP, much research has been 
done to understand why some firms adopt PFP and others do not, and why some firms 
offer more incentives than others (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992b, Bloom and 
Milkovich, 1998, Eisenhardt, 1989a, Heywood et al., 1997, Stroh et al., 1996, Gerhart 
and Rynes, 2003). However, research related to PFP has been strongly controversial. 
For instance, an examination of studies of PFP programmes in North America done by 
Heneman et al., (2000) suggests that performance improves in approximately two out of 
three programmes. On the other hand, Hendry et al., (2000) and IRS (2003) note that 
research into PFP in the UK over the past decade has failed to show that such systems 
have an effect on performance. Nevertheless, it is reported by Schuler and Rogovsky 
(1998) that PFP is more likely to be associated with cultures with higher levels of 
individualism as opposed to collectivism. This is further explained by studies of 
Hofstede as below.  
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Hofstede (1984) 1  argued that PFP would not be generally appropriate for Chinese 
organisations because he distinguished China in the 1980s as generally being a 
collectivistic culture. Moreover, the ‘Confucian Dynamism’ was identified in his later 
study (Hofstede, 1991) 2  p.173:‘Confucian Dynamism’ or ‘long-term vs. short-term 
orientation’ concerns fiscal conservatism. In short-term oriented cultures social 
obligations are fulfilled regardless of cost, whereas in long-term oriented cultures 
financial resources are reserved and individuals subordinate needs to causes. Therefore, 
Hofstede's Confucianism further argues that short term rewards will not be very 
attractive to Chinese staff as they look for long term and group rewards.   
 
Although Hofstede’s (Hofstede, 1984, Hofstede, 1980a, Hofstede, 1980b, Hofstede, 
1983, Hofstede, 1991) theories on culture have been widely applied in cross-cultural 
comparative studies3 on reward practices between Asia and the West, such theories of 
culture have been severely criticised4. Furthermore, even though Hofstede's work may 
be valid in the 1970s and 1980s of China, this aspect of culture is unlikely to apply to 
China post 2001 in that the more recent studies on rewards in China indicate the 
opposite to Hofstede’s argument (Hofstede and Bond, 1988, Hofstede, 1991). For 
instance, studies on PFP in China’s state owned enterprises (SOEs) and foreign owned 
multinational companies (MNCs) show certain employees’ acceptance and managerial 
adoption of PFP (Baruch et al., 2004, Ding et al., 2006, Shen, 2004). This raises the 
following questions: What is the cause of the controversy regarding PFP in general? To 
                                                 
1  The four dimensions Hofstede suggests are ‘power distance’ (strong vs. weak), ‘collectivism vs. 
individualism’, ‘masculine vs. feminine’ and ‘uncertainty avoidance’ (strong vs. weak). These dimensions 
ere independently verified in similar form through an unrelated survey developed by a multinational 
research team (Hofstede and Bond, 1984). A collective culture is concerned with the well-being of an in-
group individuals are born into. An individual culture, according to the Western scale, is one where 
people are concerned with immediate family and personal well-being, or ‘tolerance, ‘conservatism’ and 
‘solidarity’ in the Eastern scale’ (Hofstede, 1991 p. 163). 
2 The multinational research team above also recorded a fifth dimension, not measured by Hofstede, 
labelled ‘Confucian dynamism’ by Michael Bond and ‘long-term vs. short-term orientation’ by Hofstede 
(1991: 159-174).  
3 Wei and Rowley (2009) note that Hefstede’s theories have been widely used in studies on rewards in 
Asia. For instance, the comparative research on distributive justice values (giacobbe-Miller., 1997), 
reward allocation preferences (Kim et al., 1990), managers’ rewards policy capturing (Zhou and 
Martocchio, 2001), performance appraisal and culture (Snape et al., 1998), and pay satisfaction (Fong and 
Shaffer, 2003).  
4 Hofstede's work (where he had questionnaires from IBM staff in Hong Kong- although Bond's 
contribution was wider than IBM it still was focused on HK) has been severely criticised. For instance, 
Child (1980) notes that cross-cultural research previous to Hofstede’s work had very often not offered an 
explicit culture definition and had rather used ‘culture’ as a ‘trash-can’ residual variable. Also, Hofstede 
(1982) does not consider that within one culture there is the possibility of regional variation, subcultures 
and individual deviation. Braun and Warner (2002) argue that Hofstede sees the individual in quite a 
passive way, in which all actions are in fact predetermined by a mental ‘programme’. 
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what extent has PFP been applied to China? Do firms differ in their PFP plans in China? 
How do managers make sense of and make decisions about PFP initiatives in China? 
These questions were the researcher’s initial interest and motivation for studying PFP in 
the context of China.  
 
In the literature, PFP advocates argue that PFP is not a question of the incentive value of 
money per se. A well designed PFP programme is essential to avoid its pitfalls. 
Moreover, the controversy surrounding PFP in practice also largely reflects the fact that 
a good design must accompany effective implementation over time in order to run a pay 
system effectively (Gupta and Shaw, 1998, Kerr, 1999, Lawler, 1990, Luthans and 
Stajkovic, 1999, Pfeffer and Sutton, 2001). However, the existing literature shows that 
although research on PFP has widely covered Western countries, it still has not been 
well studied in the Asian contexts, such as China (Wei and Rowley, 2009, Werner and 
Ward, 2004). Therefore, the prime aim of this thesis is to help fill the gap by analysing 
and explaining the nature of PFP design and implementation in the context of China, 
specifically non-public sector knowledge-intensive industries. The non-public sector5 is 
defined by Tung (1981) as private-owned enterprises (POEs), joint ventures (JVs) and 
foreign owned multinational companies (MNCs). Knowledge-intensive industries 6 
chosen for the thesis are investment/marketing research, Information Technology (IT) 
and pharmaceuticals. 
 
In order to identify the significant areas of the study, a pilot study of ten non-
standardised interviews was necessary. The interviewees were four specialists on 
reward management from Chinese HR consultancy firms, two HR specialists from 
Mercer and Watson Wyatt (the world leading HR consultancies) and four senior 
managers from large (in terms of employees) investment organisations in Shanghai, 
including one JV and three POEs 7 . Finally, four objectives for the research were 
identified to explore PFP design and implementation in China based on the pilot study 
as below:  
 
                                                 
5 The development and definition of the non-public sector in China is presented in Chapter 2 section 2.3.  
6 The introduction of the knowledge economy and knowledge-intensive industries in China can be found 
in Chapter 2 section 2.4. 
7 The detail of the pilot study can be found in Chapter 5 section 5.6. 
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First, this study examines the state regarding PFP in the current pay systems of non-
public sector knowledge-intensive industries in China. The current state of PFP is a 
fundamental issue that shows the extent to which PFP is adopted and the reasons for 
using PFP plans. Moreover, examining the current state of PFP in China is also likely to 
indicate the significance which the knowledge-intensive organisations place upon their 
PFP in the current pay system. Following this, the study discovers in what ways PFP 
plans are designed in the firms, whether or not internal and external factors impact on 
managers’ decision making of PFP plans. Further, the study discusses issues regarding 
the implementation of PFP programmes. Finally, both the existing literature and the 
pilot study indicate there are gaps between what managers know about PFP and what 
they actually do. Therefore, it is highly necessary to examine whether and how the key 
deliverer, that is, line managers are involved in the whole process, and to evaluate line 
mangers’ role in PFP design and implementation.  
 
It should be noted that PFP design and implementation can be studied from either a 
single perspective (the management or the employees) or from both parties’ 
perspectives. However, this study is from the management perspective only. 
Employees’ acceptance, preferences and views on fairness and effectiveness of PFP are 
not included. Furthermore, this study focuses on the characteristics of management’s 
decision making on PFP plans choices and delivery, it does not attempt to evaluate the 
outcomes of PFP plans or assesses the effectiveness and/or success of PFP systems, 
although the research might indicate the positive impact of PFP design and 
implementation on employee motivation and performance.  
 
Following the above line of reasoning, the four areas of research focus are investigated 
by considering the following research questions:  
 
Question 1: How important is PFP in the current pay system? 
Existing literature shows that the current pay system in China was transformed from the 
traditional system (before the economic reform in 1978) 8 , which was strongly 
egalitarian with no performance related payment. PFP emerged after the reform in 1978 
with strong state led in practice. However, there has been very little research on PFP on 
                                                 
8 The economic reforms since 1978 and the evolution of reward systems in China can be found in Chapter 
2 section 2.2 and Chapter 3 section 3.4.1 respectively.  
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the current pay system (after China’s accession to the WTO in 2001) of the non-public 
sector (see Chapter 3 for details). Therefore, the two sub-questions are:  
 
1a: To what extent is PFP adopted? 
This question examines whether or not firms adopt PFP at all levels in the organisation, 
which indicates the current state of PFP in non-public sector knowledge-intensive 
industries of China. This question enables the researcher to examine the meaning and 
content of PFP for management in the context of China, and specify how management 
formulates PFP in the payment and the importance of the latter. Therefore, this question 
may also lead to an indication of the key characteristics between the traditional and the 
current pay systems. 
 
1b: Why do firms use PFP? 
Previous research on PFP in the context of China examined employee rewards 
preferences and rewards allocation by using expectancy and equity theories (Baruch et 
al., 2004, Bozionelos and Wang, 2007, Giacobbe-Miller et al., 1997). However, 
management’s drive and preferences for PFP plans have not been investigated. This 
question seeks the motivations and reasons for firms’ adoption of PFP plans, and 
illustrates whether PFP is desirable and necessary for management in the context of 
China.  
 
Question 2: How is PFP designed? 
The research moves on to the concept of pay plan design. PFP plans, such as piece rates 
bonuses, were restored to the pay system in China after the Economic reforms in 1978. 
Proportions of PFP in the pay system and the enterprises’ autonomy over the 
distribution of PFP have been increased since the 1980s (Han and Morishima, 1992; 
yuan, 1990). In addition, the level and structure of employee rewards vary by the 
ownership of the firm, and differ across firms from different industries (Ding et al., 
2006). However, previous literature on PFP in the context of China favoured studies 
from employees’ perspective rather than the PFP design issues which are considered 
important by management. Therefore, the two sub-questions are: 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 6
2a: What types of PFP plans are adopted? 
Different PFP plans vary along two dimensions: performance measure and measurement 
level. Performance measure refers to the type of measurement that is used by 
organisations to assess the contribution of employees to the organisation. Measurement 
refers to the level and content at which employee performance is measured. This 
question identifies management’s choices of the above in their PFP plans they have 
adopted, including the coverage, focus, uniformity of design, and forms of review and 
measures. 
 
2b: What are the contextual factors that impact on the adoption? 
This question focuses on the integration of PFP design. The most popular models of 
rewards management focus heavily on the alignment between rewards and business 
strategies. However, Werner and Ward (2004) argue that we know very little about the 
connections between business strategy formulation and how this affects reward strategy. 
In the context of China, Ding et al., (2006) explored factors that affect the components 
of managerial pay. However, there has been very little research on factors that influence 
variable pay design. Therefore, this question aims to improve our understanding of 
possible elements of the internal and external environment that might be associated with 
PFP plans design in the context of China, and to further examine whether the classical 
approach within contingent theory is supported.  
 
Question 3: How is PFP implemented? 
The process of PFP implementation can be complex. Pfeffer and Sutton (2001) argue 
that potential barriers to implementing PFP can be measuring performances, employees’ 
perceptions of unfairness and inequity, and factors outside the control of individuals and 
teams etc. Again, this question focuses on the implementation issues from 
management’s side. Moreover, performance appraisal (hereafter referred to as ‘PA’) is 
defined as the key part of PFP implementation practices to be examined. Therefore, the 
two sub-questions are: 
 
3a: In what ways is performance measured? 
PA practices have long existed in China with strong Chinese characteristics (Zhu and 
Dowling, 1998). However, it is also evident that Western PA systems have been 
influencing the Chinese system since the economic reforms in 1978 (Bai and 
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Bennington, 2005, Cooke, 2003). Thus, an attempt is made to investigate the current PA 
practice in the context of China, such as elements, instruments and process of PA 
systems.  
 
3b: What functions does PA serve in PFP?   
Drawing from the literature review, PA as a system performs many functions. It helps 
managers make administrative decisions, especially regarding record keeping, pay and 
promotions, and meet developmental objectives, such as coaching staff and assessing 
training and development needs (Brumback, 1988, Jacobs et al., 1980, Taylor and 
O'Driscoll, 1993). The existing literature shows that PA outcomes have not been well 
utilised by management in China (Chou, 2005, Ding et al., 1997, Chen, 2003). This 
question seeks to identify the functions of PA results in China’s knowledge-intensive 
firms.  
 
Question 4: How are line managers involved in PFP design and implementation? 
One of the characteristic features of the HRM literature is the pivotal role which has 
been given to line managers as a delivery point for a variety of employment policies that 
are intended to raise workforce performance (Storey, 1992, Legge, 1995). Devolving 
HRM to the line is seen as a key issue in successful HRM practices and has been 
received much attention from both academics and practitioners (Cunningham and 
Hyman, 1999, Larsen and Brewster, 2003, Gibb, 2003, Renwick, 2003). Gerhart and 
Rynes (2003) further note that pay programmes are not simply determined by forces in 
the external environment. Instead, managers play a significant role in the adoption, 
modification, or even discontinuation of PFP. However, there has been no literature on 
the involvement of line managers in PFP in the context of China. Therefore, the two 
sub-questions are: 
 
4a: How do line managers understand their role in PFP?  
McGovern et al., (1997) note that devolving HRM to line managers has been 
problematic. Renwick (2003) highlights that a partnership approach to HRM requires 
the integration of HRM activities into the work of line managers, which implies that 
there needs to be a shared understanding between HRM and line managers. Therefore, 
in order to examine line managers’ involvement in PFP programmes, how line 
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managers understand their responsibilities with PFP plans, their views, attitudes towards 
PFP and participation in PFP are to be explored. 
 
4b: What are the key supports and barriers to their involvement in PFP?  
Challenges to devolving HRM to the line managers lie not only in the relationship 
between HRM and line managers, but also the ability and willingness of the line 
managers to carry out HRM tasks, and the line managers’ knowledge of company 
policies and government laws and regulations (Renwick, 2003, Renwick and MacNeil, 
2002, Bond and Wise, 2003). Thus, this question critically evaluates the extent to which 
line managers are involved in the PFP design and implementation, as well as the 
difficulties they face and the support they have from HR and top management in the 
context of China.   
 
1.3 Background and rationale  
Nowadays effective reward strategies are critical to firms, especially in knowledge-
intensive industries (Zingheim and Schuster, 2000). However, organisations continually 
struggle to design and implement successful and credible reward strategies (Corby et al., 
2005, Cox, 2000, Cox, 2005). Developing a reward strategy at all is a challenge for 
many organisations. Given the centrality of rewards to the employment contract, one 
would expect widespread attention to be given to formulating and implementing 
appropriate strategies. However, survey data by CIPD9 (CIPD, 2006, CIPD, 2007, CIPD, 
2009) shows that in the UK only 26 to 35 per cent of 520 organisations have a written 
reward strategy, while 91 per cent of managers believed that implementing a reward 
strategy was difficult or extremely difficult. UK data  also shows that less than 10 per 
cent of organisations involve line managers in designing reward strategies (CIPD, 2006, 
Towers, 2000). It is hard to think of another management scenario where the key 
customer and deliverer of the intervention are so emphatically excluded from the design 
process. This situation is rather like devising a marketing strategy without conducting 
consumer research or a new supply chain process without involving the purchasing 
department. 
 
                                                 
9 The annual reward management survey report by CIPD is based on responses received from 520 UK 
organisations, across all industrial sectors, employing around 1 million employees. The research was 
carried out between August and October each year. The main aims of the research are to provide readers 
with an invaluable information and benchmarking resource in respect of current and emerging practice in 
UK reward management. 
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Immense pressure for higher performance has led knowledge-intensive firms to search 
continually for managerial practices that will enhance competitiveness. An increasingly 
large number of corporations have explored how rewards, particularly PFP could be 
linked to desired behaviour and/or performance outcomes to improve effectiveness 
(Gerhart and Rynes, 2003, Pfeffer, 1998, Rigby, 2001). This led to a widespread and 
growing of PFP plans. Studies have examined a variety of ways in which PFP systems 
impact on individuals, groups and organisations (Stajkovic and Luthans, 2001, Bonner 
and Sprinkle, 2002, Michelle and Heywood, 2002, Bloom and Michel, 2002, Reilly, 
2005, Werner and Ward, 2004). However, despite the breadth and sophistication of 
topics examined in research related to PFP, the crucially important issues of design and 
implementation by management have not received much attention.  
 
Review articles, such as Werner and Ward (2004) and Werner (2002), further argue that 
the vast majority of the research on rewards was published in North American Journals, 
authored by academics from North American universities, and used North American 
samples. Most of the research and discussion on PFP in the literature has involved 
studies performed in Western nations such as USA, the UK and Australia (Heneman, 
1992, Bartol and Locke, 2000, Cox, 2005). Therefore, it is quite likely that those 
researchers (as in many other areas) suffer from an Anglo-Saxon perspective bias. This 
raises the question of whether the findings and theories of these research can be 
generalised to a global context.  
 
In the Asian context, there have been extremely rare review articles on rewards. Wei 
and Rowley (2009) have recently provided a picture of research on rewards in Asia 
since the 1990s. It is noted that research on rewards in Asia as a whole has been so far at 
an ‘early stage’ compared to studies in the North American and European contexts, in 
terms of topic areas, methodological concerns and theoretical development. Further, 
development of research areas in is certainly essential. The current studies of rewards in 
Asia have been heavily biased towards the study of rewards transformation. However, 
the transformed reward systems in Asia have not been researched from every 
perspective. For instance, PFP seems well worth studying. There is now also a need to 
study the neglected area of reward practice in terms of what organisations ‘deliver’. 
These deliverables could relate to corporate performance, intended strategies and 
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practices that are actually delivered via managers, therefore, the implementation of 
rewards and middle managers’ role need to be explored. 
 
China has experienced substantial reward system transformation since its economic 
reforms from 1978, when pay was started to be linked to performance (see Chapter 3 for 
details). The author further reviewed studies on rewards in China over the last 25 years 
(see Chapter 3 section 3.6.3). These studies generally cover principles of psychology, 
economics, international management and labour law etc. Research topics include from 
both the employees’ perspectives, such as pay preferences and satisfaction, reward 
allocations, motivation; and from the management perspectives, such as the reward 
system in Mao’s time, reward system changes, reforms and evolutions, firm 
determinants of pay, international rewards, equity and equality of pay systems. It is also 
noticed that previous studies heavily focused on the public sector (SOEs and COEs) 
rather than non-public ownership. There are only several recent studies on both POEs 
and MNCs, which are mainly on employee preferences on reward allocation and 
managerial pay (Shen, 2004, Baruch et al., 2004, Chen et al., 2002, Cheng and Firth, 
2005, Ding et al., 2006). Therefore, PFP in the non-public sector has been paid very 
little attention to. Moreover, there has been no study of PFP design and implementation 
practices in the non-public sector. 
 
The trend towards a more knowledge economy has brought many changes in Chinese 
society in recent years. For instance, human capital development has been given much 
more attention than ever by researchers and practitioners (Zhao, 2008). Many more 
people are engaged in knowledge-intensive industries, such as high-value added hi-tech 
firms, in China. However, the imbalance between the shortage of skilled labour and 
oversupply of unskilled and semi-skilled workers has become obvious. The competitive 
rewards which attract and retain good performers have become critical in recent years. 
Knowledge-intensive firms are the research setting for this thesis because employees in 
those companies are some of the best trained and best educated employees in any sector. 
PFP practices are typical for them and how employees in this sector are rewarded in 
China can be a predictor of reward management trends for knowledge-intensive work 
globally.  
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The issues above reveal that there is a significant gap in the knowledge concerning PFP 
design and implementation by the management. Therefore, an effort is needed to 
explore the nature of such practices in China’s non-public sector knowledge-intensive 
industries. To undertake such research in the Asian context, it is necessary to consider 
two opposing schools of thought on the relation of culture to HRM practices, such as 
PFP. First, the convergence view proposes that, as a result of common industrial logic, 
technological forces, organisational patterns and structures, universal management and 
HRM practices are appropriate, leading to increasing similarities between cultures 
(Adler and Jelinek, 1986).  
 
Second, the divergence view holds that culture is the primary determinant of the most 
appropriate management practices, so HRM programmes need to be carefully tailored to 
create an appropriate match (Adler and Jelinek, 1986). Current studies are inconclusive 
in determining which of these approaches is the most applicable. It has been suggested 
that whatever approach is correct might depend on additional factors, so that in some 
cases the same HRM practices would be effective across cultures and in other cases HR 
practices need to be tailored to the culture (Adler and Jelinek, 1986, Redding, 1994). 
For instance, in Asia, globalisation, international trade and finance may place 
substantial pressure on firms to standardise practices and policies, while the local 
customs, institutions, and labour forces provide serious constraints to the degree of 
convergence and may well lead to an increasing level of divergence. Following this, the 
empirical findings of this thesis are discussed and compared to the arguments above to 
illustrate the signs of and reasons for convergence and divergence trends in PFP design 
and implementation within the context of China. 
 
This study is also very concerned with another theoretical perspective, classical 
contingent theory in reward management. Contingency theory is probably the leading 
general paradigm in HRM and also becoming increasingly influential in the study of 
pay (Dyer and Holder, 1988, Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992a, Jackson and Schuler, 
1995, Cox, 2005). Contingency theory principles underlie both the resource based view 
and institutional theory (Gerhart et al., 1996). Resource based approaches represent a 
high risk – high potential return option, which aim for sustained competitive advantage 
by adding value in a way that is rare and difficult to imitate (Oliver, 1997). Whereas 
institutional approaches represent a low risk – lower potential return option, which 
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strives for parity with other organisations in the business environment (Gerhart et a., 
1996) (see Chapter 3 for details) 10 . This thesis uses the above two contingent 
approaches as lenses for examining PFP design and implementation practices in the 
non-public sector knowledge-intensive companies, and further illustrates whether 
resource based view or institutional theory could better explain the current PFP 
practices in the context of China. 
 
1.4 Research methodology 
Werner and Ward (2004)11 reveal that research on rewards is largely quantitative and 
empirical, reflecting the dominant methods currently found in management identified by 
Scanduran and Williams (2000). Most surprisingly, there was no single entirely 
qualitative study identified by Werner and Ward among 396 articles reviewed. The 
same situation was found in studies on rewards in the Asian context. Wei and Rowley 
(2009) 12 also note that most of the studies on rewards in Asia used a comparative 
research approach via quantitative hypotheses testing. There is a strong need for more 
exploratory and theory building research.  
 
This thesis seeks to provide case data and share insights that inform the neglected 
research areas – management’s approach to PFP design and implementation in the 
context of China. A multi-case study approach was identified as the most appropriate 
method for the research because there has been lack of relevant literature on this topic, 
and the research questions are basically ‘how and why’ questions which are more 
explanatory and likely to lead to the use of case studies by being sensitive to what may 
be special in one context but does not exist in another (Yin, 2003). Moreover, a multi-
case study also has distinct advantages in comparison to single-case designs. The 
                                                 
10 Chapter 3 section 3.4.3 provides the discussion on reward management models – the universal and 
contingent model. The critics of the universal model are examined and the resource-based view and 
institutional theory within the contingency model are discussed.  
11 Werner and Ward (2004) reviewed the literature of compensation and compensation-related issues 
within the field of management from 1997 to 2004. 396 articles were examined in 20 top journals.  
12 In the Asian context, the volume of research on HRM and OB has significantly and continuous to 
increase. Previous review articles have dealt with existing studies on business and management in Asia, 
and HRM and OB in specific Asian countries. However, a review of how far the existing research on 
rewards in Asia has extended remains absent. Wei and Rowley (2009) examined papers published in 33 
leading international academic management journals between 1990 and 2007 inclusive. Both conceptual 
and empirical papers which included samples from countries in Asia were considered. Specifically, 
papers purely on rewards, papers on reward related areas such as performance appraisal, employment etc. 
and papers mainly on HRM with rewards related constructs were included. Finally, some 78 were 
selected for use in this article. 
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evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling, and the overall study 
is therefore regarded as being more robust (Herriott and Firestone, 1983, Yin, 2003).  
 
Rigorous procedures were in place for question design and the interview process. The 
design of the interview guide first involved a review by an expert panel. Comments and 
feedback from the panel resulted in modification of some re-wordings. The interview 
guide was then translated from English to Chinese and back-translated by two language 
instructors of a tertiary institution. Translation and back-translation ensure greater 
consistency (Brislin, 1970). Subsequently, the interview guide went through a rigorous 
pilot study to test the questions’ variation, meaning, difficulty and interviewees’ interest. 
Pilot study and formal fieldwork were conducted from June 2006 to March 2008 in 
Shanghai, the financial centre of China. Initially, seventeen companies were visited. 
However, twelve medium to large companies (by employee numbers) including five 
POEs, two JVs and five MNCs were selected as the sample, which were from the non-
public sector investment/marketing research, IT, pharmaceutical knowledge-intensive 
industries. Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with fifty-one top managers, HR 
and line managers from the sample, and nine HRM and reward management specialists 
from world leading and local HRM consultancy firms.  
 
This multi-case study research method offers several methodological advantages. 
Specifically, many other studies relied on only one, or a very limited number of cases, 
which makes generalisations difficult. This study covered one pilot and two periods of 
fieldwork that lasted over two years, which provided long term opportunities for the 
researcher to observe managerial experience of PFP design and implementation. 
Interviewing line managers is also not a typical characteristic of many other previous 
studies on rewards. Yet, interviews were essential to accomplish the overall aim of a 
better understanding of how management make decisions about introducing certain PFP 
plans, and how they make sense of performance measurement and delivery. 
 
Along with these advantages, it should also be acknowledged that the data set has some 
significant limitations. For instance, this research is not a randomised experimental 
design with control groups, the interviewees especially the line managers, were selected 
by the HR or top management of the companies concerned. Most of the sample firms 
have their unit offices outside Shanghai. However, due to the time and access 
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restrictions unit level data of the sample were not collected to examine if there were 
other variables that could have been of interest to the researcher. 
 
1.5 Importance of the study 
First, many academics and practitioners believe that the design and implementation of 
effective incentive reward systems and performance management are important tools 
through which to motivate the workforce and execute strategy (Huberman and Miles, 
2002). The need for greater understanding of the processes through which management 
and workforce create value to their reward management systems, such as PFP, has never 
been more acute in both the West and Asia. This thesis fills a research gap and provides 
an important contribution to the literature on the design and implementation of reward 
systems and performance management by exploring the nature of PFP in China’s non-
public sector knowledge-intensive firms. 
 
Second, the study shed lights on the applicability of Western reward management 
theories and techniques to China, especially with relation to PFP practices. This study 
demonstrates that institutional theory could better explain the situation regarding PFP in 
China than the resource based view within a contingent model. The findings also enrich 
our understanding of the debates concerning possible convergence or continuation of 
differences in HRM. In particular, PFP as a Western management tool has been widely 
acknowledged and applied to the knowledge-intensive companies. However, the 
practices may differ from those in the West. For instance, in some cases, like POEs and 
JVs, the adoption is highly focused on policy rather than real practice, such as the 
development of a performance orientated culture. Therefore, the study might support a 
combined convergence – continued – divergence approach (Rowley and Benson, 2002). 
 
Third, the research offers an opportunity for top managers, HRM and line managers of 
multinational and domestic firms in knowledge-intensive industries to develop their 
knowledge and practice of PFP. Moreover, the findings and implications are useful for 
policy makers to refine their strategy of PFP in order to promote the right behaviours 
and better target top performers, especially at a time of economic downturn. 
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1.6 Thesis organisation 
The thesis is organised into ten chapters (see Figure 1.1). Chapter 1 outlines the aims 
and objectives, rationale, significance and structure of the thesis. The author’s reasons 
and motivations for choosing the topic and conducting the study are also illustrated.  
Following this introduction, Chapters 2 to 4 comprise a review of the literature, on 
which the foundation for the study is formed. Chapter 2 provides background to China’s 
economic development, introduces historical overview and definition of the industrial 
setting for the thesis – China’s non-public sector knowledge-intensive industries. The 
statistical background to Shanghai, where the fieldwork was conducted, is also 
presented. Chapter 3 looks at both theoretical and empirical literature on three relevant 
bodies: HRM, reward management and pay for performance. Overviews of HRM in 
general, in Asia as a whole and in China specifically are presented as a background for 
the study. The chapter also critically reviews the two major theoretical concerns in the 
thesis: the convergence/divergence debate in international HRM and reward 
management models – the universal and contingent perspectives. Moreover, the 
historical development of rewards in China and the challenge of reward management in 
the knowledge economy are discussed. Most importantly, the current state of the 
existing research on PFP is critically discussed, which directly leads to the development 
of research focus and questions in Chapter 4. The definition of PFP for the thesis is 
demonstrated in Chapter 4, within which research gaps, objectives and research 
questions are also developed. Furthermore, theories and frameworks in relation to each 
research question are examined.   
 
Chapter 5 discusses the research strategies, methods and research process adopted in the 
thesis. The chapter identifies reasons for applying a qualitative multiple case study 
method to the research, and ways to limit some disadvantages of this approach. This 
chapter also demonstrates sampling criteria, data collection methods and coding in data 
analysis. The profiles of case firms and interviewees are listed, and the research process 
is illustrated.  
 
Chapter 6 to 9 have the empirical findings of each of the research questions. Chapter 6 
presents findings for research question 1 - the importance of PFP in the current pay 
system. In order to effectively compare and contrast PFP plans with and across the cases, 
employees are categorised into four critical employee groups, namely, top management, 
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sales and marketing, professionals and junior staff. The proportion of PFP as a 
component in employee pay mix, and the extent to which pay ranges and pay 
progression depends on performance is analysed within the pay structures. Chapter 7 
presents empirical findings for research question 2 - PFP plans and design. Different 
PFP plans for the four critical employee groups are examined. The contextual factors in 
terms of organisational environment, organisation characteristics and pay strategies that 
influence PFP plans design by management are explored.  
 
Chapter 8 presents empirical findings for research question 3 – implementation and 
functions of PA. Elements, instruments and processes of PA in the non-public sector 
knowledge-intensive industries are analysed, and the functions of PA served in PFP 
programmes, are measured. Chapter 9 presents empirical findings for research question 
4 – line managers’ involvement in PFP. Line managers’ perceptions, commitment and 
understanding of their role in PFP are analysed, and the supports that line manager have 
and the difficulties they face in designing and implementing PFP are also demonstrated. 
Finally, Chapter 10 contains a discussion and conclusion of the thesis. The empirical 
part of the study is linked with Western reward management and HRM theories and 
practices. Empirical and theoretical contributions as well as managerial implications are 
provided. Furthermore, the limitations of this thesis are examined and several areas for 
further research are suggested. This concluding chapter has two main dimensions: one is 
empirical and concerns the implications for organisations concerning the management 
of PFP. The second dimension is theoretical and concerns the applicability of the 
Western reward management and HRM theories to the practice of PFP in the context of 
China, and the extent to which the research expanded our understanding of those 
theories and academic knowledge.  
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Figure 1.1 Structure of the thesis 
 
 
Source: Developed for the thesis. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the background knowledge to this research which enables us to 
have a better understanding of the topic. This thesis studies PFP design and 
implementation in China’s non-public knowledge-intensive industries. It is, therefore, 
important to review the changes in China’s economic development, industrial 
ownership restructuring and general information about knowledge-intensive industries 
that are included in the thesis.   
 
The year 1978 appears to be a great divide in Chinese economic history. Since 
launching economic reforms and the policy of opening up to the outside world at the 
end of 1978, China has made profound changes to its economic and social development. 
There have been dramatic changes in two areas. One is the most remarkable change in 
the economic system. China has successfully moved away from the command economy 
and adopted a functioning market economy. Nevertheless, even today, the process of 
market transition in China is far from complete.  The other change has been in the 
ownership structure of industrial enterprises. China has transformed its industrial 
ownership from highly state-owned to a diversified structure, which includes public and 
non-public.  
 
In spite of rapid economic growth, China is still a developing country with a vast land-
area, a large population and a relatively weak industrial structure. Currently with the 
development of the knowledge economy, multiple and complex changes are taking 
place in China’s economic and social structure. Traditional agriculture is modernising, 
traditional industry is modernising, industrial society is changing to a knowledge 
economy society, extensive economic growth pattern is becoming intensive, and the 
dominant industry of the whole society is being transformed from resources- and 
energy-consumption-based to knowledge- and intellectual-based. Thus, the knowledge 
economy has provided China with many opportunities and challenges for promoting 
knowledge-intensive industries such as computer software, telecommunications, 
investment finance, and other professional industries.   
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This chapter begins by briefly reviewing the features of the traditional command 
economy in China and the economic reforms since 1978. The chapter then examines the 
impact of economic reforms on the two major areas: the development of the Chinese 
economy, and changes of ownership structure. Further, as the thesis is based on case 
studies of knowledge-intensive firms, the development of the knowledge economy in 
China, the definition of knowledge-intensive organisations, and the specific knowledge-
intensive industries covered in the research are discussed. Finally, background statistics 
on Shanghai where the sample and research fieldwork were based are also provided.   
 
2.2 Development of the Chinese economy  
The Chinese economy has experienced its traditional system, and a reformed system as 
well as further improvement after China’s accession to the WTO. These changes caused 
the sustainable development of the present Chinese economy.  
 
2.2.1 Traditional Chinese economic system 
After the PRC was founded in 1949, the Maoist Chinese model was developed and 
maintained until the commencement of economic reforms at the end of 1978. China’s 
new leaders turned their backs on China’s traditional household-based economy after 
1949, and set out to develop a massive socialist industrial complex through direct 
government control. Planners neglected labour-intensive sectors suitable to China’s vast 
population, and instead poured resources into capital-intensive factories producing 
metals, machinery, and chemicals. The early achievements of coastal enclave 
industrialisation orientated to the Pacific were discarded, and a new inward-directed 
strategy was adopted. China turned to the Soviet Union as its primary model, as well as 
its chief trading partner and source of technology (Naughton, 2007). However, China’s 
scarce capital and poorly developed economy could not support extremely capital-
intensive heavy industries. To reduce the conflict between a capital-intensive heavy 
industry and a capital-scarce economy, a command economic system was established.  
 
The command economy in China had two prominent features: central planning and 
public ownership (Pu, 1990, Riskin, 1987). Central planning involved the central 
government setting priorities and carrying them out administratively by distributing 
materials and finance to enterprises and ordering output from them. Public ownership, 
including state ownership of the means of production mainly via state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and collective-owned enterprises (COEs), reflected the control of 
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state institutions over enterprise. Public ownership of the means of production was 
regarded as one of the most important characteristics of socialism in China and was 
referred to as the material foundation of the superiority of socialism. According to 
Maoist ideology, public ownership was always superior to other types of ownership. As 
Child (1994) p.121 explains, ‘The Chinese concept of ownership (suoyouzhi) is 
appreciably more ambiguous and is a political and ideological consideration rather than 
an economic and legal one. The term suoyouzhi….implies an overall system of 
governance based on the ideological principles of socialism; such that all the means of 
production are ultimately a public asset and that the state acts as the custodian of this 
public ownership.’  
 
For 30 years, China pursued this vision of socialism. However, there were a number of 
adverse factors associated with the socialist development strategy (Riskin, 1987). First, 
the single-minded pursuit of industrial development meant that consumption was 
neglected. A second major shortcoming was that employment creation was relatively 
slow. Because most industry was capital-intensive and services were neglected, new 
labour requirements were modest. Third, much of the industrial investment was not only 
capital-intensive, but also relatively demanding technologically. Plants were often large, 
complex, multi-stage commitments that took years, even decades, to construct and put 
into operation. Those shortcomings caused a huge gap in the economic development 
between China and its newly industrialised neighbours (Lin et al., 1996, White, 1993, 
Naughton, 2007). 
 
2.2.2 Economic reforms since 1978 
By the end of 1978, the Maoist development strategy had been critically reviewed. 
China’s market transition began with a wide-ranging reassessment of nearly every 
aspect of the command economy. The economic reforms started with changes in micro-
management by offering the enterprise a profit incentive to improve its performance. 
Under the planned economy, the state centralised all earnings and expenditures of SOEs, 
profits were channelled to the central government, and losses were covered by the state. 
In order to improve the incentive mechanism, different types of profit sharing systems 
were experimented with from late 1978 to loosen the government’s control over the 
economy and build a market regulatory mechanism (Chai and Docwra, 1997). Moreover, 
since 1994, the objective of reforms at the micro-management level was no longer only 
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to provide incentives for improving efficiency but also to increase the market 
competitiveness of enterprises. 
 
Under central planning, market forces were totally ignored in the allocation and 
acquisition of material, capital and human resources and the distribution of output. The 
reform of the resource-allocation system in 1984 focused on the marketisation of the 
Chinese economy with the intention of reducing direct planning control over the 
economy. However, reforms in the micro-management institution and resource-
allocation system could not be sustained without reform in the macro-policy 
environment, which in a broad sense referred to price reform. Reform affected prices in 
five major areas:  the price of production inputs (raw materials, intermediate input, and 
energy), products (final products and services), capital (the interest rate), foreign 
currency (the exchange rate), and labour (wages) (Lin et al., 1996). Under the command 
economy, most prices were determined by the state and failed to reflect the value of 
social input, or market supply and demand, thus hindering the establishment of an 
efficiently functioning economic system. Profits, for example, were neither a good 
indicator of enterprise performance nor a reliable base for government taxation under 
the old system (Wong, 1993). Thus, price reform was regarded as ‘the key to the reform 
of the entire economic structure’ by the CPC in 1984, because ‘the existing 
administratively set prices were like a “funny mirror” that distorted reality and sent 
economic decision-maker perverse signals’ (Shirk, 1993) p45. As prices became 
decentralised, the market increasingly influenced production and management policies 
in enterprises, and ‘striving for economic efficiency became an integral part of an 
enterprise’s action’ (Lin et al., 1996). 
 
2.2.3 Emerging economy with rapid growth 
After the economic reforms, China has transformed its economic system from a highly 
centralised, planned economy to a market economy. Though people hold different views 
on whether or not China has set up a complete market economic system, the 
transformation has been profound and irreversible (see Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1). 
Moreover, it has been necessary to speed up the reform process, especially since 
China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in December 2001. 
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Figure 2.1 China’s economic growth after 1978 reform (GDP: billion RMB) 
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China. www.stats.gov.cn (Last cited in Feb. 2008) 
 
Table 2.1 GDP growth of major economies 
Major Economies 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
China 8.0% 7.5% 8.3% 9.1% 9.0% 7.5% 8.1% 8.0%
Asia (excluding Japan) 6.7% 4.6% 6.3% 7.0% 7.8% 7.4% 7.2% 7.0%
Japan 2.8% 0.4% -0.3% 2.5% 4.4% 2.3% 1.1% 1.0%
UK 3.9% 2.3% 1.8% 2.2% 3.4% 2.5% 2.8% 2.5%
USA 3.7% 0.8% 1.9% 3.0% 4.3% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5%
Source: International Monetary Fund (2008).  
 
Figure 2.1 shows China’s economic growth over the past 28 years, indicating that 
China’s average annual growth rate in GDP from 1978 to 2006 was 9.6 per cent with 
the highest in 1994 at 14 per cent and the lowest in 1999 at 7.6 per cent. In over half of 
the years, the growth rate was above 10 per cent, which is much higher than the world 
average of 3 to 4 per cent during the same period. Table 2.1 shows a comparison of 
GDP growth between China and other major economies in Asia and the rest of the 
world. Obviously, China has kept its GDP growth at an average of 8 per cent since 2000, 
which is a higher ratio than the rest of Asia and much higher than the UK and USA.  
 
2.3 Development of China’s non-public sector  
The economic reforms from 1978 developed the Chinese economy, and also caused the 
change in industrial restructuring. Public ownership, the main feature of the traditional 
economy model, was reformed into multiple ownerships, and almost half of the 
corporations were in non-public ownership by 2001 (see Table 2.3).  
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2.3.1 Traditional Chinese industrial structure  
As the result of socialist transformation and consolidation of socialist ownership after 
the PRC was established in 1949, China’s economy was basically dominated by two 
forms of socialist ownership on the eve of reform: state ownership by the whole people 
as in all SOEs, and collective ownership by the working people, as in many small and 
medium-sized enterprises. In 1978 before the economic reform, the state and collective 
sectors represented 98-99 per cent of the gross social product, gross national product, 
and national income of China, while the individual and private sectors were a mere 1-2 
per cent (Talas, 1991). 
 
2.3.2 Ownership reforms and the non-public sector 
Under the monopoly of state ownership, many problems occurred, such as low 
efficiency and overstaffing of enterprises, short supplies of daily necessities and slow 
commodity circulation (Wu, 1996). It was not until the mid-1980s that the key to the 
success of China’s economic reform was a deep and radical reform of the ownership 
system (Talas, 1991). The monopoly status of the state sector was undermined by 
allowing collective and private enterprises to flourish, and by allowing foreign 
investment to support enterprises in many industries, especially manufacturing and 
tertiary industries. These different forms of ownership were granted legal status in 1988 
and were supported by government policies such as low tax rates, the retention of all 
profits, and no restrictions on employee salaries. As many of these enterprises had a 
competitive advantage over state enterprises in that they could meet market demand, 
they soon flourished. Thus, Tung (1991) identified four major types of industrial 
enterprises in China consisting of SOEs and COEs, which are public sector, and POEs 
and foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) including JVs and foreign owned MNCs, which 
are non-public sector. The number of corporations by ownership form has changed 
immensely during the reforms, as indicated in Table 2.2. By 2001, non-public 
enterprises accounted for almost half (48.3%) of the total corporations and one third 
(29.2%) of the total employment in China.  
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Table 2.2 Numbers of corporations and employment in China 
 Corporation 
(10,000) 
1996 
% Corporation
(10,000) 
2001 
% Employees
(10,000) 
2001 
% 
Total 
SOEs 
COEs 
POEs 
FIEs 
Others 
(including share 
companies) 
262.8
44.2
150.1
44.3
11.1
13.1
100
16.8
57.1
16.9
4.2
5.0
302.6
36.9
85.8
132.3
13.9
33.7
100 
12.2 
28.3 
43.7 
4.6 
11.2 
16,502.2
5,056.8
3,763.1
3,170.3
1,641.4
2,870.6
100
30.6
22.8
19.2
10.0
17.4
Source: Adapted from data in China Statistical Yearbooks (2007) 
www.stats.gov.cn (Cited in Feb. 2008). 
 
2.3.3 Current situation of the non-public sector 
After the communist party took power in China in 1949, POEs did not survive beyond 
1956 due to the hastily and forcefully implemented socialist transformation. Two major 
driving forces behind the transformation were the adoption of the heavy-industry-
oriented development strategy and Mao’s radical ideology. The transformation of 
ownership from private to public enabled the state to collect every piece of resources to 
form a huge accumulation of capital so as to concentrate on the development of heavy 
and military industries (Zhu, 2005). By the end of 1956, 99 per cent of 88,000 
nationwide had been transferred to the public sector (People’s Daily, Overseas Edition, 
9 April 1999).  
 
After the economic reforms, the private economy in the urban area was initially 
accepted only in the form of individual industrial commercial households in 1979. 
Figure 2.2 explains the development of Chinese POEs. The resurrection of individual 
business happened during 1978 and 1987, which provided job opportunities for young 
people returning to the urban area from the countryside as a result of Cultural 
Revolution. In 1988 the state promulgated ‘Provisional Regulations on Private 
Enterprises in People’s Republic of China’ and related administrative regulations. These 
regulations applied to private enterprises employing more than eight people, specified a 
‘ceiling’ on the monthly salary for POEs’ owners and managers, and addressed issues of 
employment and working conditions within POEs. The state also launched tax 
inspection and collection to tighten its control over POEs (Young, 1995). The recovery 
of private business occurred after early 1992, when the state clarified the position and 
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importance of private business. The number of POEs increased nearly six-fold between 
1992 and 1997 (Beijing Review, 1 March 1999).  
 
FIEs, especially JVs, were created after China actively participated in the world 
economy. The growth of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China over the past decade 
has been dramatic (Cooke, 2004a, Zhu and Warner, 2004, Farley et al., 2004). UNTCA 
(2004) reported that in 2003 China’s inward FDI of US$53.5 billion topped figures for 
both France (US$47 billion) and the US (US$29.8 billion), the second and third largest 
recipients of FDI during the same period. In 2002, China’s total merchandise trade 
(export plus imports) stood at US$620.7 billion and ranked fourth in the world, if the 
European Union (EU) was treated as a single entity. In 2004, China’s total merchandise 
trade shot up to US$1 trillion, making it the third largest trader in the world, after only 
the EU and the US. It was also estimated that FIEs in 2000 accounted for more than a 
third of China’s total industrial growth (Tsui and Lau, 2000, Tung and Worm, 2001). 
FIEs from the US, Europe and Japan sought to enter the Chinese market through the 
establishment of equity JVs with local Chinese partners (Bjorkman and Lu, 2001, 
Cooke, 2005, Leung and Kwong, 2003). With China’s further opening up to the world, 
FIEs started establishing their wholly owned operations – MNCs. By the late 1990s, the 
number of MNCs exceeded the number of JVs.   
 
Figure 2.2 Birth of the modern Chinese POEs 
 
Source:  Bucknall & Ohtaki (2005) 
 
2.4 Knowledge-intensive industries 
This section reviews the industrial setting for the thesis – knowledge-intensive 
industries.  The development of the knowledge economy, the definition of knowledge-
intensive firms and its situation in China are discussed.  
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2.4.1 The knowledge economy 
The knowledge economy has entered our economic life, driven by commercialisation of 
knowledge, skill and information, and has come to dominate the world economy taking 
the place of the material economy. The authoritative explanation of the knowledge 
economy is proposed in the report on The Knowledge Based Economy issued by OECD 
in 1996 (Kim and Maugborgne, 1997), which says it is an economy based on the 
production, distribution and application of knowledge and information. Its major 
economic features are as follows: first is commercialisation of knowledge, skills and 
information; second, intellectual property rights system; third, price mechanism of 
knowledge; fourth, wide application of information technology; and last, the industrial 
structure with human capital as the centre. The typical phenomenon of the knowledge 
economy is the wide application of information technology, the foundation for 
development of the knowledge economy is talent, and the core of the knowledge 
economy is innovation.  
 
In the knowledge economy, the success of corporations relies more on knowledge 
possessed by corporations. With the intensity of competition in the market, the 
increasingly uncertain aspects in the environment and the growing turnover of 
employees, corporations will need to provide value-added service for more diversified 
customers, which requires them to have stronger capabilities in communication, 
knowledge acquisition, knowledge creation and knowledge transmission. Therefore, in 
the knowledge economy, the success of corporations from the management perspective 
relies more on managing and developing knowledge workers and talents. 
 
2.4.2 The knowledge economy and China 
The development of a knowledge-based economy is a challenge that aspires to elevate 
China to a new stage of social evolution. Hui Yongzheng (2006), vice Minister of the 
Ministry of Science and Technology of China, in a policy statement noted that 
“Implementing a strategy of ‘revitalising the nation through science and technology’ 
will help China reinforce its economic power, and we should focus more on promoting 
industries related to the knowledge-based economy, such as computer software, 
telecommunications, environmental protection, finance, computer-aided services, 
technological consulting, education and professional training industries”.  
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The trend of the knowledge economy has brought many changes in Chinese society in 
recent years. During the past decade, China has placed more importance on reforming 
and modernizing its information and communication technology (ICT) sector than any 
other developing country. At the first session of the 10th National People’s Congress in 
2003, the Chinese leadership was strongly committed to making ICT one of the most 
important national goals – from transforming Chinese society at home to pursuing its 
ambitions as a world economic and political power (National-People's-Congress, 2003). 
The current leadership under President Hu Jin-tao and Premier Wen Jiabao continues to 
devote massive material and political resources to what is called ‘informatisation’ as a 
key strategic element for advancing the final goals (Zhao, 2008). Within the next couple 
of years, several important policy decisions should be made under the Chinese 
leadership that will shape domestic and possibly global ICT performance and will affect 
a variety of other key matters such as economic efficiency, growth rates, international 
competitiveness, and patterns of political participation for many years. Some examples 
of data can demonstrate the size and direction of changes in Chinese ICT sectors. For 
instance, China’s Ministry of Information Industries (MII) predicts that the ICT industry 
will continue to grow about 20 percent annually, or around three times the growth rate 
of GDP. The China Centre for Information Development (CCIID) estimates that 
China’s PC industry will grow 11.5 percent in market sales annually from 2004 to 2010. 
CCIID estimates that China’s PC industry will reach a value of US$ 1450 billion by 
2010 (China-Electronic-News, 2007). Therefore, human capital development has been 
given much more attention than ever by researchers and practitioners.  
 
2.4.3 Definition of knowledge-intensive organisations 
It is difficult to find a precise definition for knowledge-intensive organizations even 
though there is a lot of literature on the subject. However, knowledge-intensive 
organizations can be recognized from the following characteristics: (1) Their most 
valuable asset is intellectual capital – physical assets, such as machinery are of 
secondary importance (Edvinsson and Malone 1997, p. 10). (2) Gathering and applying 
new information and knowledge is essential for the success of the organization 
(Sydänmaanlakka 2000, p. 25 and p. 255). (3) They are flexible, adaptive, and they have 
low organizational hierarchies (Edvinsson and Malone 1997, p. 9). (4) They produce 
mass customized products and services using close relations with their customers, 
suppliers and strategic partners (Edvinsson and Malone 1997, p. 9).  
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Sydänmaanlakka (2000, pp. 24-25) has also presented other characteristics related to 
knowledge-intensive organizations. First, their business environment changes very 
rapidly, which forces them to change their strategies accordingly. In addition, the role of 
employees has changed from simple and controlled work to complicated knowledge 
work in which the employee has a lot of authority. Finally, the organizational structures 
are based on processes or projects, and the structures can be changed flexibly to best 
serve the business objectives. 
 
2.4.4 Knowledge-intensive industries in China 
Samples for the thesis were selected from knowledge-intensive industries because 
knowledge-intensive firms require a large human capital investment in sales, research 
and development. Employees even from lower levels are required to be qualified and 
skilful because of the nature of their work. Overall, PFP could be extremely typical and 
important for those companies.  
 
The investment, IT and pharmaceutical sectors were chosen for the thesis. A report in 
2007 by China Salary Survey stated that the present top ten industries in China were 
Banking, IT, High-tech, Real estate, FMCG, Pharmaceutical, Education & Consultancy, 
Chemistry, Manufacturing and Logistics (China-Salary-Survey-Database, 2007). Table 
2.4 shows the average annual salary and average annual salary increase rate of the top 
ten industries in China in 2007. It is clear that investment, IT and pharmaceuticals are 
among the present top ten industries in China. Although the average annual salary level 
of IT and pharmaceutical were respectively number 7 and 4 in the list, their average 
annual salary increase rates were obviously higher than most of the other top ten 
industries with IT at 9.2 percent and pharmaceutical at 8.5 percent.   
Table 2.4 Average salary and increase rate of top ten industries in China                            
 
Industry Average annual salary 
(RMB) 
Annual salary increase rate  
% 
Banking/investment 46520 10.6
IT 39512 9.2
Hi-tech 40052 9.3
Real estate 38562 7.0
FMCG 42500 9.2
Pharmaceutical  40283 8.5
Education 39520 7.4
Chemistry 42736 7.3
Manufacturing 39862 7.2
Logistics 37650 7.1
Source: www.xinchou114.com (China rewards survey website, cited in July 2008) 
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2.5 Background statistics on Shanghai  
This section introduces some important information on the economic development, 
industrial enterprises and local labour market of the research site – Shanghai, where the 
sample firms and research fieldworks were based.  
 
2.5.1 Economic development  
Shanghai, the industrial, financial, and commercial center, represents 1 per cent of 
China’s population, 5 per cent of China’s GDP, 10 per cent of China’s contracted FDI 
and 13 per cent of China’s imports (U.S. Commercial Service, 2007). Shanghai also 
hosts a concentration of manufacturing activity in such key industries as automotive, 
electronics, telecommunications, machinery, textiles, iron and steel, and petrochemicals. 
In 2010 Shanghai will host the World Expo, and plans to invest billions of dollars in 
new urban infrastructure to prepare for this momentous event. Shanghai Mayor Han 
Zheng aims for Shanghai to become the high-technology center of China in the coming 
five years. 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the difference of GDP growth between Shanghai and China. It is 
obvious that the GDP growth in Shanghai has been much higher than China as a whole 
since 1990.  
 
Figure 2.3 Comparison of GDP growth between Shanghai and China 
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Source: State Statistical Bureau (2008) and Shanghai Statistical Bureau (2008). 
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2.5.2 Shanghai industrial enterprises 
As shown in Table 2.5, non-public enterprises in Shanghai consist of POEs (38.7%) and 
FIEs (JV 1.4% plus MNCs 38.3%), which are 68.4 per cent of the total enterprise units 
and 77.4 per cent of the whole employment.  
 
Table 2.5 Industrial enterprises in Shanghai 
Ownerships Enterprise 
units 
% Employees 
10,000 
% 
Total 14,404   269.65
State-owned (SOEs)   407 2.8   14.17 5.3
Collective-owned (COEs)   911 6.3   8.62 3.2
Joint Owned (JVs)   198 1.4   3.16 1.2
Private (POEs)  5 ,579 38.7   56.70 21
Hong Kong Macao and Taiwan Funded 
(MNCs) 
 1 ,782
12.4 
  41.02
15.2
Foreign funded (MNCs)  3 ,765 26.1   107.76 40
Others 1,762 12.2 38.22 14.2
Source: Shanghai statistical year book (2008). 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the historical, economic and social background to the study, which 
consists of the economic reforms and its impact on Chinese economy and industrial 
ownership structure, the definitions and current situation of non-public sector and 
knowledge-intensive organisations in the context of China, as well as the knowledge-
intensive industries involved in the thesis. The chapter demonstrates that since the 
economic reforms in 1978, China has commanded the fastest growing country and the 
second largest world economy in terms of purchasing power parity. China’s accession 
to the WTO in 2001 further opened up the industry because of the relaxation of market 
entry rules, surge of foreign direct investment, liberalisation of RMB and frequent 
cross-border transactions. The ownership structure in China after the economic reforms 
was changed from the state monopolies to diversification. SOEs, COEs, POEs and FIEs 
were identified as the four major ownerships by Ting (1991). POEs and FIEs (including 
JVs and MNCs) are the non-public sector which is studied in this thesis.  
 
The development of a knowledge-based economy is a challenge that aspires to elevate 
China to a new stage of social evolution. The chosen case firms from 
investment/marketing research, IT and pharmaceuticals in the thesis are knowledge-
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intensive industries which are currently among the top ten industries of high growth and 
salary in China. Therefore, the examination of PFP in these industries could be a 
predictor for knowledge workers elsewhere. Furthermore, the background statistics on 
Shanghai showed that it was a financial centre with higher GDP increase than China 
overall and over 60 per cent of POEs and FIEs of its total enterprise units.  
 
The next chapter will review the bodies of literature relevant to the research, which are 
HRM, reward management and PFP.   
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CHAPTER THREE  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Broadly defined, this thesis explores the current situation of pay systems, particularly PFP 
in the context of China. This chapter looks at both theoretical and empirical literature on 
three relevant bodies: HRM, reward management and PFP.  
 
This chapter consists of three parts. First, the overview of HRM in general, in Asia and its 
development in China is presented, which provides a broad background for the study. 
Moreover, the convergence/divergence debate in HRM is considered. Reasons for 
convergence and determinants for divergence of HRM practices in the context of China are 
discussed. Second, the reward management practice in China and theoretical models of 
reward management are illustrated. The reward system in China has experienced dramatic 
changes since the economic reform in 1978, when pay began to be linked to performance. 
More recently, China’s accession to the WTO membership and knowledge economy have 
brought new challenges to reward management in China’s knowledge-intensive industries. 
In order to study the current pay practices in the context of China, another theoretical 
perspective - the classical contingent theory in reward management - must be considered. 
Particularly, resource-based view and institutional theory approaches in contingent theory 
which are taken as the two theoretical lenses in the thesis are evaluated. Third, PFP is 
defined and the existing literature on PFP in general, in Asia and in China is examined, 
which supports the further discussion of research gaps and research questions in Chapter 4.  
 
3.2 HRM: An overview  
This section briefly describes the development of HRM as a concept in the West, the 
changes and transformation of HRM in Asia, and the evolution of people management in 
China since the 1950s.  
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3.2.1 HRM in general: A combination of West and East conceptualisations 
The concept of HRM was developed initially in the US in the 1960s and 1970s, and it 
experienced a process of evolution from a more traditional model to a more concurrent one 
(Brewster, 1995). Fombrun, Tichy & Devanna (1984) identified that the initial development 
of the HRM concept was based on the ‘resource’ aspect of HRM and that effective 
utilisation of human resources could lead to the realisation of business strategy and 
organisational objectives. The ‘Matching Model’ links different personnel functions to an 
organisation’s strategy and structure (Galbraith and Nathanson, 1978) and it emphasizes a 
‘tight fit’ between organisational strategy, organisational structure and the HRM system.  
 
Another analytical framework was developed, namely the ‘Harvard Model’, to complement 
the ‘hard’ oriented ‘Matching Model’ (Budhwar and Debrah, 2001). The earlier stage of 
HRM development as a concept, such as the ‘Matching Model’ and the ‘Harvard Model’, 
has had a profound influence on the formation of the later ‘Contextual Model’ and the ‘5-P 
Model’. The ‘Contextual Model’ was based on the ‘Harvard Model’ by developing an 
understanding of strategy-making in complex organisations and then relating this to the 
ability to transform HRM practices (Budhwar and Debrah, 2001). Schuler (1992) 
developed the so-called ‘5-P Model’ of SHRM (philosophies, policies, programmes, 
practices and processes), which brings interrelated activities together in achieving the 
organisation’s strategic needs. In contrast to these mainstream HRM approaches, a 
European-based model was developed in order to seemingly better reflect the reality of 
European organisations and their surrounding environments with more restricted 
organisational and management autonomy (Brewster, 1995). The ‘European Model’ 
highlights the influence of national cultures, ownership structures, the roles of the State and 
trade unions on HRM in different national settings within the context of increasing EU 
integration and the adoption of common EU labour legislation. 
 
Although the concept of HRM was developed in the West, the formation of this concept 
was influenced by the increasing competition of manufacturing production predominately 
in East Asia, including Japan and the so-called ‘Four Asia Tigers’, namely Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. By adopting new management initiatives, such as 
HRM, it was thought the US firms might develop certain competitive advantages in order 
to help survive better in the face of global competition (Porter, 1990). In fact, some of the 
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aspects within the HRM paradigm were based on Japanese management practices that had a 
profound influence not only in Japan, but also in the whole of East Asia in the 1960s and 
1970s. The elements of cohesiveness and collectiveness, such as harmony, information 
sharing, loyalty, on-job-training, teamwork, etc., were key dimensions of the ‘new’ HRM 
paradigm, but had existed in East Asian organisations for a long time. By combining the 
dominant American-oriented, in other words the individualistic elements of management 
practices, with East Asian (particularly Japanese) management practices, the ‘new’ HRM 
paradigm was expected to improve the competitiveness of organisations and the well-being 
of both individuals and organisations (Schuler and Jackson, 1987). Therefore, the 
conceptual formation of HRM was not a purely ‘Western’ notion, but a combination of 
both ‘East’ and ‘West’ conceptualisations. 
 
3.2.2 HRM in Asia: Changes and continuities 
HRM in Asia has experienced dramatic development since the 1990s. Rowley (1997) 
considered how tremendous and massive economic, social and political change in Asia 
affected the style and approach of HRM, and how HR were dealt with in Asian countries. 
There have been continuous tumultuous changes in the operating context of HRM and its 
HR practices and policies after the Asian financial crisis in 1997 (Rowley, 2003, Rowley 
and Benson, 2002, Rowley and Benson, 2004, Rowley and Warner, 2007).  
 
Rowley et al., (2007) further show that the conceptual formation of HRM in Asia is a mix 
of ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ conceptualisations. Zhu, Warner and Rowley (2007) note that 
the development of HRM in Asia has been not only highly influenced by  foreign 
economies such as US and the Europe, but also has its distinctive Asian characteristics, 
such as influence by the state, overall social and economic development as well as national 
history. Some of the US-oriented individualistic HRM dimensions have been gradually 
adopted among East Asian economies. Key aspects, such as individual contracts, fixed-term 
contracts, and downsizing and retrenchment, freedom to hire and fire, the strategic role of 
HRM and so on have become increasingly important in the East Asian people-management 
system. In addition, the European influences of social partnership, institutional building and 
legalistic environment play a positive role on the society transformation towards the ‘rule 
of law’ and institutionalisation. However, it is more of a triangular-influence on HRM, 
between East Asia, the US and Europe. Although the US is the dominant power in both 
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‘hard’ and ‘soft’ approaches towards HRM with the emphasis on individualist and unitary 
approaches, both East Asia and Europe have some influence on each other as well as on the 
US with their unique characteristics.  For instance, the East Asian model emphasises a 
collective approach, harmony and relational based business operation. The European model 
then pays attention to pluralistic labour-management relations and legalistic environment.  
 
3.2.3 HRM in China: Transformation with Chinese characteristics 
This section reviews the development of people management in China before and after the 
economic reforms in 1978, as well as the new challenges after China’s accession to the 
WTO membership in 2001.  
 
3.2.3.1 HRM before the economic reform in 1978 
Before the economic reform and open door policy in 1978, under the highly centralised 
economy, people-management in China was characterised by the ‘three-irons’ policy 
consisting of the ‘Iron Armchair’ (‘tie jiaoyi’), ‘Iron rice-bowl’ (‘tie fanwan’) and ‘Iron 
Wages’ (‘tie gongzi’) (Zhao, 2005, Ding et al., 2001). The ‘Iron Armchair’ refers to the 
management of executives and technicians under a permanent job system. Once a person 
was recruited, he or she would be entitled to hold the position for his or her life. The ‘Iron 
Rice-bowl’ refers to the system of employment that created boundaries between ‘cadres’ 
and ‘workers’. A lifelong guarantee of a cadre’s position, and the policy that cadres could 
be promoted but never demoted, led to a surplus of unproductive personnel. The ‘Iron 
Wages’ describes the pay distribution system. In the highly centralised planned economic 
system, the state played an authoritative role in the reward systems of enterprises, and 
evenly distributed pay had little to do with profits and individual performance. Table 3.1 
sets out the characteristics of personnel management and the process of the ‘Three Irons’ 
system being strengthened in China before the economic reforms.  
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Table 3.1 Characteristics of personnel management in China before 1978 
Year Stage of personnel 
management 
Characteristics 
1949-1952 Preliminary Stage Fixed employment; state monopoly of 
recruitment and labour allocation. 
1952-1957 Beginning Stage Soviet management model with authoritarian 
leadership; piece rate wages; merit-oriented 
payment.  
1957-1966 Development Stage Chief leader responsibility system; 
committees with employee delegation; 
democratic management with employee 
participation. 
1966-1967 Stagnation Stage “Three Irons” policy strengthened.  
Source: Adopted from Zhao (1998) . 
 
3.2.3.2 HRM after the economic reform in 1978 
The transformation of people-management systems towards HRM started in the middle of 
the 1980s (Child, 1994, Warner, 1995, Warner, 1999, Warner, 2003a, Warner, 2004). 
Initially, HRM as an academic concept was introduced by joint teaching arrangements 
between Chinese and foreign universities, as well as in management practice in overseas-
funded firms, mainly from Japan, the US and Europe (Warner, 1992). The translation of 
HRM into Chinese is ‘renli ziyuan guanli’ (with the same Chinese characters as in Japanese) 
which means ‘labour force resource management’. But in fact, some people now use it 
misleadingly as a synonym for ‘personnel management’ (‘renshi guanli’) and treat it as 
such (Warner, 1993, Warner, 1995, Warner, 1996, Warner, 1999). This form is still very 
common in SOEs, and probably is still far from the initial concept of HRM as understood 
in the international academic and managerial community (Poole, 1997, Zhu, 2005). Table 
3.2 shows the stages and characteristics for each time period that personnel management in 
China has changed. Moreover, Zhao (1998) also noted that after 1994 when the market 
economic system was officially adopted personnel management in China started gradually 
transforming to HRM.   
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Table 3.2 Changes of personnel management in China after 1978 
Time and 
period 
Stage Characteristics Traits 
Early 
1980s to 
mid 1980s 
Exploration 
Stage 
Reform of recruitment 
methods to enlarge the pool of 
candidates to include the entire 
population; strengthening of 
skill straining 
Decentralisation of labour 
relations and employment 
Mid to late 
1980s 
Break-
through 
Stage 
Use of contracts Enterprises become main 
agency of employment; 
employers and employees 
can make mutual 
employment decisions; 
labour relations 
determined through 
contracts. 
Early 
1990s to 
present 
Developme
nt Stage 
Abolition of “3 irons” policy; 
use of employment contracts 
expanded to include all 
employees according to 
“labour law”; appropriate 
macro-level reforms. 
Transfer to human 
resource management 
system. 
Source: Adopted from Zhao (1998). 
 
The main characteristics of HRM after the economic reforms in China have been  described 
by Zhao (2001) and Warner (2000) as follows. First, the key HRM transition was the shift 
from a political and administrative relationship to an economic relationship between 
government and enterprise. Second, the highly centralised labour allocation system shifted 
to “two-way” selection. Third, the fixed reward system shifted to an enterprise-determined 
compensation package. And last, competition for talent increased since entry into the WTO 
in December 2001.  
 
Although HRM in China had started its transformation since the economic reforms, 
researches discovered that in reality there were imbalances in HRM practices in different 
industrial ownerships. For instance, the old form of personnel management practice is still 
more common in China’s industrial enterprises, especially in SOEs, where a decidedly 
conservative air continues to pervade the administration of personnel (Verburg, 1996, Zhu, 
2005). Personnel management is largely the norm in many POEs and even in JVs 
management seems to be more inward looking, with a focus on issues like wages, welfare 
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and promotion as found in the conventional personnel arrangement, rather than strategic 
ones like long-term development normally associated with HRM  (Goodall and Warner, 
1997, Zhu, 2005). MNCs and some JVs adopted more international standardised HRM 
policies and practices (Ding et al., 2001). The larger FIEs, hitherto admired as the pattern-
setting employers, are the main the firms practising HR practices, such as HRM borrowed 
from the West. In many cases, their HR managers are expatriates or, if Chinese, are 
recruited from the prestigious MBA programmes emerging in China such as the one at 
CEIBS (the China-Europe International Business School) based in Shanghai. Such 
graduates speak the language of modern management and, if relevant, HRM. They follow 
‘best practice’ in HRM and strategic HRM (SHRM), as exemplified in their own 
corporation internationally or in other MNCs operating in China.  
 
3.2.3.3 New challenges to HRM after the WTO membership 
Earlier studies of HRM in Chinese firms have found that they tended to be less strategic 
than their Western counterparts in their approach to HRM (Warner, 1993, Child, 1996, 
Poole, 1997). More recent studies, however, have observed the fact that HRM in China is 
becoming more systematic and market oriented, with evidence of adaptation of Western 
HR techniques (Warner, 1998, Ding and Akhtar, 2001, Zhu and Dowling, 2002).  
 
Since China joined the WTO in 2001 it has added an international dimension to China’s 
HRM practices. There is now an emerging consensus among researchers (Warner, 1998, 
Zhu and Dowling, 2002) that many traditional HR policies in China have changed and there 
is clear evidence that a more complex and hybrid management model is emerging as the 
result of an increasing level of marketisation and enterprise autonomy. For example, Ding 
and Akhtar (2001) note that an increasing number of Chinese enterprises are moving 
towards the adoption of HRM practices that focus on human capital development. This is 
particularly the case for larger and new enterprises across different ownership structures 
that are located in relatively developed cities.  
 
Battling in the war for talent, Chinese firms are reported to becoming more strategic in 
linking their HR practices to organizational performance (Law et al., 2003, Zhu et al., 2005, 
Wang et al., 2007, Wei and Lau, 2005). Studies by Wei and Lau (2005), Zhu et al. (2005) 
and Wang et al. (2007) found that the differences in key HR practices amongst firms of 
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different ownership forms in China are diminishing, indicating a trend of convergence in 
the HR practices adopted by foreign-invested and Chinese firms. There is a continuing 
trend and increasing movement away from traditional Chinese HR practices to more 
Western HR practices and the gaps in HR competence between Chinese-owned private 
firms and MNCs are closing. In addition, Wang et al. (2007: 699) found that ‘while foreign-
invested companies emphasize humanistic goals the most, it was private-owned enterprises 
that linked these goals most tightly with the high-performance HR practices’. According to 
Wang et al. (2007: 699), ‘the pattern of the organizational goals and HR practices linkage 
reflects that private-owned enterprises are more aggressively utilizing their HR functions to 
accomplish their organizational goals’. This is in spite of the fact that they have adopted 
fewer high-performance HR practices than the foreign-invested companies. In addition, 
there is evidence that flagship domestic private firms are adopting commitment-oriented 
HRM practices (Ding and Akhtar, 2001, Gong et al., 2006).  
 
In summary, this section reviewed the development of HRM in the West, Asia and China. 
It is obvious that the conceptual formation of HRM has been a combination of West and 
East conceptualisations in its historical development. The changes and continuity of the 
HRM concept, practices and policies in East Asia show a good example of the triangular 
influence of HRM among the US, Europe and East Asia itself.  
 
The transformation of people-management systems towards HRM started in the middle of 
the 1980s in China. An international dimension has been added to China’s HRM practise 
since China joined the WTO in 2001. Chinese firms are reported to be becoming more 
strategic in linking their HR practices to organisational performance. However, although 
the US and European models have been heavy influences, the development of HRM in 
China has its own uniqueness, which was described as ‘HRM with Chinese characteristics’ 
(Warner, 2005, Warner and Zhu, 2002).  
 
The section presented the argument that the development of HRM as a whole has been in a 
triangular influence among the US, Europe and Asia. This leads to the question whether 
there is a HRM approach that is universal. Therefore, the next section is the review and 
discussion of the convergence/divergence debate in HRM. 
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3.3 HRM: Convergence versus divergence debate 
When we study HRM in either a Western or Eastern context, there can be two useful 
perspectives: the universalistic and contingent approaches (Boxall and Purcel, 2000, Delery 
and Doty, 1996, Richardson and Thompson, 1999). The universalistic approach, which is 
so called ‘best practice’, believes that the greater use of specific HRM practices will always 
result in better (or worse) organisational performance (Delery and Doty, 1996). In contrast, 
the contingency approach, which is so called ‘best fit’, argues that whether specific HRM 
practices result in better or worse organisational performance depends on contingencies (i.e. 
internal or external factors) (Delery and Doty, 1996, Richardson and Thompson, 1999).   
 
3.3.1 Reasons for convergence 
Increased globalisation has given renewed focus to the debate about convergence and 
divergence in the study of international HRM. Pudelko (2005) notes that the search for 
‘best practice’ in HRM in comparative management research is at the macro-level closely 
related to the debate on cross-national convergence versus divergence of managerial 
processes. 
 
Kerr et al., (1962) note there exists ‘a universal logic of industrialisation’ which is 
accompanied by ‘a logic of the development of organisations and management’. The 
direction of this development is determined by the ‘best practice’ of economically more 
advanced countries, with latecomers following and adopting similar organisational 
structures, strategies and processes, resulting in a convergence of management systems. 
Consequently, authors who perceive management as rather independent from the respective 
national culture, and focus on the importance of learning from ‘best practice’ in order to 
increase national competitiveness, are more positive about cross-national convergence, as 
‘best practice’ is held to determine the direction of convergence (Kerr et al., 1962, Child 
and Kieser, 1979, Levitt, 1983, Waters, 1995, Heneerz, 1996, Toynbee, 2001). Hence, the 
convergence approach proposes that managers around the world embrace attitudes and 
behaviours common to managers in other countries, despite cultural differences. Factors 
such as globalisation, contextual contingencies and business environments are viewed as 
cosmopolitan forces leading to more homogeneity among organisations (McGaughey and 
De Cieri, 1999, Ralston and Gustafson, 1993, Ralston et al., 1997).  
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In Asia, globalisation, international trade and finance may place substantial pressure on 
firms to standardise practices and policies. There has been some convergence in HRM and 
some common environmental factors operating on those Asian countries tested in the 
research, such as China, Japan and South Korea.  But, the outcome of this, which is 
producing change in indigenous HRM, is not necessarily towards a model of Asian HRM 
(Warner, 2003b). ‘HRM with Asian characteristics’ must be seen as a term which 
sometimes is even more specific to the country concerned and its historical and economic 
development (Rowley et al., 2004). Local customs, institutions and labour forces do 
provide serious constraints on the degree of convergence and may well lead to an 
increasing level of divergence. More detailed analysis of the pattern of and changes to 
HRM in Asia were undertaken by Rowley et al., (2002, Rowley and Benson, 2004, Rowley 
et al., 2004). The argument above leads to reasons for divergence.  
 
3.3.2 Determinants for divergence 
Despite claiming a convergence of economic and management systems, cultural theory and 
institutional theory are usually viewed as being at the opposite pole from universalistic 
perspectives which support the theory that economic activities around the world are 
convergent towards best practice (Child, 2000, Lane, 1995, Whitley, 1992, Whitley, 1999). 
Cultural theory emphasises culture as a factor which makes people’s behaviour and 
economic activity different. While cultural values are considered to be deep-seated and 
enduring, culture is considered to be immutable. Economic activity between nations with 
different cultures should on that basis remain divergent. Institutional theory emphasises that 
a nation’s economic activities are influenced by social institutions, such as the state, legal 
system, financial system and family. Hence, the divergence approach proposes that 
differences among societies result from their parochial sets of values and that individuals 
maintain diverse, culturally based values despite growing economic and social similarities 
between nations. Based on similar arguments, many more studies also outline the 
importance of divergence or preservation of core characteristics within international HRM 
(Baldacchino, 1997, Lu and Bjorkman, 1996, Rowley and Benson, 2002, Schuler and 
Rogovsky, 1998).  
 
The literature above illustrates that studies have employed three different sets of variables 
in order to understand international HRM issues: 1) socio-cultural variables such as work-
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related values or national cultures upon which the divergence theory is built; 2) economic 
and contextual variables such as the phenomenon of globalisation and deregulation of 
economies upon which the convergence theory is built; and 3) organisational variables such 
as parent-company control and influences tend to support a convergence view. However, 
the contrasting findings are not only because of the isolated use of these variables but, on a 
more fundamental level, because of the differing theoretical perspectives adopted. 
Therefore, it is concluded that neither the convergence nor the divergence debate alone is 
adequate to explain the dynamic interactions between organisations and their environments. 
An integrative approach should be adopted to encompass an effective analysis and to 
propose a more comprehensive theory of behaviour in the international HRM context.  
 
Rowley et al (2002) further identify that convergence appears to be more about individual 
HRM practices than system change in Asia. The factors that led to some convergence at the 
practice level include the operation and interactions of foreign and indigenous employees 
and MNCs in overseas and domestic markets, exposing them to other practices. Factors that 
impeded some convergence at the other two levels (policy, deep structure) included 
institutions and cultures. Therefore, there are relative convergence signs of HRM in Asia. 
However, cultural and institutional factors have different levels of impact on the adoption 
of Western (US) management practices.  
 
In relation to HRM in China, researchers also acknowledge the difficulties and problems 
that arise during the transferring process. For example, Pye (1991) argues that both 
Confucianism and the Chinese version of Marxist-Leninism have played down 
individualistic assumptions, the basic premise of Western HRM. Warner (1995) argues that 
Western motivation theories may not apply to Asian societies, such as in China. Wong et 
al., (2002) state that traditional cultural values of loyalty, ‘guanxi’ (relationship) and ‘bao’ 
(return/repay) still play a key role in affecting Chinese employees’ work-related attitudes 
and behaviours. Therefore, the literature shows that moves towards Western management 
methods may not have the desired effect because of the deep-rooted cultural and 
institutional influences(Lockett, 1988).  
 
This thesis will discuss convergence and divergence issues of one of the HRM practices - 
reward management in the context of China - in later chapters. Therefore, the next section 
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is a review of development of rewards systems in China, challenges of reward management 
in the knowledge age and reward management models that are used in the thesis.  
 
3.4 Reward management  
Reward management is concerned with the formulation and implementation of strategies 
and policies that aim to reward people fairly, equitably and consistently in accordance with 
their value to the organisation (Milkovich and Newman, 2002). The principle objectives of 
reward management are to attract and retain suitable employees; maintain or improve levels 
of employee performance and comply with employment legislation and regulations. There 
has been an evolution process of reward management in China as presented in the 
following sections.  
 
3.4.1 Rewards in China: A historical review 
The reward system in China has experienced a process of evolution from the pre-reformed 
model before economic reforms in 1978 to the post-reformed model after the economic 
reform. Characteristics of reward systems in each period are introduced below. 
  
3.4.1.1 Rewards in China before 1978 (pre-reformed model) 
Before the economic reforms in 1978, employee rewards in China were strictly controlled 
by the state rather than enterprises. Under the ‘Three Iron’ system, the ‘Iron Rice-bowl’ 
model was applied to employee rewards, which was strong egalitarianism, minimal reward 
differentials, largely based on age, length of service and political loyalty; minimal 
differentials between staff categories (factory boss and workers, for example); a rigid eight-
grade wage system (sixteen for cadres); low take-home pay but high subsidies; an emphasis 
on non-material, 'spiritual' rewards a stress on moral-encouragement rather than ‘bourgeois 
materialism’ incentives;  an absence of performance-related payments, non-performance 
linked but seniority-based wage promotion (Cieri et al., 1998).  Some of the main 
characteristics of rewards in China before 1978 are discussed below. 
 
Highly centralised wage setting  
Under a centrally planned economy, industries were owned and run by the state, and their 
growth was regulated by planning targets rather than by the profit-maximising decisions of 
independent entrepreneurs (Putterman, 1992). Enterprises were thus described as “little 
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more than appendages of the state bureaucracies that administered them” (Harding, 1987) 
p23. The government gave mandatory instructions to enterprise that guaranteed both the 
delivery of inputs, including capital, production material and HR, and a set of prices for all 
the products (Borgonjon and Vanhonacker, 1992). Enterprises had no right to set up or 
change any wage scale, let alone to increase their total payroll regardless of their 
performance. This was especially true for SOEs because managers in profitable enterprises 
did not have residual rights to the profit of the enterprise and thus lost incentive. Meanwhile, 
the state’s ‘soft budget constraints’ provided loss-making managers with unlimited 
protection from the consequences of poor performance (Kornai, 1980, Kornai, 1986, 
Walder, 1986). Therefore, managers in SOEs had no incentive to improve either their 
efficiency or effectiveness.  
 
No management input on employee rewards decision making 
During Mao’s regime the wage level was determined by the state centrally and unilaterally 
and managers of all levels were involved only in the administrative function and policy 
implementation. There was effectively no wage bargaining mechanism for employees in 
China, even though workers’ representation bodies, such as trade unions, are often seen as 
primarily conservative forces seeking to defend the established wage structure and prevent 
the erosion of existing rights and benefits.  
 
As discussed above, China had itself developed a ‘distinctive’ model of personnel 
management since 1949 at least (Warner, 1993; 1995). Its origin lay in the Soviet industrial 
model which it adopted after the ‘Liberation’ (Kaple, 1994). The socialist transformation of 
Chinese industry after 1949 in principle created conditions for a collective interest and the 
success of enterprises. Many of its devotees expected that non-material motivators of a 
moral and ideological kind would be effective in such circumstances. In practice, however, 
socialist countries combined material with non-material incentives, the balance between 
them often varying markedly over time (Lane, 1986, Wood, 1987). The Chinese leadership 
has at different times attempted to utilize both material and moral incentives to encourage 
productivity in support of economic growth (Henley and Nyaw, 1987, Jackson, 1992, 
Takahara, 1992).  
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Moral and spiritual based pay norms  
In Western societies rewards are considered to be of strategic importance for employee 
attraction, retention, motivation and performance, which will in turn enhance organisational 
performance, even though the existence of such a link and the effectiveness of pay as a 
management strategy long remain debatable. Rewards in China used to be treated, however, 
to a much lesser extent as a motivational strategy of pursuing organisational efficiency and 
effectiveness than as a necessity to cover the living costs of the employees themselves and 
their family, in a Marxist tradition. Yu (1998) and Cooke (2003) identified four main norms 
that governed rewards in China before the economic reforms: 1) The contribution norm. 
For instance, the seniority wage system essentially rewarded the employee for the 
additional work experience accumulated in the past work years, because work experience 
reflected one’s potential to make more contributions. Even today seniority pay remains one 
of the components in the formal pay structure in the public sector. 2) The effort norm. 
Chinese employers tended to attach considerable weight to their employees’ work attitude 
and the effort they had made in their work, often to the disregard of outcomes. This norm 
was typically applied in selection for promotion and bonus allocation. 3) The morality norm. 
This included one’s political loyalty to the Communist Party, integrity of personality, and 
diligence at work, which played a key role in promotion decisions and other kinds of 
rewards. 4) The egalitarian norm. This played the most significant role in rewards as it was 
a taken-for-granted assumption of fairness and equity. 
 
Small pay differential between individuals 
There was a small gap between individuals’ pay. Wages at each grade were fixed and total 
payroll was determined by the overall number of employees. This reward system was not 
linked to personal performance, work attitude or even technical skills. The increases were 
commonly according to national grade promotions which were based on seniority or 
political background and connections (Knight and Song, 1991, Shenkar and Chow, 1989, 
Walder, 1986). Moral encouragement was emphasised rather than the materialistic 
dimensions of human aspirations, because it involved less risk for managers to use non-
material incentives (Zhao, 1995). Moreover, the salary was normally low but with high 
subsidies. Tsang (1984) pointed out that subsidies paid by SOEs in 1984 included work 
insurance, medical coverage, public welfare, non-staple food, winter heating fee and home-
leave travelling allowances. Subsidies paid by the central government were housing, 
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education and medicine, transportation and staple foods. These subsidies helped to form the 
‘iron rice bowl’.  
 
3.4.1.2 Rewards in China after 1978 (post-reformed model in the 1980s and 1990s) 
The traditional employee reward system became a major target of China’s economic 
reforms after 1984. Top Chinese leaders became aware of the basic deficiencies of the 
reward system, which was being criticised as ‘eating from the big iron rice bowl’, which 
literally means a life—tenure employment system. They realised that wage reform was 
essential and the weaknesses of the reward system must be overcome. The top decision 
makers clearly stated that the primary socialist principle of “to each according to one’s 
work” was the only practicable approach to distributing wealth. The policy of “allowing 
some people to get rich first” was adopted to accelerate productivity and economic growth. 
The wage reforms played a vital role in China’s transformation from a centrally-planned 
economy to “market socialism”.  
 
The Chinese government implemented two reforms of the employee reward system for 
SOEs in 1985 and 1992. Consequently, the employee pay package diversified and 
employee reward shifted from equal distribution to income polarisation among employees 
working in both state and non-state enterprises such as FIEs. Diversified forms of reward 
systems such as floating and structural pay systems were introduced in 1985. A structured 
pay system consists of basic pay, position pay, floating pay and allowances. The proportion 
of each component varies according to the nature of business and different types of industry. 
A fixed pay system was supplemented by a floating pay component. The basic pay and 
allowances were relatively stable to ensure the employee’s minimum standard of living, 
while the variable portion motivated workers to work harder.  
 
This new system saw the reintroduction of bonus incentives and has, operationally, made it 
easier to quantify the worker’s performance and easier to link such performance to pay 
(Zhao and Nichols, 1996). In theory, the structural pay policy represented a marked shift in 
the principle of pay reform by placing far greater emphasis on position, which should 
reflect competence and responsibility, i.e. ‘to each according to their work’. The policy was 
to enhance workforce morale by improving the relationship between their responsibility 
and wages, defining more persuasive wage differentials among them and guaranteeing their 
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basic livelihood. It was also an attempt for China to move away from the Soviet-style 
grading system and to build in greater rewards for flexibility.  
 
Employee pay began to be linked to their performance after 1978. Pay reform started in 
1983 with the introduction of a new incentive structure which combined decentralised 
control with differential remuneration. An emphasis on meritocratic methods was indicated 
in the top priority assigned to current performance as the most important basis for 
allocating rewards. In determining the basis of reward allocations, current performance, 
prior service, work effort, political/moral devotion, hardship and acquired skills, seniority, 
gender and fairness were all considered important.  
 
Another new position-and–skills pay system was introduced in 1993 in order to facilitate 
enterprise reform. The new pay system was divided into two parts: fixed pay and flexi-pay. 
It is believed that the third reform moved employee pay to a non-egalitarian system that 
closely linked employee earnings to their performance both at individual and organisational 
level. Moreover, a survey conducted by Henley et al. (1987) showed that material 
incentives, such as pay increases and bonuses, were ranked by workers as first and second 
out of twenty motivation items, although research conducted in the early 1980s had 
revealed that bonuses often became a solid part of the basic pay of employees (Nelson and 
Reeder, 1995, Tu and Jones, 1991). Therefore, the development of the reward system in 
China can be summarised in terms of changes in pay model, pay determinants, pay 
differentials and structure as in Table 3.3 below: 
Table 3.3 Development of rewards in China 
 Pre-reform 
(1949-1978) 
Post-reform 
(1980s and 1990s) 
Reward model Iron rice-bowl 
Strong egalitarianism 
Fixed and floating wage system 
Pay determinants Seniority and political 
loyalty 
Moving to non-egalitarian 
Pay differentials Minimal Introduced high wage differentials 
Pay structure Rigid – eight-grade 
wage system  
Diversified – basic wage, position 
wages, floating wages and subsidies. 
PFP Absent Added performance related pay such as 
payment by results schemes 
Source: Developed for this thesis. 
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3.4.1.3 New challenges for rewards after the WTO membership 
China’s accession to the WTO opened a new page in China’s reform and further 
engagement in the process of globalisation. The impact of globalisation on the division of 
labour and HR in the East Asian region have been identified by Zhu et al., (2004). The first 
issue is about the international division of labour. The second is about changes in 
employment/unemployment via the process of globalisation. The third issue relates to the 
enterprise-level management of HR. The restructuring of industries under the political 
pressure of globalisation has led to a number of consequences, such as relocation of 
factories, downsizing and retraining (Warner, 2002). These shifts have created new 
enterprise-level HRM practices, such as recruitment flexibility, fixed-term employment 
contracts, performance based compensation and rewards, training and career development, 
as well as an emphasis on commitment and motivation towards the organisation and work. 
Furthermore, many more people are today engaged in high-value-added hi-tech industries. 
The imbalance between the shortage of skilled labour and oversupply of unskilled and 
semi-skilled workers has become obvious. Employee rewards which attract and retain good 
performers with good HRM policies have become critical in recent years.  
 
3.4.2 Reward management in the knowledge age 
Chapter 2 section 2.4 introduced the current development of knowledge-intensive industries 
in China. This section discusses the challenges and renewed focus of reward management 
in knowledge age.  
 
Smith and Kelly (1997) believe that future economic and strategic advantage will rest with 
the organisations that can most effectively attract, develop and retain a diverse group of the 
best and the brightest human talent in the market place. Obviously, this puts HR at the 
forefront of the knowledge economy (Soliman and Spooner, 2000). As intellectual capital is 
the key competitive advantage in the knowledge economy, people management should 
naturally become an integral part of corporate strategy and a key responsibility of all 
managers.  
 
The traditional domains of HRM take on a different colour when we view them as 
contributing to organisational knowledge stocks (Narasimha, 2000). In fact, the idea of the 
knowledge economy appears to place the fundamentals of HRM onto an entirely new 
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footing (Storey and Quintas, 2001). HR systems need to be geared towards creating and 
promoting a learning environment. Among the more important challenges to consider are: 
how to ensure an adequate supply of knowledge workers, a resource which promises to 
become scarce in the future; how to identify, develop and evaluate knowledge workers and 
the outputs they produce; how to motivate and reward knowledge workers to maximise 
their productivity and the quality of their outputs; and how to structure the organisation and 
how to make the transition to new organisational forms to obtain output and productivity 
from an increasingly knowledge-based workforce (Despres and Hiltrop, 1995). In order to 
effectively deal with the challenges above, reward management in knowledge firms 
becomes critical.  
 
The management of rewards was once relatively straightforward: salary and job level went 
hand in hand. This is no longer the case. Empirical evidence indicates that many reward 
systems fail to deliver the expected results (Lawler, 1989) in the knowledge economy. 
Wilson et al. (1994) argue that many reward systems are biased towards management’s 
view and do a poor job of recognising the individual’s experience, organisational 
contribution and skill development, while many individuals believe their wages are unfair, 
their pay increases inequitable, their performance gains unrecognised and their creations or 
innovations unrewarded. It is also true that many reward programmes focus on hierarchical 
position and nominal job context as proxies for contribution to the business, even while this 
is at odds with the realities of knowledge-work where insights from any level can have a 
profound impact on the business.   
 
When we study reward management practices, two theoretical models in reward 
management need to be concerned. The next section will critically review the two 
theoretical perspectives – universalistic and contingency models. 
 
3.4.3 Reward management models 
Kessler (2001) notes that reward management has also been treated in two different ways. 
One revolved around notions of high commitment, high involvement or high performance 
management, as seen in best practice or universalistic terms. The other was related to a 
concern with contingency, fit or match. Within the context of universalistic and 
contingency models, different forms of rewards have routinely been presented as part of a 
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high commitment bundle of practices while matching models have invariably linked reward 
to various contingencies. This section reviews the critics of the universal model, and 
illustrates the resource-based view and institutional theory as the two approaches of the 
contingent model, which is the theoretical lens for the research.    
 
3.4.3.1 Critics of the universal model  
The high commitment and high performance approaches link pay and indeed other HR 
practices to employee attitudes and behaviour. For instance, Wood (1999) notes that 
formulations of the high performance approach have placed particular emphasis on 
behaviour, suggesting that certain HR mechanisms have a particularly direct effect in this 
respect without the mediating influence of attitudinal re-structuring. The work of Bechker 
& Huselid (1998) drew attention to high-performance management, which appears to attach 
particular importance to contingent forms of reward as a powerful technique for stimulating 
required behaviours in this unmediated way.  
 
The high commitment approach appears to give greater weight to pay’s ability to influence 
employee attitudes, and more specifically its potential to generate organisational 
commitment. Kessler (2001) notes that the high commitment approach is silent on 
behaviour, but the assumption must be that enhanced employee commitment feeds through 
to ‘desired’ behaviours, which then contribute to improved organisational performance. 
Reviewing some of the major studies (see Table 3.4) on high commitment management 
practices makes it clear that there are a number of differences in approach to collective and 
individual forms of PFP.  
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Table 3.4 Studies on employee high commitment pay 
Author High commitment pay practices 
Roach (1999) Individual PFP – incidence of merit-based performance pay 
Collective PFP -  collective group-performance-based pay 
(employee share options, profit sharing, group bonus) 
MacDuffie (1995) Contingent compensation: 
Corporate performance 
Plant performance  
Skills acquired 
Wood (1996) Some merit element in pay 
Arthurs (1992) Relatively high wages (relatively low wages) 
Stock ownership (incentive-based pay) 
Walton (1985) Variable rewards to create equity and reinforce group 
achievement: profit and gain sharing (PFP where feasible to 
provide individual incentive) 
Individual pay linked to skills and mastery (individual pay geared 
to job evaluation) 
Cully et al. (1999) Profit sharing and employee share ownership schemes 
Pfeffer (1998) High pay contingent on organisational performance 
Source: Storey (2001), p211. 
 
The high commitment model relates to the incidence and combination of collective and 
individual forms of performance pay. For many of the listed authors in table 3.5 high 
commitment reward is seen to reside in some combination of collective and individual 
approaches. As shown above, with a few exceptions these authors do not provide a 
sophisticated discussion of, or justification for, the inclusion of particular pay practices. 
Indeed, which reward approach is really suitable to the commitment model is unclear. The 
uncertainty about what constitutes a high commitment pay practice may well reflect the fact 
that similar pay approaches can be compatible with markedly different corporate HR 
philosophies or management styles and contextual circumstances. In other words, any given 
pay practice can be used in very different ways and for markedly different purposes rather 
than necessarily being associated with any particular HR model or narrowly defined goal. 
The high commitment label is provided by academic researchers and may or may not 
reflect management intent. Therefore, it is fundamentally misconceived to try to label any 
pay practice as intrinsically high-commitment oriented.  
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3.4.3.2 The contingency model 
The relationship between pay practices and different contingencies might be viewed as 
taking two forms, one of which remains within the high commitment framework and the 
other which moves beyond it. If contingency is about match, then the high commitment 
approach does contain elements of contingency. It suggests that the efficiency and 
effectiveness of high commitment pay practices in terms of their contribution to business 
performance, depends on internal fit with other HR practices and with production systems 
or job design. Lupton & Gowler (1969) and Bowey et al., (1982) note that the contingency 
pay frame work provided a comprehensive and sophisticated analytical map of the factors 
associated with organisational structure, design and operation which might affect the 
adoption of the different pay practices. The frameworks of contingent model including 
resource-based view and institutional theory focus on a fit or match between pay and a 
much wider range of organisational circumstances and related to a greater array of 
corporate needs.  
 
A company’s resources include all input factors owned and controlled by the firm that 
enable it to develop strategies that improve its economic status (Amit and Schoemarker, 
1993, Daft, 1983). The resource-based view of the firm depicts an approach to 
compensation strategy that we characterise as high risk and high return. Much of the 
potential for success in this framework may result from synergistic fit between the pay 
policy and other organisation and employee level factors. In contrast, institutional theory 
explains how firms might take a lower risk, moderate return approach. Under institutional 
theory, through following ‘best practice’, firms decrease risk and may take a somewhat 
different route toward success.  
 
Resource-based view of the firm 
As Oliver (1997) points out, the resource-based view is driven by the assumption of 
economic rationality, that is an organisational concern with efficiency, effectiveness and 
profitability or the pursuit of ‘sustained competitive advantage’. The route to these ends is 
seen to lie in the firm’s leveraging of distinctive resources and capabilities. Three sets of 
resources are typically identified: physical, organisational and human. Pay might be seen as 
related to both human and organisational resources. Its relationship with HR has tended to 
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be in a supportive role. Thus interest has focused on whether pay can help generate and 
sustain employee know-how and skill.  
 
Institutional theory 
Institutional theory can be employed to describe a lower-risk approach for organisations 
choosing and implementing pay practices, but this approach may not offer as much 
synergistic benefit as the resource-based model (Gerhart et al., 1996). What an institutional 
approach can offer to firms is a way to respond adequately to pressures in the business 
environment, so that, at a minimum, reward does not become a competitive disadvantage.   
 
According to institutional theory, organisations respond to pressures in their environments 
to conform to accepted ways of doing business so that they will appear legitimate to 
investors, customers, and others from whom resources flow and with whom they have 
relationships (Gerhart et al., 1996). Accepted ways of doing business are defined in the 
environment through a combination of historical, cultural, social, and other environmental 
forces that arise form a variety of sources, including the government, professions and 
sources internal to organisations. Organisations themselves are seen as socially-constructed, 
routine-reproduced programmes or rule systems.  
 
The end result of the operation of institutional influences is that over time many 
organisations acquire similar structures, or use similar practices (Meyer and Roman, 1977). 
Institutional influences are visible in patterns of diffusion among organisations (Meyer and 
Roman, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). Over time, as 
newer pay practices such as PFP come to be seen as acceptable ways of doing business, 
increasing numbers of firms from a variety of industries will adopt some form of these pay 
policies, and an ever-widening pattern of diffusion will be evident. The level and form of 
organisational responses to institutional pressures may vary (Eisenhardt, 1988; Powell, 
1991).  
 
Comparison between resource-based view and institutional theory 
The relationship between these two theories are identified by (Gerhart et al., 1996) (see 
Table 3.5). Resource-based approaches represent a high risk – high potential return option, 
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whereas institutional approaches represent a low risk – lower potential return option. 
Resource-based approaches to reward aim for sustained competitive advantage by adding 
value in a way that is rare and difficult to imitate, whereas institutional approaches strive 
for parity with other organisations in the business environment. In some senses, the high 
potential for resource-based approaches begins where the benefits of institutional 
approaches end.  
 
Related literature suggests that the resource-based and institutional approaches of firms are 
complementary. Oliver (1991) argues that resource-based and institutional approaches to 
rewards may be compatible in the area of strategic behaviour. It is possible for 
organisations to respond strategically to institutional influences. Also, of course, the 
resource-based view of firms is posited on the strategic action of these organisations.  
 
As discussed above, it is fundamentally misconceived to try to label any pay practice 
intrinsically high-commitment oriented. Best fit approach is better suited to describe pay 
practices. Resource-based and institutional approaches are interrelated with emphasis on 
different strategic orientation. Therefore, these two approaches are taken as the theoretical 
lenses in this study to explore the reward management situation in the context of China, 
particularly PFP. The next two sections will discuss the definition of PFP adopted in the 
thesis and critically review the existing literature on PFP.  
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Table 3.5 Comparison of resource-based and institutional theory 
 Resource-Based Theory Institutional Theory 
Key idea Firms strategically develop 
and integrate practices within 
systems 
Firms choose practices in 
response to institutional 
pressures 
What drives choice of 
practice? 
Strategy Environment 
Manifestation Firms develop complex, 
unique practices and integrate 
them in firm culture and with 
other practices 
Firms imitate the practices 
of other firms, especially 
practices that are 
normatively acceptable  
Coupling Tight Loose 
Goals 
  Level 1 
  Level 2  
  Level 3 
 
Inimitability/Rarity/Integration
Synergy 
Sustained competitive 
advantage 
 
Legitimacy 
Continued resources, 
relationships  
Survival  
Risks/Returns 
  Risk 
  Minimum required 
    Resources & effort 
  Potential pitfalls 
  Potential gains 
  Potential imitability of 
    Practice 
 
High 
High 
 
Penalty for system failure  
High-synergy 
Low 
 
Low 
Low 
 
Penalty for nonconformity 
Low-avoid penalties 
High 
Assumptions Unique is good 
Complex is good 
People and firms can optimise  
Firms are idiosyncratic 
Conformity is good 
Simple is good 
People and firms satisfies 
Firms are similar over time 
Source: Gerhart et al.,  (1996)  
 
3.5 PFP 
This section examines definitions of PFP, and reviews the historical development of PFP 
practices in general and in the context of China.   
 
3.5.1 Definition  
Paying people based on performance has been a salient topic in books, newspapers and 
magazines throughout the last century. PFP has been defined in slightly different ways, as 
shown in several examples below.  
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PFP can broadly be defined as the explicit link of financial reward to 
individual, group or company performance (Armstrong and Murliss, 1991, 
Wright, 1991).  
 
PFP is any form of direct pay that is not folded into base pay and that varies 
according to performance (Schulter and Zingheim, 1992) p. 154.  
 
PFP is an alternative compensation system that ties pay to business 
outcomes and supports a participative management process. Cash payments 
are based on a predetermined measure or measures of group or 
organizational outcomes (Belcher, 1996) p.10.  
 
PFP is one of employee rewards that received in addition to base pay, and it 
varies depending on the performance of the individual, team, company, etc. 
By its very nature, it is not guaranteed, although many organizations have 
allowed such programs to become entitlements, like base pay. PFP is 
usually received in a lump-sum check, and does not become part of base 
pay. PFP can also take the form of cash payments or equity related 
investments (Wilson, 1995) p. 53.  
 
PFP, in contrast to fixed pay, is contingent upon some performance 
related outcome (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998) p134.  
 
According to the common themes in the definitions above, PFP is defined as the payment 
that is in addition to base pay and the payment that ties to performance measure at 
individual, group and firm level. This definition includes several dimensions: whose 
performance is being assessed? How is it being measured? And how is it being rewarded? 
First, the definition highlights the coverage of PFP schemes. The schemes can relate to the 
individual employee or to the group however defined. Second, the definition focuses on 
performance measures. These can take the form of employee-group inputs or outputs and 
be expressed in ‘harder’ quantifiable terms or in ‘softer’ qualitative forms. Third, the 
definition concentrates on the performance-pay link. The definition directs attention to the 
distinction between a relatively fixed relationship, where a given level of output usually 
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produces an automatic payout, and a less mechanistic link often founded on some 
assessment of individual/group performance. 
 
3.5.2 Development of PFP in the West 
PFP plans are diverse and complex now, and depend on the strategic circumstances of each 
organisation. It would have been very uncommon for a person in 1900 or even 1950 to have 
a total reward package that included awards based on individual contributions, profit 
sharing bonuses, stock options, plus choices among various benefits and services. Such a 
package is increasingly common today (Milkovich and Stevens, 1999, Heneman, 2002).  
 
By the early 1900s, scientific management had transformed incentive plans. The standards 
and rates under earlier plans were haphazard and prone to manipulation by both supervisors 
and employees. Taylor engineered differential piece rates by designing the work into 
discrete tasks and determining minimum times to complete them. Group based gain-sharing 
plans gained ground during the 1930s and 1940s. In 1953, 50 percent of U.S. workers were 
paid by some type of group-based incentive plan (Milkovich and Stevens, 1999). For much 
of the post-Second World War period, the concern with PFP in Britain focused primarily on 
manual worker individual bonus systems, especially in the private manufacturing sector. 
This focus sprang from the importance attached to instability in industrial relations as a 
cause of the difficulties emerging in the British economy from the mid- to late 1960s. This 
instability was traced in large part to the traditional piecework systems that covered almost 
six million employees at that time. These systems were seen to have decayed in the face of 
workplace pressures, undermining ordered national bargaining, generating conflict, 
earnings drift and rigidities in working practices.  
 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the use of all forms of pay-for-performance plans declined. 
The U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics surveys in the 1968-1970 period show that only 20 
percent of manufacturing workers were paid under incentive plans (compared to 50 percent 
in 1953); other industries show much smaller percentages. By the 1980s and 1990s, 
contemporary high performance work systems included a variety of approaches that 
attempt to foster a high performance – high commitment organisation culture (Milkovich 
and Stevens, 1999). The notion of embedding PFP as part of cultural values started 
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becoming popular. The use of different types of PFP plans by organisations proliferated 
over the last decade (Lawler, 2000).  
 
Immense pressure for higher performance has led corporations to search continually for 
managerial practices that will enhance competitiveness. An increasingly large number of 
corporations have explored how rewards, particularly money, could be linked to desired 
behaviour and/or performance outcomes to improve effectiveness (Gerhart and Rynes, 
2003, Rigby, 2001) A recent survey by the US Institute of Management Administration 
indicated that 82 per cent of American companies have PFP plans (Administration, 2005), 
compared with about 50 per cent in the early 1990s (Merriman and Deckop, 2007). PFP is 
also now a ‘standard element of the management toolkit’ for the UK and has particularly 
grown in use throughout the public sector (Merriman and Deckop, 2007).  
 
3.5.3 Development of PFP practice in China 
PFP was absent in the pre-reformed pay system before the economic reform in 1978 (see 
Section 3.4.1). The first stage of the pay system reform in China (1978-1984) started with 
the restoration of piece rates and bonuses in 1978 which weighted only 3.1 percent of total 
cash income. However, by 1984, this figure rose to 24 percent (Han and Morishima, 1992; 
Yuan, 1990). Moreover, the autonomy of SOEs over the distribution of bonuses 
substantially increased over the reform period.  The amount of bonus paid was based, in 
principle, on the collective performance of the work group and the individual performance 
of workers.  
 
The second stage of the pay system reform (1985-1992) was to link total cash income, 
rather than bonuses, to enterprise performance (Zhuang, 1994; Byrd, 1992). The autonomy 
of SOEs in determining bonuses was further expanded. The new stage of the pay system 
reform (1992 to now) has been moving towards full autonomy of enterprises over pay to 
meet the requirements of a market economy (Wang, 1997). On the macro-level, the rigid 
state control over aggregate pay was replaced by a more flexible approach. At the micro-
level, SOEs have full authority to design their own pay systems (Zhuang, 1994). Another 
significant step in the pay system reforms was to introduce an annual salary system 
applicable to senior managerial staff, especially enterprise directors. The purpose was to 
increase the pay-disparity between the latter and common employees to such an extent that 
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the manager is sufficiently motivated to improve enterprise performance. It was also 
designed to break any collusion between the manager and employees, by separating the 
interests of the two parties (Zhuang, 1994). The pay reform programme is still underway. In 
the transition to the market economy, it can be predicted that the state administered pay 
system will finally be wholly replaced by a market-oriented pay system in which the pay 
level reflects the supply-demand conditions in the labour market and management-
employee collective negotiation (Warner and Ng. 1999).  
 
In summary, PFP in the West began to be used in the 1930s-1940s and became popular in 
the 1990s, while PFP in China began to be adopted after the economic reform in 1978, and 
was then gradually developed under the control of the state during the 1980s and 1990s. 
The next section will review the existing research on PFP.  
 
3.6 Review of existing literature on PFP  
This section critically discusses the existing literature on PFP in general, in Asia and in 
China, which directly lead to identifying research gaps and establishing research focus and 
questions of the thesis in Chapter 4. 
 
3.6.1 Research on PFP in general  
Research has examined a variety of ways in which PFP systems impact individuals, groups 
and organisations (Stajkovic and Luthans, 2001). There has been a growing interest in 
group PFP systems and the conditions under which systems are most effective (Hollensbe 
and Guthrie, 2000). Many firms have implemented group-based PFP plans – a trend that is 
likely to continue (Flannery et al., 1996). In a survey Gross (1995) found that 51 percent of 
companies either had group pay programs or were considering instituting them. This trend 
is supported by impressive results, including increased productivity (Hansen, 1997, 
Kaufman, 1992), teamwork (Hatcher and Ross, 1991), pay satisfaction (Welbourne and 
Cable, 1995), group communication (Hanlon and Taylor, 1991), and decreases in 
grievances (Hatcher and Ross, 1991) and monitoring costs (Cooke, 1994). Group pay plans 
take on many names and forms, including profit sharing, gain-sharing, team incentives, 
goal sharing, achievement sharing, and results sharing  (Belcher, 1996, Lissy, 1993, 
McNutt, 1990, Schuster and Zingheim, 1993). 
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Scholars have also looked not just at motivation, but also at the broader impact of pay-for-
performance systems, such as how they affect organisational learning (Arthur and Aiman-
Smith, 2001), the relationship between pay distribution and individual and organisational 
performance (Bloom, 1999), how the PFP plan helps the firm attract and retain more 
productive employees and motivates these employees to further improve their productivity 
(Banker et al., 2000) and how pay dispersion affects managerial turnover (Bloom and 
Michel, 2002). The impact of pay dispersion has also been a topic of growing interest 
(Bloom, 1999, Bloom and Michel, 2002, Shaw et al., 2002). In addition, gender differences 
and their impact on pay satisfaction (Graham and Welbourne, 1999) have been identified. 
Furthermore, some attention has been given to particular professions, such as accounting, 
and the distinctive impact that PFP systems can have on different professions (Bonner and 
Sprinkle, 2002).  
 
Controversy over PFP 
Despite the breadth and sophistication of topics being examined, research related to PFP 
has been strongly controversial. For instance, an examination of studies of PFP 
programmes suggests that performance improves in approximately two out of three 
programmes (Heneman et al., 2000). On the other hand, research into PFP in the UK over 
the past decade has failed to show that such systems have an effect on performance 
(Hendry et al., 2000, IRS, 2003). The controversy surrounding PFP largely reflects an 
implementation issue and is not a question of the incentive value of money per se (Gupta 
and Shaw, 1998, Kerr, 1999, Lawler, 1990, Luthans and Stajkovic, 1999). Pfeffer (Pfeffer, 
1995, Pfeffer, 1998) argues  that the major reason for weak or mixed effects of PFP appears 
to be in the design and implementation procedures. For example, PFP systems can have a 
destructive effect on intrinsic motivation, self-esteem, teamwork, and creativity. 
Furthermore, other scholars have argued that the real problem is that incentives work too 
well. Specifically, they motivate employees to focus excessively on doing what they need 
to do to gain rewards. 
 
With regard to the controversy over PFP in practice, PFP advocates argue that intelligent 
design of programs is essential to avoid pitfalls. However, intelligent design alone is 
insufficient to assure the success of such programs. As Pfeffer et al., (2001) note, persistent 
gaps exist between what managers know (the concepts they can articulate) and what they 
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can actually do. Thus, intelligent design must accompany effective implementation over 
time in order for pay systems to run effectively. In particular, two significant barriers must 
be overcome: barriers associated with linking performance to effort, and with linking pay to 
performance.  In addition, these two types of barriers must be overcome in a way that is 
perceived as fair and equitable by management and employees alike.  
 
Pfeffer et al., (2001) also note that potential barriers to linking performance to effort 
include difficulties in measuring performance; factors outside the control of individuals and 
groups being paid for that performance; and managers and peers being uncomfortable with 
rating employees differently. Potential barriers to linking pay to performance include the 
following: employees can come to rely on the additional compensation; employees are 
biased toward overestimating their own contributions; corporate budgets for bonuses often 
limit payouts; and managers can lose commitment to the pay system if it pays out more 
than anticipated due to problems in payout standards and if there are changes in 
performance standards due to changes in technology and organisational arrangements and 
unanticipated learning curves. It is changing circumstances that make it difficult for 
managers to sustain links between pay and performance in a way that will avoid 
perceptions of unfairness and inequity. Such perceptions can undermine the perceived link 
between pay and performance that is so important to sustain its motivational power.  
 
Importance of PFP design and implementation 
Despite the importance of understanding design and implementation PFP systems in order 
to overcome these and other barriers, little research has studied implementation (Fay et al., 
2001). In a broad review of the theory and evidence on compensation practices, Gerhart and 
Rynes (2003) detected a number of significant disparities between what is important to 
know about compensation and what is being researched. In addition to the lack of attention 
on implementation, the study of managerial decision making related to pay systems has also 
been neglected. More specifically, Gerhart and Rynes (2003) note that pay practices vary 
widely and are not simply dictated by market forces and the environment. Instead, 
managers play an active role in determining whether to initiate, retain, or modify a system 
of PFP and what type of system to use. However, very little academic research has 
investigated how managers make these decisions and implement the system. 
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Nevertheless, Werner and Ward (2004, Werner, 2002) further argue that the vast majority 
of the research on rewards has been published in North American Journals, authored by 
academics from North American universities, and uses North American samples. Therefore, 
it is quite likely that those researches (as in many other areas) suffer from a North 
American perspective bias. This raises the question whether the findings and theories of 
that research can be generalised to a global context.  
 
3.6.2 Research on PFP in Asia 
Wei and Rowley (2009) reviewed articles on rewards published from 1990 to 2007 
inclusive in 33 top management journals. In general, studies on rewards in Asia fall into 
two main streams. One follows the evolution of reward systems and the analysis for these 
studies is at the macro level of the economy, society, and/or HRM. The other stream is the 
micro-analytical and studies at industrial, organizational level from both the management 
and employees’ perspectives. Eventually, 8 areas were identified in existing studies based 
on the level of analysis (see Figure 3.1). These were: the evolution of reward patterns from 
macro perspectives; plus 7 areas from micro perspectives: pay systems (as a whole), 
performance related pay, gender pay, executive rewards, employee benefits, reward 
psychology, and organisational justice. Main Stream I focuses on the evolution of 
traditional rewards; Main Stream II focuses on transformations in rewards, including 
overall rewards (firm level pay systems and PFP), specific rewards (gender pay, executive 
pay and employee benefits), reward psychology and organisational justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 Literature Review 
 63
Figure 3.1: Topic areas of rewards in Asia 
 
 
Source: Adopted from Wei & Rowley (2009). 
 
It is noted that PFP has been one of the major areas covered by researchers on rewards in 
Asia. However, this area has not been very well studied. Papers on PFP have been mainly 
on China and South Korea. For instance, PFP in SOEs and the sports industry in China, and 
attitudes of Chinese workers towards individual PFP (Baruch et al., 2004, Bodmer, 2003, 
Bozionelos and Wang, 2007), or the effect of individual PFP on organisational commitment 
and the implementation of PFP in the government of South Korea (Kim, 2002, Chang, 
2006), comparisons of skill based pay, PFP for sales forces, and the impact of incentives on 
innovation between US and Japan (Brown and Reich, 1997, McMillan, 1990, Money and 
Graham, 1999), and cultural influences on incentive pay design, and PFP in the retailing 
industry of Singapore (Soon and Huat, 1999) and other examples. From management’s 
perspectives, the impact of hierarchy and job characteristics on PFP and pay and 
performance measure have been studied (Chen and Chen, 2004); from employees’ 
perspectives, attitudes to PFP and influences of PFP on employees’ organisational 
commitment and work effort have been studied (Baruch et al., 2004, Bozionelos and Wang, 
2007, Chang, 2006). However, the design and implementation of PFP has not been paid 
much attention.  
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3.6.3 Research on PFP in China 
As discussed in Section 3.4.1, the traditional reward system which was strictly controlled 
by the state rather than the enterprise became a major target of the economic reform in 1978. 
Three major changes happened after the reform (Zhu, 2000): First, linking pay to enterprise 
performance was launched in 1984; Second, diversified pay packages emerged, and the 
restoration and development of the bonus system was another distinctive change. The third 
major change in the reward system was that FIEs were subject to much less stringent 
government regulations compared with SOEs. Since the issue of the labour law in 1994, 
FIEs only need adhere to the minimum wage regulation.  
 
Most of the research and discussion on PFP in the literature has involved studies performed 
in Western nations such as USA, the UK and Australia (Heneman, 1992, Bartol and Locke, 
2000). One of the few studies examining reward practices across different countries such as 
Argentina, Belgium, Korea, Japan, Mexico, France and Germany etc is (Schuler and 
Rogovsky, 1998). It was reported that PFP was more likely to be associated with cultures 
having higher levels of individualism as opposed to collectivism (Schuler and Rogovsky, 
1998). Hofstede (1991) identified China as generally being a collectivistic culture, so PFP 
would not be generally appropriate for Chinese organisations. Shenkar and Chow (1989) 
described the traditional reward system in China as avoiding material incentives with an 
emphasis on egalitarianism. However, Zhu and Dowling (1994) believed that China’s 
market reform would lead to significant changes in management practices, including 
changes in production and reward systems that would place an increasing emphasis on 
efficiency and performance. They indicated that with ‘increased autonomy and decision 
making power it is becoming possible for managers to select differential monetary rewards 
to motivate the workforce according to individual performance’ (Zhu and Dowling, 1994: 
7). Moreover, recent studies in China’s SOEs and MNCs do indicate certain acceptance and 
adoption of PFP (Baruch et al., 2004, Ding et al., 2006, Shen, 2004). 
 
Studies on rewards in China from 1980 to 2007 inclusive were reviewed by the researcher. 
Table 3.6a and 3.6b show the topics, theoretical frameworks, findings and methodology 
applied in the reviewed papers. It is noted that those studies have generally covered 
principles of psychology, economics, international management and labour law etc. 
Research topics include from the employees’ perspective, pay preferences and satisfaction, 
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rewards allocations, motivation; and from management’s perspective, reward systems in 
Mao’s time, reward system changes, reforms and evolutions, firm determinants of pay, 
international reward, equity and equality of pay systems.  
 
The current state of research on rewards in China can be summarised as below. First, like 
the current state of research on rewards in Asia, the evolution of employee rewards after 
China’s economic reforms in 1978 has still been the large focus in previous studies on 
rewards. Second, the existing studies have heavily concentrated on rewards in SOEs and 
COEs rather than other ownership types, such as POEs and FIEs. This is understandable 
because from Mao’s time to 1978, the start of the economic reform, almost 99 per cent of 
enterprises in China were SOEs, and also most of the changes in pay systems occurred in 
SOEs. Studies of rewards in the non-public sector, of both POEs and FIEs, have been very 
few, and those done were mainly on employee preferences of reward allocation and 
managerial pay (Shen, 2004, Baruch et al., 2004, Chen et al., 2002, Cheng and Firth, 2005, 
Ding et al., 2006). PFP in the non-public sector is far from being well studied. Third, 
methodology wise, the existing studies favoured quantitative approaches much more than 
qualitative ones, with only a few among the reviewed studies using case study methods (see 
Table 3.6b).   
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Table 3.6a Articles on rewards in China (content and findings) 
 
Author and  
Year 
Title Level of 
analysis 
Findings 
Tung 
(1981) 
Patterns of motivation in Chinese 
industrial enterprises 
Organisation Firms that intended to set up manufacturing operations in China 
should b e knowledgeable about the nonmaterial incentives in 
order to put them to good use.  
Sharpe  
(1982) 
Reward system in China Organisation The paper discussed the reform of the bonus system after 1978. 
Henley  
and Nyaw  
(1987) 
The development of work 
incentives in Chinese industrial 
enterprises – material versus non-
material incentives 
Organisation This paper discusses the factors affecting the work motivation of 
Chinese worker in SOEs, and the problems encountered in the 
wage reforms.  
Shenkar  
and  
Chow (1989) 
From political praise to stock 
options: Reforming compensation 
systems in the People’s Republic 
of China 
Longitudinal This paper examines the evolution of compensation schemes in 
China after 1978, and discussed the obstacles and prospects for the 
post-reform pay system in future. 
Jackson & 
Littler  
(1991) 
 
Wage trends and policies in 
China: dynamics and 
contradictions 
Longitudinal The paper reviews the pre-1978 Chinese low-wage and high 
employment policy and details the development of Chinese wage 
policies during the 1980s. The dynamics and contradictions which 
have resulted in inflation, declining labour productivity, falling 
real wages and social tensions are analysed. 
Chow  
(1992) 
 
Chinese workers’ attitudes 
towards compensation practices 
in the People’s Republic of China 
Workers An overview and background of the compensation methods used 
in the earlier socialist period and post-reform time were examined. 
Groves et al.,  
(1994) 
 
Autonomy and incentives in 
Chinese SOEs 
Organisation The new incentives were effective: productivity increased with 
increases in bonus payments and in contract workers. The increase 
in autonomy raised workers’ incomes and investment in the 
enterprise, but tended not to raise remittances to the state.  
Child (1995) 
 
Changes in the structure and 
prediction of earnings in 
Chinese state enterprises 
during the economic reform 
Organisation The results indicates that in 1985 factors identified by the 
traditional model, especially age, were the most important 
predictors of earnings. By 1990, some movement towards 
the reform model had taken place, although age continued to 
have an important, albeit weaker, association with level of 
earnings and the link between and performance was still 
quite limited.  
Source: Developed for the thesis. 
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Table 3.6a Articles on rewards in China (content and findings) – continuous 
Author and  
Year 
Title Level of 
analysis 
Findings 
Child (1995) 
 
Changes in the structure 
and prediction of 
earnings in Chinese state 
enterprises during the 
economic reform 
Organisation The results indicates that in 1985 factors identified by the traditional model, 
especially age, were the most important predictors of earnings. By 1990, some 
movement towards the reform model had taken place, although age continued to 
have an important, albeit weaker, association with level of earnings and the link 
between and performance was still quite limited.  
Chen (1995) 
 
New trends in rewards 
allocation preferences: A 
Sino-U.S. comparison  
Organisation The Chinese employees were economically oriented and preferred to invoke 
differential rules for the allocation of both material and socio-emotional rewards 
whereas their U.S. counterparts were humanistically oriented and preferred a 
performance rule for the allocation of material rewards but equality rules for 
socio-emotional rewards.  
Yao (1997) 
 
Profit sharing, bonus in 
SOEs 
Organisation Previous studies do not consider labour quality may have produced biased 
results. The positive effect of bonus payment on production found by others is 
confirmed.  
Giacobbe-
Miller (1997) 
Equity, equality and need 
as determinants of pay 
allocations: A 
comparative study of 
Chinese and US 
managers 
Organisation Both equity and equality were emphasised in Chinese allocation decisions. 
Equity was the primary criterion for US managers. However, equality was the 
primary criterion for Chinese managers. Need was a significant criterion among 
Chinese managers, but not for US managers. However, the amount allocated 
according to need was not very meaningful. 
Meng and  
Perkins  
(1998) 
Wage determination 
differences between 
Chinese state and non-
state firms 
Organisation The state and collective sectors behave more like labour managed firms in that 
they try to maximise income per worker rather than profit, whereas POEs are 
profit maximisers.  
Luk and 
Chiu  
(1998) 
 
Reward systems for local 
staff in China 
Organisation The perceived effectiveness of various reward components by employees were 
base salary, merit pay, year-end bonus, individual bonus, cash allowance and 
overtime allowance. This indicates that cash-form items are found to be most 
effective in attracting, motivating and retaining local Chinese staff. 
Dong (1998) 
 
Employment and wage 
determination in China’s 
rural industry 
Organisation The paper examines the employment and wage behaviour of Chinese TVEs, 
based on a panel of data for the years 1984-1990 
White et al., 
(1999) 
Pay systems and regional 
convergence 
Organisation This paper compares pay policies and wage determination across Hong Kong 
SAR and Guangdong province.  
Lee (1999) 
 
Wages and employment 
in China’s SOEs: 1980-
1994 
Organisation Using firm-level panel data, the importance of reform measures, market 
development, and insider forces in wage and employment determination in 
China’s SOE sector are examined.  
Source: Developed for the thesis. 
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Table 3.6a Articles on rewards in China (content and findings) - continuous 
 
Author and  
Year 
Title Level of 
analysis 
Findings 
Cooper et al., 
(1999) 
Gaming against managers in 
incentive systems: Experimental 
results with Chinese students and 
Chinese managers.  
Organisation The strategic interaction between firms and planners in China, 
comparing behaviour between students and managers with field 
experience with this situation.  
Huang (1999) The impact of education and 
seniority on the male-female wage 
gap: is more education the answer? 
organisation The results show that gender and education have a strongly 
positive and interactive effect on income. The implication is that, 
although males have been seen to benefit from the impact of 
additional education on wages, more education for females may 
still help narrow the gender-based wage gap. 
Choe and Yin 
(2000) 
 
Contract management responsibility 
incentives 
Organisation When the managers in SOEs make decisions under uncertainty to 
maximise their own expected compensation, it is shown that 
managerial contracts generally fail to provide incentives to 
managers for expected profit maximisation.  
Coady and 
Wang (2000) 
 
Incentives, allocation and labour 
market reforms during transition: the 
case of urban China 1986-1990 
Cross-section Failure to address the issue of endogenous selection of more 
‘able’ individuals into SOE can severely bias returns downwards. 
Unlike in SOEs, returns in COEs increased, the latter having 
been allowed to ‘grow out of the plan’ more quickly and subject 
to more competition in factor and product markets.  
Zhang (2001) 
 
The effects of frequency of social 
interaction and relationship 
closeness on reward allocation 
Individuals Both past interaction and future interaction between the co-
workers significantly influenced the allocation decision. The 
results also suggested that the frequency of 2 individuals’ past 
interaction can be predictive of the closeness of their 
relationship.  
Zhou and 
Martocchio  
(2001) 
 
Chinese and American managers 
compensation award decisions: A 
comparative policy capturing study 
Cross-nation Compared with American counterparts, Chinese managers (a) put 
less emphasis on work performance when  making bonus 
decisions; (b) put more emphasis on relationship with co-workers 
when making non-monetary decisions; (c) put more emphasis on 
relationship with managers when making non-monetary award 
decisions; (d) put more emphasis on personal needs when 
making bonus decisions.  
Source: Developed for the thesis.  
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Table 3.6a Articles on rewards in China (content and findings) – continuous 
 
Author and  
Year 
Title Level of 
analysis 
Findings 
Chiu et al.,  
(2001) 
 
Hong Kong and China: The cash 
mentality revisited 
Cross-region Employees in Kong and PRC are both highly motivated by the cash 
mentality. Cash can be very effective in attracting and motivating 
employees.  
Chui and Luk 
(2002) 
 
Retaining and motivation 
employees: Compensation 
preferences in Hong Kong and 
China  
Cross-region In Hong Kong, base salary, merit pay, year-end bonus, annual 
leave, mortgage loan, and profit sharing were the most important 
factors to retain and motivate employees. In China, base salary, 
merit pay, year-end bonus, housing provision, cash allowance, 
overtime allowance, and individual bonus were the most important 
factors to retain and motivate employees. Results are discussed in 
light of economic, geographic, and culture-related factors.  
Chen et al.,  
(2002) 
 
Making justice sense of local-
expatriate  compensation disparity: 
Mitigation by local referents, 
ideological explanations, and 
interpersonal sensitivity in China-
foreign joint ventures 
Organisation Fairness vis-à-vis expatriates increased if the locals were 
compensated higher than their peers in other IJVs or endorsed 
ideological explanations for expatriates’ advantage. Furthermore, 
expatriates’ international sensitivity toward locals reduced the effect 
of disparity on perceived fairness. Finally, perceived compensation 
fairness was related positively to compensation satisfaction but 
negatively to intentions to quit.  
Bodmer 
(2003) 
 
On the use of incentive pay in 
Chinese state-owned enterprises: 
the role of hierarchy 
Organisation Wage are quite sensitive to firm performance, especially at higher 
levels of the hierarchy.  
Nie et al., 
(2002) 
Gender-based perceptions of equity 
in China’s state-owned enterprises 
Organisation Differences between male and female employees’ perceptions of 
equity in SOEs were found to be statistically significant only among 
those employees with fewer years of work experience and those this 
lower levels of technical skills. Perceptions of equity were also 
found to be related to the job satisfaction of both male and female 
employees.  
Hickey (2003) 
 
MNC pharmaceutical 
compensation in China: A 
predictor for human capital trends 
Organisation When comparing the costs of Western pharmaceutical workers with 
their Chinese counterparts, the differentials are large. Nonetheless, 
these labour savings will not be realised to the organisation if 
employee development and ensuing succession are not in place.  
Source: Developed for the thesis. 
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Table 3.6a Articles on rewards in China (content and findings) – continuous 
Author and  
Year 
Title Level of 
analysis 
Findings 
Liu (2004) 
 
A comparison of management 
incentives, abilities, and efficiency 
between SOEs and TVEs: The case 
Iron and Steel industry in China 
Iron and 
steel 
industry 
The problem of the inefficient management of SOEs is deep-rooted and 
multi-faced. The results obtained evidence that the reform measures had 
conflicting impacts on production efficiency and managers’ reward.  
Baruch et al., 
(2004) 
Performance related pay in Chinese 
professional sports 
Organisation The results indicate the importance of the valence for monetary 
incentives, the instrumentality of performance for these incentives and 
clear individual and group objectives for improving performance.  
Shen (2004) Compensation in MNCs Organisation A model of Chinese international reward and compensation is found.  
Cooke (2004b) 
 
Public-sector pay in China: 1949-
2001 
Organisation An overview of three major reforms in China's public sector pay system 
for the last five decades is assessed. The pay system in China 
demonstrates certain unique characteristics such as egalitarian culture 
and heavy proportion of bonus in the pay package. 
He et al., 
(2004) 
 
Reward-allocation preferences of 
Chinese employees in the new 
millennium  
Organisation The effects of ownership reform and collectivism on rewards-allocation 
preferences based on the model of allocation goal priority and the 
conceptual distinctions of vertical and horizontal collectivism.  
Cheng and 
Firth (2005) 
 
Ownership, corporate governance 
and top management pay in Hong 
Kong 
Cross-region Director and institutional ownership moderate compensation but that is 
little evidence that they encourage PFP reward schemes.  
Kato and Long 
(2006) 
 
Executive compensation, firm 
performance and corporate 
governance in China: Evidence from 
firms listed in Shanghai Shenzhen 
stock exchanges 
Organisation It is statistically significant sensitivities and elasticities of annual cash 
compensation (salary and bonus) for top managers with respect to 
shareholder value in China’s listed firms.  
Ding (2006) 
 
Organisational differences in 
managerial compensation and 
benefits in Chinese firms 
Cross-
section 
Organisational factors, such as ownership, firm size, firm age, location 
and industrial sector, have significant impact on the variances in Chinese 
managers’ compensation levels, compensation structures and benefits.  
Lee et al., 
(2006) 
The impacts of benefit plans on 
employee turnover: a firm-level 
analysis approach on Taiwanese 
manufacturing industry 
Organisation 
(Manufactur
ing) 
With respect to the firms’ employee turnover rate, retirement fund and 
fringe benefits are negative while severance plans are significantly 
positive. The results are consistent with the transaction cost theory.  
Bozionels and 
Wang (2007) 
An investigation on the attitudes of 
Chinese workers towards individual 
performance-related reward systems 
Organisation Attitudes towards equality and equity-based rewarding were negatively 
and positively related, respectively, with attitudes towards individually 
based performance-related reward systems.  
Source: Developed for this thesis. 
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Table 3.6b: Articles on rewards in China (methodological considerations) 
Articles Research 
strategy 
Research 
methods 
Empirical 
studies 
Data collection 
tool 
Samples Sampling 
method 
Tung (1981) Qualitative Case study Yes Interviews SOEs Convenience  
Sharpe (1982) Qualitative Explanatory Yes Case study SOEs Convenience 
Henley and Nyaw  
(1987) 
Quantitative 
Qualitative 
Explanatory 
& Survey 
Yes Secondary 
Questionnaire 
SOEs Convenience 
Shenkar and Chow (1989) Qualitative Explanatory Yes Secondary - - 
Jackson & Littler (1991) Qualitative Explanatory Yes Secondary - - 
Chow (1992) Quantitative Survey Yes Questionnaire SOEs JVs Judgement 
Groves et al.,(1994) Quantitative Survey Yes Questionnaire SOEs Snowballing 
Child (1995)  Quantitative Survey Yes Questionnaire SOEs Convenience 
Chen (1995)  Quantitative Comparative Yes Role-play 
Questionnaire 
SOEs Judgement 
Yao (1997) Quantitative Case study Yes Questionnaire SOEs Judgement 
Miller 1997  Quantitative Comparative Yes Role-play 
Questionnaire 
SOEs, JVs, 
POEs 
Convenience 
Meng and Perkins (1998) 
 
Quantitative Survey Yes Questionnaire SOEs, COEs, 
POEs 
Judgement 
Luk and Chiu (1998) Quantitative Survey Yes Questionnaire FIEs Random 
Dong (1998)  Quantitative Survey Yes Secondary TVEs - 
White et al., (1999)  Quantitative Survey Yes Questionnaire JVs and FIEs Judgement 
Lee (1999)  Quantitative Survey Yes Secondary SOEs - 
Cooper et al., (1999)  Quantitative Experimental Yes Random game 
test 
Students 
Managers 
Judgement 
Choe and Yin (2000) Quantitative Survey Yes Secondary SOEs Random 
Coady and Wang (2000) Quantitative Survey Yes Secondary Households Random 
Zhang (2001)  Quantitative Experimental Yes Questionnaire Chinese 
adults 
Random 
Zhou and Martocchio (2001)  Quantitative Experimental Yes Questionnaire Chinese & 
American l 
Convenience 
Source: Developed for the thesis. 
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Table 3.6b: Articles on rewards in China (methodological considerations) - continuous 
Articles Research 
strategy 
Research 
methods 
Empirical 
studies 
Data 
collection 
tool 
Samples Sampling 
method 
Chiu et al., (2001) Quantitative Survey Yes Questionnaire SOEs FIEs Random 
Chui and Luk (2002) Quantitative Survey Yes Questionnaire Bankers, students Random 
Chen et al.,  (2002) Quantitative Survey Yes Questionnaire FIEs Judgement 
Bodmer (2003) Quantitative Survey Yes Questionnaire SOEs Convenience 
Hickey (2003)  Qualitative Case studies Yes Interviews MNCs Judgement 
Liu (2004) Quantitative Case study Yes Secondary SOEs, TVEs Judgement 
Baruch et al., (2004) Quantitative  Survey Yes Questionnaire Sports sector Judgement 
Shen (2004) Qualitative Survey Yes Interviews MNCs Convenience 
Cooke (2004b) Qualitative Descriptive Yes Secondary SOEs - 
He et al., (2004) Quantitative Survey Yes Questionnaire SOEs Judgement 
Cheng and Firth (2005) Quantitative Survey Yes Secondary FIEs - 
Kato and Long (2006) Quantitative Survey Yes Secondary SOEs - 
Ding (2006)  Quantitative Survey Yes Questionnaire SOEs, FIEs, PLFs Judgement 
Bozionels and Wang (2007) Quantitative Survey Yes Questionnaire SOEs Convenience 
Source: Developed for the thesis. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter critically reviewed both theoretical and empirical literature on three relevant 
bodies: HRM, reward management and PFP. The conceptual formation of HRM was not a 
purely ‘Western’ notion, but a combination of both ‘East’ and ‘West’ conceptualisations. 
This argument is also indicated in the transformation of people management systems in 
Asia as well as China. The process of transformation of people management in Asia has 
been a triangular influence among the US, Europe and Asia. The development of HRM in 
China demonstrated that apart from the foreign influence, the state, Chinese culture and 
history strongly impacted the changes.  
 
Universalistic and contingent approaches have dominated studies in international HRM, 
more specifically reward management. However, it is fundamentally misleading and 
misconceived to try to label any HRM practice as universal best practice and any reward 
practice intrinsically high-commitment oriented. Cultural and institutional factors highly 
influence HRM practice in different economies. The contingent approach is better suited to 
explain those cultural and institutional factors than the best practice approach. Furthermore, 
the different approaches of the contingent perspective - resource-based view of the firm and 
institutional theory are evaluated as the theoretical lenses in studying reward practices in 
the context of China in the thesis.    
 
HRM is facing new challenges in the knowledge economy, so that strategic positioning of 
reward management has become critical in knowledge-intensive companies. PFP as a 
managerial tool to enhance higher performance has been shown to be a widespread and 
growing practice. This chapter provided a broad picture of PFP practice in both the West 
and China. Furthermore, the current state of research on PFP in general, in Asia and in the 
context of China were evaluated. Hence, the neglected areas, focus and methodological 
considerations in the existing studies were discovered to support further development of 
research focus and research questions for the thesis in Chapter 4.   
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CHAPTER FOUR  
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 briefly provided the historical development of the Chinese economy and its non-
public sector knowledge-intensive industries as the background to the research. Chapter 3 
critically defined PFP as a concept and examined the existing studies on PFP. Based on the 
literature in the above two chapters, this chapter demonstrates the research focus and 
proposes research question for the thesis. This chapter firstly identifies the research gaps in 
the existing studies on PFP, upon which the aim, focus and research objectives of the thesis 
are then generated, and research questions are defined. Finally, the literature and theories 
relevant to each research question are evaluated.   
 
4.2 Research aim and objectives 
Chapter 3 section 3.6 critically reviewed the existing literature on PFP in general, in Asia 
and in China. This section further identifies empirical and theoretical gaps in the existing 
literature, and establishes specific research aims and objectives for the thesis.  
 
4.2.1 Gaps in the existing literature 
First, the key controversies over PFP were linking pay to performance and linking 
performance to effort (Pfeffer and Sutton, 2001). Therefore, chapter 3 section 3.6 identified 
the importance of PFP design and implementation in order to overcome the potential 
barriers. However, organisations struggle with design and implementation. The intelligent 
design of PFP is essential to avoid pitfalls, and it must accompany effective implementation 
over time. In the existing literature of PFP in general there are very few studies of the 
barriers to linking pay to performance, managerial decision making relating to PFP plans, 
and how the system is implemented (see Section 3.6.1).  
 
Second, PFP has been largely studied in Western nations. However, PFP is still an area 
which has not been well developed in the existing literature of rewards in Asia.  In addition, 
rewards in China have focused on the evolution of pay systems and employee pay 
preferences; pay system in the non-public sector has been rarely studied. Further, PFP 
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design and implementation has been paid extremely little attention (see Section 3.6.2 and 
3.6.3).  
 
Third, the importance of reward management in knowledge based organisations has been 
identified (see Section 2.2). However, PFP in China’s knowledge based industries has been 
neglected (see Section 4.2.3.4). 
 
Fourth, methodology wise, studies of PFP in the West, Asia and China have mainly 
adopted a quantitative approach. In addition, the majority of studies on PFP in the West 
used North American data (Werner, 2004), which might lead to problems with generalising 
findings in a global context. The majority of studies on PFP in Asia as a whole and in the 
context of China heavily applied quantitative questionnaire survey in the empirical studies. 
There is certainly a need for studies on PFP with non-Western and qualitative data. There is 
also a need for exploratory and theory building research. Qualitative research, such as in-
depth, longitudinal case studies can discover important phenomena, especially by being 
sensitive to what may be special in one context but does not exist in another. 
 
4.2.2 Aims and objectives 
In accordance with the discussion above, the overall aim of the thesis is to fill the gaps in 
the existing literature by exploring the nature of PFP practice in the context of China. 
Moreover, the thesis is to provide qualitative data, such as cases and share insights that 
inform those neglected research areas in PFP design and implementation, specifically 
China’s non-public sector knowledge-intensive firms.  
 
The focus of this thesis is on the experience of the management in those companies of their 
PFP practices. Four specific research areas are identified in order to achieve the overall aim 
and further develop research questions. First, in order to give a fair treatment to the topic, 
fundamental knowledge about the situation of PFP in the current pay system as well as the 
ways that management make their decisions on PFP adoption in knowledge-intensive 
industries is necessary; Second, the specific PFP plans and management’s concern about 
introducing the plans are to be identified; Third, intelligent design must accompany 
effective implementation process. The specific organisation’s way of conducting their PFP, 
and the methods applied to measure performance are essential. Fourth, an increasing 
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amount of evidence demonstrates that line managers play a vital role in implementing 
rewards and HR policies successfully, and creating committed and high performance work 
team (Brown and Purcell, 2007). The line managers’ buy-in of PFP strategy can be critical 
in running the system. Therefore, the research objectives for the thesis are: (a) to examine 
the importance of PFP in the current pay system; (b) to identify PFP plans adopted and how 
they are designed; (c) to illustrate PFP implementation issues; (d) to examine the role of 
line management in PFP design and implementation. 
 
There are different ways and perspectives to study PFP because pay plans vary as to pay 
basis, design and administration (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992a). Studies of PFP could 
be from the management’s and /or the employees’ perspectives. This research examines 
PFP plans adopted, the main characteristics of the plans, the performance measures 
selected, and the implementation from a management’s perspective only. The employees’ 
acceptance of PFP system, their preferences of PFP plans, their view of PFP design and 
implementations by management and equity of PFP are not included. Moreover, Studies on 
PFP could also focus on process or outcome. Process encompasses who “champions” the 
plan when it is designed and sold, how opportunities for participation are utilised, how the 
appeal procedure is operated, how performance feedback is provided and so on. This 
research focuses on PFP plan characteristics only.  
 
One can ask why PFP plan characteristics matter, the tie to organisational effectiveness 
seems critical and must be addressed at least in a general way. The existing research shows 
that it is fundamentally misleading to label any pay practice as a universal ‘best practice’; 
therefore, contingent theory can better explain pay practices (see Chapter 3 section 3.4.3 for 
details). The contingency theory holds that the more rational the decision-makers, then the 
greater the extent to which plan characteristics reflect a good fit, and consequently, the 
more effective the plan (Balkin and Geomez-Mejia, 1987, Lawler, 1990). Following this, 
the researcher argues that pay plan characteristics and its effectiveness are interrelated. This 
study examines PFP plan characteristics only, which is as important as the effectiveness.  
 
Limitations of the research focus must be made explicit. This study does not deal with the 
consequences of PFP plan success or failure, including the plan’s impact on organisational 
functioning, and/or individual performance, although the research might to some extent 
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indicate the positive impact of PFP design and implementation on employee motivation and 
performance. Moreover, Bechker and Huselid (1996) note that pay plans should be viewed 
as a part of broader HR systems, in which other elements could harmonise or be at odds. 
Research also shows that pay plans are more likely to affect organisation performance 
when they are bundled with other incentives or HR practices (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 
1992a). However, this study deals with PFP design and implementation practices only. 
Other HR practices by management, such as training and development which might also 
add value to PFP plans are not discussed. In addition, PFP system implementation can 
include different aspects, for instance, PA, communication and feedbacks. However, this 
study examines PA as the main process of implementation only. Based on the discussion 
above, specific research questions are defined and frameworks and theories in relation to 
each of the research questions are considered in the following sections.  
 
4.3 Question 1: How important is PFP in the current pay system? 
Pay systems are the processes of paying employees within a given pay mix and structures. 
The process of evolution of the pay system in China can be summarised as below (see 
Chapter 3 for details): Before the economic reforms, the Chinese government adopted a 
unified grade-wage system, following the Soviet model, in which differentials in wage 
levels were based on different regions and industrial sectors (Takahara, 1992). At that time, 
labour markets did not exist and urban labourers were paid according to the wage grades. 
Despite the constant efforts by the labour authorities to make the wage system conducive to 
productivity, the so-called ‘Rational Low Wage System’, which governed compensation in 
the state sector in China before the economic reforms had generally been criticised as being 
equalitarian, over-centralised, rigid and insensitive to variations in performance (Chow, 
1992, Cooke, 2004b, Takahara, 1992).  
 
With the deepening of the economic reforms, the traditional compensation and benefit 
system characterised by the ‘iron rice bowl’ and ‘cradle-to-grave welfare’ has faded out to 
be replaced by a hybrid, market-oriented, performance-based reward system (Ding, 2000, 
Warner, 1996). Chinese enterprises began to realise the importance of breaking the 
equalitarian mentality and providing sufficient incentives to motivate employees to seek 
better firm performance. Changes in the compensation system include the introduction of 
higher wage differentials and a shift in the relative weight of the various compensation 
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components. A number of market-oriented, performance-based floating or variable 
components have been incorporated into employees’ pay structures, such as position wages, 
skill wages, subsidies, bonuses and profit sharing. The first stage of the pay system reform 
(1978-1984) started with the restoration of piece rates and bonuses in 1978 which weighted 
only 3.1 percent of employee total cash income. However, by 1984, this figure rose to 24 
percent (Yuan, 1990, Han and Morishima, 1992). Moreover, the autonomy of SOEs over 
the distribution of bonuses substantially increased over the reform period. However, the 
level and structure of employee rewards tend to change over time, vary by the ownership of 
the firm, and differ across firms from different industries (Ding et al., 2006).  
 
The existing literature on rewards in China has heavily focused on the traditional pay 
system itself and its transformation. Also, studies on rewards in the non-public sector have 
been few and mostly on employee preferences towards rewards allocation and managerial 
pay. PFP practices in the non-public sector have been very little. In order to explore the 
current situation of PFP in the non-public sector, it is highly necessary to examine the 
extent to which PFP weights in the current pay mix and pay structures of the non-public 
sector. Therefore, the first sub-question is proposed as below: 
 
1a: To what extent is PFP adopted? 
This question illustrates the proportion of PFP in the pay mix, and the extent to which pay 
depends on performances in the pay structure. This section is concerned with outlining the 
relevant theories on components of pay mix, types and determinants of pay structures as 
below.   
 
Components of pay mix 
The traditional Chinese pay system (before the economic reform in 1978) can be roughly 
broken down into three sub-systems: 1) the eight-scale pay structure for production workers, 
mainly in mining, energy and heavy industries; 2) the post or job-type pay structure, for 
employees mainly in light and service industries; 3) the responsibility pay structure, mainly 
for managerial and technical personnel in enterprises (Henley and Nyaw, 1987). After the 
reform, monthly pay consisted of two parts: a basic pay and a supplementary pay (Warner, 
1995, Ng and Warner, 1998). The existing literature shows the employees’ preferences of 
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rewards allocation (Chiu and Luk, 2002), but the exact pay components and pay structures 
in the non-public sector have been absent.  
 
Armstrong (1996, , 2004) divides a pay mix into three key areas: base pay, variable pay and 
employee benefits. Base pay is determined through job evaluation studies and pay surveys 
that inform the pay structure. Variable pay (for example, profit sharing and bonus payments) 
and employee benefits (such as company pensions and healthcare schemes) are determined 
according to individual performance, practice in the organisation and minimum standards 
set by national legislation and influenced by custom. All three taken together make up the 
total remuneration received by the individual. If the theory is applicable to the current pay 
mix in the non-public sector, the findings should display similar components to what 
Armstrong described. Then, the weight of PFP in the pay mix should be identified. 
 
Pay structures  
Pay structures provide a framework for managing pay. The Chinese traditional pay 
structure was identified as strictly graded. The transformed pay structure in the 1990s was 
still influenced by the government official pay guideline (Ding et al., 2001). The existing 
literature on rewards in China does not show the exact current pay structures in the non-
public sector. The main types of pay structure identified by Armstrong (2004) are narrow-
graded, broad-banded, career family and job family structure. A narrow graded pay 
structure consists of a sequence of job grades into which jobs of broadly equivalent value 
are placed. A pay range is attached to each grade. The maximum of each range is typically 
between 20 per cent and 50 per cent above the minimum. The pay ranges provide scope for 
pay progression, which is usually related to performance, competence or contribution. 
Grades may be defined by job evaluation in points terms, by grade definitions or simply by 
the jobs that have been slotted into grades. Differentials between pay ranges are typically 
around 20 per cent and there is usually an overlap between ranges, which can be as high as 
50 per cent.  This overlap provides more flexibility to recognise that a highly experienced 
individual at the top of a range may be contributing more than someone who is still in the 
learning curve portion of the next higher grade.  
 
Broad-banded structures are replacing narrow-graded structures in many organisations 
(Armstrong and Murlis, 2004). ‘Broad-banding’ means that the number of grades is 
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compressed into a relatively small number of wider ‘bands’ in which pay is managed more 
flexibly than in a conventional graded structure, and increased attention is paid to market 
relativities. Broad-banded structures allow for considerable overlap between different 
occupations and levels of responsibility, albeit with the maximum obtainable amount of pay 
usually still increasing as one progresses through the bands and being consistent with 
increased management responsibility. The key difference between graded and broad-
banded structures is that the latter are simpler and more flexible.  
 
Career family structures consists of jobs in a function or occupation such as marketing, 
operations, finance, IT, administration or support services, which are related through the 
activities carried out and the basic knowledge and skills required, but in which the levels of 
responsibility, knowledge, skill or competence needed, differ. Typically, career structures 
have between six and eight levels, which places them somewhere between narrow-graded 
and broad-banded structures. The number of levels may vary between career families and 
certain, often higher, levels may not be divided. Within each career family there are defined 
career paths for progressing to higher levels and routes for pursuing careers in other 
families. Job family structures consist of separate grade and pay structures for different job 
or career families. Whereas career families are focused on an occupation or function, job 
families are typically based on common processes. For instance, IT, finance, HR and legal 
jobs would be identified as separate in a career family structure, but a job family approach 
might combine all these roles into a ‘business support’ family. This approach means that 
typically there are only three to five separate families, although some organisations have 
many more. Each job family has its own structure that may be graded in terms of skills, 
competences, or responsibilities.  
 
Determinants of pay structures 
There are three factors that determine pay structures – job, market and person (Suda, 2007). 
Labour markets are generally divided into two types: external labour markets and internal 
labour markets (Doeringer and Piore, 1971, Williamson, 1975). The market taken in this 
paper as the factor for analysis of the pay system is mainly the external labour market. 
There are two basic types of pay structure: job-based and person-based (Lawler, 1990, 
Milkovich and Newman, 2002, Lawler, 2000). In the job-based structure, pay ranges may 
be determined by reference to relative internal value (established by job evaluation) and 
Chapter 4 Research Questions 
 
 81
external relativities (established by market pay data) (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992a, 
Milkovich and Newman, 2002). Thus, the job and the market are the factors that determine 
pay structures in a job-based pay structure. Pay levels of individuals increase within a 
salary grade or between salary grades according to the individual’s contribution or time in 
the job. Therefore, the factor considered in pay systems is the person (performance and 
time). Consequently, job, market and personal factors determine individual pay levels and 
constitute pay systems in a job-based pay system.   
 
In a person-based pay structure, personal performance and personal attributes, such as skills, 
knowledge and behaviour determine pay rates and pay structure (Lawler, 1990, Lawler, 
2000, Milkovich and Newman, 2002). In theory, this means that pay levels are determined 
by the person’s value based on internal and external relativity. However, as market rates of 
pay for personal elements have not been established, market rates of pay have no direct 
influence on individual rates of pay. Therefore, only the person determines individual pay 
levels and constitutes the pay system in a person-based structure.  
 
In relation to this research question, if the current pay structures in China’s non-public 
sector comply with some of the types above, the findings should indicate certain features 
discussed in this section. Further, this question examines the determinants of pay range and 
pay progression within the pay structure to explore the extent to which pay depends on 
performances in the pay structure.  
 
Question 1a identifies the proportion of PFP in employee pay mix, and whether PFP is an 
important determinant in the pay structure. However, to further identify the importance of 
PFP in the current pay system of the non-public sector, the management’s purpose and 
motivation for doing PFP needs to be explored. Therefore, the second sub-question is 
proposed as below: 
 
1b: Why do firms use PFP?  
The aim of this question is to show how the management sees the use of PFP in their 
rewards setting process. This section is concerned with outlining the theories in relation to 
why PFP is employed by organisations from economic, motivational and institutional 
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perspectives. Agency theory, expectancy and equity theory and legitimacy and institutional 
factors are examined below. 
 
Agency theory 
In the many decades of scholarly research into pay, the main theoretical perspective taken 
has been an economic one, using an agency theory approach. Agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) examines the relationship between principals (the shareholders) and 
agents (the management). It sees there has to be an inherent conflict of interest in the 
relationship: management is portrayed as risk-averse and work-shy, has an incentive to run 
the company for their own benefit, which conflicts with the owners’ desire for shareholder 
value. The complexity of management’s roles means that shareholders cannot effectively 
monitor management’s every action and decision. Accordingly, agency theory sees the 
structure of remuneration contracts as one way of motivating management to manage the 
company in line with shareholders’ wishes. For a fuller explanation of agency theory see 
Eisenhardt (1989a) or Hart (1995).  
 
Prendergast (1999) suggests that there are three main assumptions underlying agency 
theory. The first of these is that there is in fact a conflict of interest between management 
and the shareholders. Not all of the participants in the debate believe this (Davis et al., 
1997). However, it is a common assumption, and one that also seems to underlie the 
broader, non-academic debate as seen in the (Financial-Report, 2003, Report, 2003), and 
that assumption is not challenged in this thesis. The second two assumptions suggested by 
Prendergast (1999) are that management can be motivated to do as the shareholders wish by 
using a form of performance related pay; and that their contracts are written in such a way 
as to facilitate this. These latter two assumptions are considered in this research. If agency 
theory tenets underlie the use of PFP, the research findings should demonstrate that PFP 
plans induce the management to work harder and take risks in the expectation of earning 
the reward.  
 
Motivation: expectancy theory and equity theory. 
Given agency theory assumptions that management can be motivated by monetary reward, 
it is appropriate to look too at the academic literature on motivation. In particular, two 
aspects are considered – whether money motivates and, if so, how money motivates. The 
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question “does money motivate?” is one which has been considered by many researchers. 
Deci (1972) discussed two kinds of motivation – extrinsic and intrinsic. Extrinsic 
motivation relates to what is done by others to motivate employees – for example, paying 
them a performance-related bonus. However, intrinsic motivation relates not to outside 
influences, but to the individual employee, and derives from the individual’s satisfaction in 
doing the job. An argument summed up by Ambrose and Kulik (1999) and Milkovich and 
Newman (2002) is that intrinsic motivation is more powerful than extrinsic, and, indeed, 
the use of an extrinsic driver will decrease the employee’s intrinsic motivation, and thus 
reduce his or her job performance. Osterloh and Frey (2002) explain this as occurring 
because extrinsic rewards “crowd out” intrinsic motivation, to the possible detriment of 
performance. However, one of Osterloh and Frey’s arguments for this is that the external 
reward has the effect of reducing the autonomy of the employee, thus reducing his or her 
intrinsic motivation. A further consideration on the subject of motivation arises from one of 
the classic texts on the subject. Maslow (1970) discusses motivation in terms of the 
hierarchy of needs, suggesting that we first need to satisfy our physiological needs then, in 
order, safety needs, love needs, esteem needs (self esteem and the esteem of others) and self 
actualisation. He points out that a satisfied need is not a motivator of behaviour. 
 
Assuming for the moment that extrinsic measures do provide motivation, it is also useful to 
see how they might work. Two theories are useful in considering this – expectancy theory 
and equity theory. Expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964, Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002) states 
that employees will only be motivated by a reward if they see that reward as being 
something worthwhile; believe that they will receive the reward for achieving the 
appropriate performance; and can see how they could achieve that performance. If those 
conditions are in place, the individual has an incentive to achieve the relevant performance.  
 
Equity theory (Adams, 1963) relates to equity between individuals, or, perhaps more 
correctly, inequity between individuals. The theory suggests that employees look to a 
relevant comparator person (for example, someone on the same grade within the company, 
or someone doing a similar job in a different company) and compares the ratio of their own 
inputs (how hard they work) and outputs (what they get paid) with that relevant other’s. If 
the ratio indicates that their input/output ratio is too high (which would occur if they were 
relatively underpaid) or too low (overpaid) then they will act to redress the inequity. The 
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relevance of this theory to the research is that an equity theory explanation would place the 
emphasis of PFP on a comparison with others, both internally and externally, rather than 
just considering the absolute monetary incentive.  
 
Institutional theory and legitimacy theory 
As discussed earlier, there were government regulations that strongly impacted on the 
traditional pay systems (see Chapter 3 section 3.4.1 for details). In this context, institutional 
theory and legitimacy theory may be relevant to PFP practices. Proponents of institutional 
theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, Scott, 1995) take the view that often companies 
structure themselves in order to be like other companies, rather than for reasons tailored to 
their individual circumstances. Explanations given for the above include coercive 
isomorphism (the need to meet the requirements of regulators) and mimetic isomorphism 
(the desire to be like other companies which are perceived as good). Linked to both of these 
theories is the concept of legitimacy (Harrison, 1987, Suchman, 1995), which suggests that 
companies need to structure their activities in order to achieve legitimacy in the 
constituencies from which they draw resources. In defining legitimacy, Suchman (1995) 
stated that it is “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, beliefs 
and definitions” (p. 574). In the context of this sub-research question, it is useful to 
consider this motive for using PFP by the management. It is possible that PFP plans are 
adopted not so much to enhance performance, but merely so that the company meets ‘best 
practice’ and does not attract adverse attention from, for example, its institutional 
shareholders. 
 
4.4 Question 2: How is PFP designed? 
PFP was defined as the payment that is in addition to base pay and the payment that ties to 
performance measure of individual, group and firm level excluding non-cash forms. The 
second research question is to examine how PFP is designed by management in the non-
public sector knowledge-intensive industries of China. Therefore, it is necessary to identify 
what kind of PFP plans are adopted by the management and what might influence their 
adoption. The two sub-questions are proposed as below:  
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2a: What types of PFP plans are adopted? 
PFP plans are commonly divided into the following three main categories (Reilly, 2005): (1) 
payment-by-results schemes: such as productivity bonus and sales incentives, where a 
proportion of the employee’s pay is linked directly to the level of output of business 
outcome. (2) Performance schemes: including individual performance-related rewards and 
team based pay, where employees are encouraged to meet specific standards or objectives 
that are not necessarily linked directly to output but help the organisation achieve its overall 
business goals. (3) Financial participation schemes: such as profit sharing paid in cash or 
shares via some form of equity-based arrangement, where employees are entitled to a share 
of the organisation’s performance or profits.  
 
Table 4.1: PFP forms 
Payment-by-results 
schemes 
Performance schemes Financial participation 
schemes 
Productivity bonus 
Sales incentives 
Gain-sharing 
Multi-factor schemes 
Profit-sharing 
Share incentive plan 
Company share option plan 
Source: Adapted from Reilly (2005) 
 
Based on the literature above, this question explores management’s choices in setting up a 
PFP scheme as below: (1) Coverage – is it to be an inclusive scheme covering all 
employees or exclusively designed for certain groups? (2) Focus – is it to be a scheme 
based on the performance of individuals or teams? (3) Uniformity of design – are there 
different schemes for different business units or functions or a single mechanism for all 
employees involved? (4) Form of review – is the scheme to be based on some form of 
managerial assessment of performance (eg through an appraisal) or automatic in the sense 
that performance against targets is obvious (eg productivity or sales)? (5) Type of measures 
– are these to be soft (eg behavioural) or hard (eg output-based)? The former will need 
managerial assessment. Are the measures against an absolute standard or relative, eg: 
comparing one team against another doing the same job but at different times or in different 
places but in the same business unit? Comparing one team against other teams in other 
business units in a multi-company group? Comparing one team against an external 
benchmark, eg a national standard of performance?  
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2b: What are the contextual factors that impact on the adoption of PFP? 
RQ2a explores PFP plans and types. To understand the mechanics of PFP design, the 
factors that impact on firms’ PFP plan choices are to be evaluated. The contingency theory 
of reward strategy holds that the effectiveness of a reward strategy depends on the fit 
among environment, organisation, and strategy (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1992, Lawler, 
1990). Therefore, PFP plan design is a function of the organisation in which the pay plan is 
located and the environment in which the organisation operates. There is no agreement as 
to “one best approach” to PFP design.  
 
Gerhart and Mikovich (1990) argue that differences in pay components across 
organisations may be substantial. Surveys have shown that the use of profit sharing, lump 
sum bonuses and other rewards vary across industries and occupations (O'Dell, 1987). 
Organisational factors, such as ownership, firm size, location and industry type, may affect 
the level of rewards (Cole and Healy, 2000, Tang et al., 2000, Chiu and Luk, 2002). 
However, the existing literature on factors impacting on PFP design in the context of China 
is extremely sparse. Factors that impact on pay strategies discussed in the previous studies 
in the context of China are reviewed as follows.  
 
Ownership: Kroll et al., (1997) note that top management pay is influenced by the 
governance of an organisation, such as the composition and structure of a firm’s ownership. 
Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) found that firms with institutional stakeholders tend to 
have lower levels of top management pay, higher proportions of long-term incentives, and 
stronger links between top management pay and firm performance. A survey in 2003, 
conducted by an institute under China’s State Council’s Development Research Centre, 
indicated that firms with foreign investment pay more than SOEs and POEs (China-Daily, 
2004a). Another survey in 2004 found that FIEs in China offer their local managers not 
only higher pay, but also better benefits and more performance related reward packages 
(China-Daily, 2004b).  
 
Location: China’s uneven transition towards a market economy involves different policies 
and enforcement in urban versus rural areas, coastal provinces versus inland provinces, and 
special economic zones versus non-favoured areas (Fleisher and Wang, 2001). China’s 
prosperous coastal and southern regions are much more open to foreign investment and 
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modern management systems and practices, in sharp contrast to the less-developed northern 
and inland regions that lack attractiveness to foreign investors and are less exposed to 
modern HRM systems and practices due to insufficient infrastructure. Employees in 
Eastern China earn more than those in other parts of the country (China-Daily, 2004b).  
 
Firm size: Sales volume and number of employees have been positively related to pay 
level (Mellow, 1982). Larger firms tend to have more complex operations and 
organisational structures. Larger and more complex reward schemes are thus necessary to 
attract and retain qualified employees (Ryan and Wiggins, 2000). Possible explanations for 
this relationship included: (1) the larger the firms, the more sources, and therefore the 
higher the rewards for employees (Wiliams and O'Reilly, 1998); (2) the larger the firm, the 
more complex, and therefore increased pay for additional job requirements (Becker, 1975); 
(3) the larger the firm, the more hierarchical levels and therefore the larger the pay 
differentials (Child, 1973, Simon, 1957). 
 
Firm age: The age of the firm in the context of China is found to be correlated with 
ownership type: most SOEs have longer histories than FIEs, which were established only 
after the economic reform in China (Ding and Akhtar, 2001). Newly established firms are 
quicker to adopted market oriented reward systems, compared with firms with long 
histories, which tend to be influenced by traditional people management practices and 
suffer from more deeply embedded institutional habits and greater barriers to change.  
 
Industrial sector: Economic research by Krueger and Summers (1988) found significant 
industry effects on pay levels that were stable over time. One possible explanation is that 
organisations in a particular industry encounter similar constraints in technology, resources, 
product demand and pricing. These constraints impact an organisation’s ability to pay 
(Gerhart and Milkovich, 1990). Many researchers assert that industry differences may have 
an effect on rewards and benefits (Wiliams and O'Reilly, 1998, Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 
1998).  Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1987) state that firms in high-tech industries pay a higher 
percentage of bonuses relative to salary in comparison with firms in non-high-tech 
industries. Empirical evidence also suggests that top managers tend to have higher pay in 
an uncertain, dynamic and ambiguous environment (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1992, Boyd 
and Finkelstein, 1998).  
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Ding (2006) tested the impact of factors discussed above on managerial compensation and 
benefits. The results indicated that not only industry sector, but also firm age, ownership 
and location impact the level of managerial compensation. Based on the discussion, this 
question examines the possible factors that might impact on the adoption of PFP by 
management in China’s non-public sector knowledge-intensive industries.  
 
4.5 Question 3: How is PFP implemented? 
Intelligent design must be accompanied with proper implementation over time to run a PFP 
system effectively. RQ3 is to explore the implementation issues in China’s non-public 
sector knowledge-intensive industries. However, PFP implementation can be a complex 
process. Pfeffer and Sutton (2001) argue that one of the significant barriers in 
implementation is linking performance to effort, which includes difficulties in measuring 
performance. Therefore, PA is defined as the focus of this research question.  
 
Definition of PA 
The concept of PA has changed over the years. PA has usually been equated with annual 
appraisals which measure the entire year’s effort of an employee, often in terms of numbers 
(Rao, 2008). More recently the concept has been expanded to PM, a broader term and 
encompassing many elements and aspects for a system, for instance planning, development, 
improvements, recognition, and so on. Many people e.g. (Armstrong and Baron, 1998) 
regard PA as a strategic and integrated approach which can increase the effectiveness of 
organisations by improving the performance of people and by developing the capabilities of 
teams and individual contributors. PA allows the company to retain and reward high 
performers and to offer guidance and improvement to poor performers (Smith and W., 
2003).  
 
The historical review of PA in China 
PA practices have long existed in China with strong Chinese characteristics (Zhu and 
Dowling, 1998). However, it is also evident that the Western PA system has been 
influencing the Chinese system since the economic reform in 1978 (Bai and Bennington, 
2005, Cooke, 2003). The development of the performance management system in China 
can be divided into two broad periods.  
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The first period was the state planned economy period during which the operations of 
enterprises were strictly controlled and management practices were greatly limited. 
Employees were generally classified into two groups: workers and cadres (persons engaged 
in certain specified leadership or management work). PA for ordinary workers mainly 
focused on attendance monitoring and skill grading tests. The former was used as the basis 
for wage deduction whereas the latter was used for pay rise. Since pay increase was frozen 
during the Cultural Revolution period (1966-1976), skill grading tests were in effect not 
carried out. In addition, personal character traits were used as part of the criteria in 
evaluating an employee’s performance. For the professional and managerial staff (broadly 
classified as state cadres), PA was used primarily as a means for selecting and developing 
cadres and as evidence for promotion (Zhu and Dowling, 1998). In the early years of 
Socialist China, ideological and technical elites were promoted. However, during the 
Cultural Revolution period, political performance (e.g. loyalty to the Communist Party) and 
moral integrity were the key criteria of performance measurement instead of technical 
competence and output. Organizational leaders were not enthusiastic in conducting PA in 
part because they lacked informative job specifications and performance indicators and in 
part they found the exercise time-consuming (Chou, 2005). The process of such appraisals 
were characterised by vagueness, being open to individual interpretation and dominated by 
political ideology. Thus, its effectiveness is often questionable.  
 
The second period started from the early 1980s till now, i.e. the period of market economic 
development. During this period, and particularly since the 1990s, Western PA systems 
have been more widely and systematically adopted by organizations in both the FIEs and 
SOEs than in the past (Zhu and Dowling, 1998, Lindholm, 1999, Bai and Bennington, 
2005). For example, Björkman and Lu’s (1999) study of 72 FIEs in China found that nearly 
half of them had adapted their western PA system to suit the Chinese culture. Ding et al.’s 
(1997) study of 158 FIEs in southern China showed that ‘regular evaluation of individual 
employee performance and setting employee pay levels based on individual performance 
have become organizational norms’ p611. They also found that workers were receptive to 
individual-oriented performance measurement and rewards in order to maximise their 
income. Lindholm’s (1999) survey of 604 Chinese managerial and professional employees 
from MNCs in China found that they were satisfied with the western-styled performance 
management system adopted in their company. Bai and Bennington’s (2005) more recent 
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study of the Chinese SOEs in the coal mining industry revealed that as a result of increasing 
pressure from intensified market competition, Chinese SOEs were utilizing modern PA 
measures as effective tools to enhance their management efficiency and productivity. PA 
has also become a top priority in the management of government and civil service 
organizations since the mid-1990s, as part of the state’s broader initiative of reforming its 
civil service function (Cooke, 2003). 
 
Changes have been taking place in PA practices that departed from the traditional form. 
Generally speaking, PA for ordinary workers is mainly about linking their productivity and 
level of responsibility with their pay and bonuses in order to motivate them to work 
towards the organizational goals. By contrast, results of PA for professional and managerial 
staff are often linked to annual bonuses and promotion (Cooke, 2007). Changes in cultural 
outlook are also occurring in China. For example, Bai and Bennington’s (2005) study 
revealed that the Chinese cultural values did not impede the implementation of individual 
PA. However, there are numbers of factors that influence the PA in China, mainly in the 
design of the performance indicator, and the process of conducting PA (Cooke, 2007), 
which is the area that existing literature on PA shows insufficient evidence. Therefore, the 
first sub-question is identified as below: 
 
3a. In what ways is performance measured? 
Gerhart and Rynes (2003) identified that there are two types of performance measure often 
used in recognizing individual or collective contributions to organisations, behaviour-
oriented and results-orientated performance measures (see Table 4.2 below).  
 
Table 4.2 Type of performance measure 
Level of Aggregation Results Behaviours 
Individual Individual PFP  
Sales commissions 
Merit pay 
Merit bonuses 
Skill-based 
Competency-based 
Collective Group incentives 
Gain-sharing 
Business unit plans 
Profit sharing 
Stock plans 
Merit pay for groups 
Source: Gerhar & Rynes  (2003) p 103. 
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Different types of appraisal instruments include graphic rating scales (GRS); ranking; 
forced distribution; behavioural observation scales (BOS); 360-degree feedback; 
management by objectives (MBO); behavioural anchored rating scales (BARS); and peer- 
and self-evaluations (Weatherly, 2004; DiNisi and Griffin, 2001). This question examines 
how performance measurements are determined and the implementation process of PA in 
knowledge-intensive firms. The question also examines to what extent PA has developed in 
knowledge-intensive firms compared to the traditional form, as well as the challenges in 
their implementation.  
However, PA systems are used for a number of reasons and can have a significant impact 
on salary administration, performance feedback, promotions, training, development, and 
identifying an individual’s strengths and weaknesses. Conventional approaches to PA 
treated it as a measurement exercise, while more contemporary approaches are more 
concerned with information processing within the PA decision-making process (Rusli and 
Nur Azman, 2004). The existing research does not show much literature in the context of 
China on this area. Thus, the second sub-question is defined as below:  
 
3b: What functions does PA serve in PFP?  
Ding et al. (1997) note that PA in the 158 FIEs in southern China is mainly used to 
determine pay. Chou (Chou, 2005) addresses the fact that PA is often seen as a waste of 
time and not taken seriously by either the appraisers or the appraisees. The lack of utility of 
PA as perceived by appraisers and appriasees remains a severe barrier to the effective 
implementation of PA, particularly in SOEs. A survey conducted by Deloitte Human 
Capital Consulting (China) in 2003 on 51 Chinese enterprises in a wide range of industrial 
sectors (Chen, 2003) found that PA outcomes were used for bonus distribution (by 88 
percent of the sample), promotion, job re-allocation or redundancy (77 percent), pay 
adjustment (49 per cent), training and development planning (49 percent). Nearly 8 percent 
of the sample did not make use of PA outcomes at all.  
 
According to Smith and Rupp (2003), PA can be a critical part of a company’s success 
because they allow the company to retain and reward high performers and offer guidance 
and improvement to poor performers. Brumback (1988) suggests that PA has been used for 
two primary purposes. First, it is to help managers in making administrative decisions, 
Chapter 4 Research Questions 
 
 92
especially regarding pay and promotions. Second, it is to meet developmental objectives, 
such as coaching staff and assessing their training and development needs. Drawing from 
the literature review citations, a wide range of other purposes for PA systems has been 
suggested (Taylor and O'Driscoll, 1993). These include improving performance, validating 
personnel selection, facilitating supervisory feedback and control, and providing a platform 
for organisational diagnosis and development (Jacobs et al., 1980). The PA system is also 
important as a management tool to assess employees’ efficiency in the workplace 
(Armstrong and Baron, 1998).  
 
According to Rusli and Nur Azman (2004), PA is also being seen as having direct influence 
on job satisfaction and motivation of workers. Likewise, Cleveland et al. (1989a) have 
provided a comprehensive list of uses of PA. They developed and empirically confirmed an 
a priori grouping of these uses into four underlying factors. First, between-individuals 
(salary administration, promotion, retention/termination, recognition of individual 
performance, lay-offs, and identifying poor performance); Second, within-individuals 
(identifying individual training needs, performance feedback, determining transfers and 
assignment, and identifying individual strengths and weaknesses); Third, system 
maintenance (personnel planning, determining organizational training needs, evaluating 
goal achievement, evaluating personnel systems, reinforcing authority structure, and 
identifying organizational development needs); and fourth, documentation (criteria for 
validation research, documenting personnel decisions, and meeting legal requirements). 
This question examines functions of PA based on Coleveland et al.’s list above in the 
knowledge-intensive industries to explore how management make use of their PA results. 
Such a study is still rare in the context of China.  
 
4.6 Question 4: How are line managers involved in PFP design and implementation?  
HRM and line managers 
The use of the term HRM has given rise to a considerable body of literature in an attempt to 
define, or deny, its distinctiveness in relation to personnel management (Armstrong, 1987, 
Beer et al., 1985, Blyton and Turnbull, 1992, Fombrun et al., 1984, Fowler, 1987, Guest, 
1987, Guest, 1989, Hendry and Pettigrew, 1986, Keenoy, 1990a, Keenoy, 1990b, Legge, 
1995, Storey, 1989, Storey, 1992, Ticky et al., 1982). One of the characteristics of HRM 
which has been accepted as distinctive, even by those who question its overall 
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distinctiveness, is an increased role for line managers, at all levels, in the management of 
human resources, for example Legge (1995). Therefore, one of the characteristic features of 
the HRM literature is the pivotal role which has been given to line managers as a delivery 
point for a variety of employment policies that are intended to raise the performance of the 
workforce.  
 
The devolving of HRM activities to line managers has received much attention by both 
academics and practitioners (Larsen and Brewster, 2003, Cunningham and Hyman, 1999, 
Gibb, 2003, Renwick, 2003). For example, Sission (1994) identifies the key role for ‘top 
managers’ and ‘line managers’. ‘Top managers’ should offer transformational leadership 
through the establishment of the organisation’s mission and values, and by being highly 
visible and sharing their vision for future success with other employees. Middle managers 
have a vital role to play through their ability to inspire, encourage, enable and facilitate 
change by harnessing the commitment and co-operation of employees. The above 
researchers also see the development of employees as a primary role. For instance, Guest 
(1987) in his initial construction of the core tenets of HRM within the British contest 
identified the role of line managers as one of its central components. He stated that the 
attitudes of line managers, along with their behaviours and practices, were crucial if the 
importance of HR was to be genuinely recognised and integrated into the organisation. 
Consequently, line managers should ‘accept their responsibility to practise HRM although 
they may use specialist resources to assist in policy development, problem-solving, training 
and the like’ (Guest, 1987)p512. 
 
Legge (1989), in her review of US and UK models of HRM, concluded that HRM is 
‘vested in line management as business managers responsible for co-ordinating and 
directing all resources in the business unit in pursuit of bottom line profits’ (1989:27). She 
argues that this approach differs from the classic personnel management model, where the 
line’s role simply reflected the view that all managers were responsible in a general sense 
for personnel management because they all managed people. It also meant, according to 
Legge, that most specialist personnel work still had to be implemented within various line 
management departments by personnel specialists. Under what is deemed to be HRM, by 
contrast, managers handled such responsibilities themselves, which meant that the HR 
dimension was an integral part of business strategy, rather than something which simply 
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flowed from it. In short, the overall argument is that if people are really so critical then 
HRM is too important to be left to personnel specialists (Storey, 1995). In the British 
context, this has traditionally been depicted as a devolution of certain personnel activities to 
line managers after a voluntary re-allocation of responsibilities by the personnel specialists, 
possibly as part of a strategic review of their work (Storey, 1992).  
 
Purcell and Hutchinson (2007) summarise that there are three debates on the role of line 
managers in the 1990s. First, within HRM there was substantial discussion on returning 
HRM to the line. Second, there is clear evidence that line managers’ roles in people 
management have been broadened while maintaining their traditional supervisory duties. 
Third, a steady stream of studies in the period on aspects of the line managers’ role in HRM, 
like appraisal, involvement and incentive pay, has noted the distinction between espoused 
and enacted HRM practices with the gap often explained by line managers’ lack of training, 
lack of interest, work overload, conflicting priorities and self-serving behaviour. 
 
According to the literature above, it can be summarised that involving and inviting line 
management to actively participate in designing and implementing HR activities is a key to 
success in HRM. This area also has been receiving increasing attention since the 1990s. 
Brewster and Larsen (2000) indicate various reasons why line involvement in HRM is 
receiving increasing attention. These reasons centre around the need for a comprehensive 
approach to people management in cost-centred units where decisions have to be made fast 
and on the spot. Ulrich (1998) believes that since line managers are responsible for creating 
value, they should integrate HRM into their work, working in partnership with HRM and 
holding HRM more accountable in delivering organisational excellence. The same concern 
is mentioned by Legge (1995), who believes that there is an enhanced role for line 
managers in those organisations which hold them responsible for bottom-line results.  
 
However, while there is of course a vast literature on managers’ jobs and managerial 
behaviour (Watson, 1994, Nicholson and West, 1988, Scase and Goffee, 1989, Stewart, 
1989, Mintzberg, 1973), there is still a remarkable lack of empirical material on the role of 
line managers within HRM in comparison with other HR areas, such as the link with 
business strategy (Truss et al., 1994). There is considerable ambiguity over how an 
organisation, or its personnel function, would devolve its activities in practice.  
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Reward management and line managers 
Ever since Drucker’s (1954) allegations of management inadequacy and lack of HRM 
attention, there has been research and debate on rewards and the people management 
responsibilities of line managers, be they the ‘forgotten supervisors’ or ‘the lost managers’ 
(Child and Partridge, 1982, Thurley and Wiredenius, 1973). The recent focus has centred 
on three issues (Brown and Purcell, 2007). First, regarding the restructuring of HRM 
functions and devolving of people management responsibilities to the line, to what extent 
are line managers’ responsibilities in rewards and HRM correspondingly increasing?  
Second, research has shown that line managers have become increasingly critical in 
generating employee commitment and high performance, but how could these relationships 
conclude that the role of line managers in bringing HR policies to life is one of the most 
important factors explaining the difference between success and mediocrity? Third, there is 
plenty of evidence of a policy/practice, espoused/enacted, saying/doing gap in HR and 
reward management, which is restricting the operation of these potentially powerful 
relationships. This is generally described in terms of line managers’ lack of interest and 
training, work overload, conflicting priorities, and so on (E-reward, 2005, Guest and 
Conway, 2004).  
 
Although research on rewards has been widely studied, the crucially important issue of line 
managers’ approaches to its design and implementation has not received much attention, 
either in the Western or Asian context. One of the objectives of this thesis is to examine the 
extent to which line managers in the non-public sector are involved in PFP practices and 
the implications of their partnership. In particular, this thesis explores the line managers’ 
role in determining PFP plans, and involvement in decision making and performance 
measurement. Therefore, the two sub-questions are: 
 
4a: How do line managers understand PFP? 
Devolving HRM to line managers has been noted as being problematic (McGovern et al., 
1997). Renwick (2003) posits that the new millennium marked the onset of keen discussion 
about the challenges surrounding line manager involvement in HRM. Challenges lie not 
least in the relationship between line managers and HRM specialists (Cunningham and 
Hyman, 1999), the ability and willingness of line managers to carry out HR tasks properly 
(Renwick and MacNeil, 2002), and line managers’ knowledge of company policies (Bond 
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and Wise, 2003). Renwick (2003), drawing on the work of Ulrich (1998) and Jackson and 
Schuler (2000), identifies that a partnership approach to HR requires the integration of HR 
activities into the work of line managers and that a real partnership approach requires a 
‘triad’ approach between HR specialists, line managers and employees. Critically, this 
implies that there needs to be a shared understanding between HR and the line of the 
latter’s HR roles and responsibilities as the basis of the partnership. Thus, this question 
examines line managers’ conceptualisation of PFP itself and their responsibilities in the 
system.   
 
4b: What are the key supports and barriers to line managers’ involvement in PFP? 
According to Kessler & Purcell (1992) the pay determination process can be divided into 
three stages when PFP is applied. This first stage is the determination of individual 
performance criteria or targets linked to organisational goals and strategy. The second stage 
is individual performance assessment. The third and last stage is when pay adjustment is 
linked to the result of the first two stages, i.e. to what extent the employee has reached his 
or her targets according to the performance assessment. The line manager’s involvement in 
the three stages can vary, depending on the degree of decentralisation in the company and 
the involvement of other actors, such as HR specialists and trade union representatives. 
Harrison (1993) suggests that PA used within performance management systems requires 
four activities, which are part of the role of all line managers. The manager must appraise 
and review the past; conduct the PA interview; plan the future and agree performance 
targets and development plans; and follow up the interview with future action. This 
question further assesses line managers’ activities in each stage of PFP design and 
implementation, and explores the supports and challenges they face.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the research aim, objectives and research questions for the thesis. 
The chapter summarised the literature in Chapter 3, and identified that theoretical and 
empirical gaps existed in PFP design and implementation issues. Therefore, this thesis 
focuses on PFP design and implementation practices from the management perspective in 
the context of China, specifically non-public sector knowledge-intensive industries. Four 
research objectives were considered to be covered, namely: the importance of PFP in the 
current pay systems; PFP plans and contextual factors that affect their adoption; PA issues 
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in implementing PFP; and the line manager’s role. Research questions were further defined 
as below (see Table 4.3). This research will provide a clearer picture of the nature of PFP 
practices in knowledge-intensive industries, and improve our understanding of managers’ 
decision making and sense making of PFP. The next chapter will discuss the appropriate 
research methods applied to achieve the research aim and objectives.   
 
Table 4.3 Summary of research aim, objectives and questions 
 
Research Aim 
 To explore PFP design and implementation practices 
in China’s non-public sector knowledge-intensive industries 
Research focus Research questions 
Q1. Importance of PFP 
in the current pay 
system 
1a: To what extent is PFP adopted? 
1b: Why do firms use PFP? 
Q2: PFP plans and 
design 
2a: What types of PFP plans are adopted?  
2b: What are the contextual factors that impact on the 
adoption? 
Q3: PFP implementation 3a:  How is performance measured?  
3b: What functions does PA serve in PFP? 
Q4: Line management in 
PFP 
4a: How do line managers understand their role in PFP? 
4b: What are the key supports and barriers to line  
     managers’ involvement in PFP design and  
     implementation? 
Source: Developed for the thesis. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapters 3 and 4 critically reviewed the existing literature and identified the research 
objectives as well as the theories which related to the research questions. This chapter 
presents the research design and methods used to undertake the investigation into PFP in 
China’s non-public sector knowledge-intensive enterprises. The data collection methods 
applied to answer research questions and research issues are discussed.  
 
Research design is the process by which the investigation is planned so that the research 
question is answered (Berg, 2001, Kumar, 1996, Neuman, 2000, Zikmund, 2000) Adopting 
the appropriate research strategies and methods is absolutely essential and extremely 
challenging for social science just as Weick (1989) p516 noted: “Whatever strategy is used, 
there will always be an unidentifiable step that relies on the insight and imagination of the 
author”. Therefore, the purpose of this section is to consider a number of methodologies in 
relation to qualitative and quantitative studies in social sciences, and demonstrate the 
system for selecting the appropriate research strategy for this thesis.  
 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the research paradigm taken for the thesis. This 
chapter then compares the advantages and disadvantages of the quantitative and qualitative 
approach, and discusses the reasons for adopting qualitative approaches with the multi-case 
study method in particular in the thesis. Subsequently, the advantages and disadvantages of 
the multi-case study approach are examined. This chapter also demonstrates criteria of the 
cases selected, data collection process, and data analysis such as coding due to the nature of 
the study. Finally, the evidences for the research design quality and ethics and 
confidentiality issues are provided.   
 
5.2 Research paradigm: The critical realism 
Paradigms are important in setting the foundations of the research process as they define 
the relationship of the researcher to the investigation. Guba and Lincoln (1994) state that 
‘paradigms are sets of basic beliefs….it represents the world view that defines, for its 
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holder, nature of the world’ (p. 107). In the context of this research, the paradigm contains 
the rules and standards for generating knowledge and the framework which guides the 
researcher in viewing the research problems and the investigation process. The paradigm 
reflects how the world is interpreted and the relationship between the inquirer and 
knowledge (epistemology). The paradigm also defines how the nature of reality is 
perceived (ontology) and how knowledge is gained (methodology) (Guba and Lincoln, 
1994, Yin, 2003). 
 
Four basic research paradigms have been developed within which researchers may work, 
explicitly or implicitly. These are summarised in Table 5.1 below (Guba and Lincoln, 1994, 
Perry et al., 1999). The critical realism paradigm is considered the most appropriate for the 
thesis because of the following reasons:  
 
(a) The overall research objective is to examine the nature of PFP design and 
implementation in China’s non-public sector knowledge-intensive industries. The outcomes 
of this research seek a deeper understanding of PFP in the context of China. The purpose of 
the research was not only to measure practices, but also to understand what is happening 
and why is happening. However, there has been very little literature on PFP in the non-
public sector. The critical realism paradigm (see Table 5.1) believes that the reality can be 
observed by its components parts.  
 
(b) PFP as a concept in the West exists with pre-determined boundaries. However, there is 
no worldwide definition of PFP, and its exact meaning varies within different countries and 
organisations (see Chapter 3 section 3.5), and PFP practices are quite cultural dependent 
(e.g. see Hofstede’s studies, 1983, 1984, 1991). The critical realism paradigm believes that 
although there is no single reality for PFP, the reality can still be reflected in observing 
parts of it.  
 
(c) PFP design and implementation is varied and dependent on the context of the country 
and the organisation (see Chapter 3 section 3.5). The critical realism paradigm believes that 
the reality can be complex and dependent on the situational factors, such as organisational 
culture, the environment etc. The researchers’ interpretation of the situational factors and 
relationships may affect how reality is observed. 
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Taking the above into account, the critical realism paradigm was considered the most 
appropriate for this thesis. The next section explains why the qualitative approach was 
adopted under the critical realism paradigm for the thesis.  
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Table 5.1: Summary of research paradigms 
 Positivism Critical theory Constructivism Critical realism Application to the 
thesis 
Nature of reality 
or the researchers 
view of 
knowledge 
(ontology). 
The world is a 
deterministic 
environment and 
has laws of cause 
and effect. 
There is a single 
reality but it is 
shaped by social 
values and 
relationships. The 
research should 
reflect the 
researcher’s 
perception.  
No real truth exists; it 
is constructed by 
people (and by 
definition of the 
researcher). 
Therefore, there can 
be more than one 
truth.  
The reality that 
exists is not certain 
as the world is 
complex. Yet 
reality can be 
reflected in 
observing parts of 
it.  
There is no single 
reality for PFP. 
How the 
researcher knows 
the world, the 
relationship 
between the 
inquirer and the 
know 
(epistemology). 
Knowledge is real 
and can be tested. 
Hence the 
researcher is 
objective and has a 
non-influencing 
relationship with the 
phenomena being 
investigated, and 
can predict cause 
and effect.  
The research is 
critiquing and 
seeking 
transformation 
which will lead to 
further 
transformation. 
Researchers’ 
relationship is an 
integral part as they 
are not discovering 
truth but playing a 
part in creating it.  
As the research is 
observing parts of 
a complex world, 
the researchers 
with the world 
impacts on the 
objectivity of the 
investigation. 
The reality that does 
exist is complex and 
dependent on 
situational factors, eg. 
Organisational 
culture, the 
environment etc.  
How we gain 
knowledge about 
the world 
(methodology). 
Scientific methods, 
such as experiments 
and surveys. 
General focus on 
action research 
techniques. 
Users interpretative 
and developmental 
(hermeneutical) 
techniques and 
phenomena are 
perceived as they are 
and causal study 
(phenomenology). 
General qualitative 
methods such as 
case studies focus 
groups and in-
depth interviews. 
Surveys have also 
been used.  
The reality can be 
observed by its 
components parts, eg. 
PFP plans, 
performance appraisal 
practice etc. The 
researchers’ 
interpretation of the 
situational factors and 
relationships may 
affect how reality is 
observed.  
Source: Adapted from Guba & Lincoln (1994), Dooley (1995), Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe  (1996) p 27, and Perry, Reign, & Brown (1999). 
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5.3 Research design: A qualitative approach 
This section examines the research strategy employed and provides the justification for 
the research approach, which is considered in relation to the research methodology and 
methods. The comparison between qualitative and quantitative approach and the reasons 
for using the qualitative strategy for the research are discussed.   
 
5.3.1 Comparison between Qualitative and Quantitative approach 
While there are various approaches to research available currently, empirical research 
plays a more important role than theoretical research in modern business and 
management (Remenyi et al., 1998). Empirical research methods, in general, can be 
divided into quantitative and qualitative. Denzin and Lonclin (2005) provide a valuable 
comparison of the two methods. Quantitative research was originally developed and 
used in natural sciences, and it has become widely used in social science research and 
subsequently organisational and management research. Encompassing such techniques 
as surveys and laboratory experiments quantitative research generally leads to numerical 
data collection facilitating mathematical and statistical modelling.  
 
Qualitative research on the other hand was specifically developed in the field of social 
sciences to enable researchers to study socially derived phenomena. Huberman and 
Miles (2002) explained how they witnessed the explosive growth of qualitative research 
methods in the 1980’s and 1990’s. This growth manifested itself in the publication of 
qualitative based research material in academic journals over the same period, taking on 
various forms including case study research, ethnography and discourse analysis, 
narratives and symbolic interaction studies using techniques, such as observation, 
interviews and questionnaires, to collect data. Each method has its own traditions 
governed by its own genres with its own preferred forms of presentation, interpretation, 
trustworthiness and textual evaluation. Qualitative research methods are designed to 
help researchers understand people, the social and cultural contexts within which they 
live. Glaser (1998) and Miles & Huberman (1994) argue the advantages of 
understanding a phenomenon from the participants perspective, pointing out the 
particular social and institutional context is largely lost when textual data are quantified.  
Quantitative and qualitative methods are normally linked to different theoretical, 
epistemological and ontological approaches (Bryman, 2001). Table 5.2 illustrates how 
qualitative research is normally inductive, in which theory is the outcome of research, 
and it seeks to define or answer the how and why questions. Quantitative research, on 
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the other hand, is generally deductive and aims to identify general laws by testing a 
theory (Strauss and Whitfield, 1998). In brief, there are two epistemological viewpoints 
in social science regarding whether or not the natural science model can be simply 
imitated in terms of principles, procedures and ethos (Bryman, 2001). Interpretivism 
denies this, and positivism advocates this. From the interpretivist stance, it is crucial to 
understand the subjective meaning of the social world, unlike the objects of natural 
sciences. Most qualitative and quantitative research adopts interpretivist and positivist 
epistemological positions respectively. Moreover, in terms of ontological considerations, 
social phenomena are understood within constructionism or objectivism. 
Constructionism embodies the view that social phenomena constantly change as a result 
of social interaction, and objectivism is the view that social reality is an existence which 
is independent from individuals (Bryman, 2001). As Table 5.2 shows, qualitative 
research often relates to constructionism, and a quantitative view advocates objectivism. 
It should be noted, however, that Table 5.2 is a simplified outline of the 
interconnections of qualitative and quantitative approaches. Their distinction is not 
always straightforward (Strauss and Whitfield, 1998) or hard-and-fast (Bryman, 2001). 
 
Table 5.2: Fundamental Differences between Qualitative and Quantitative 
 Qualitative Quantitative 
Principal orientation of the 
role of theory in relation to 
research 
 
Epistemological orientation 
 
 
Ontological orientation 
Inductive; generation of 
theory 
 
 
Interpretivism 
 
 
Constructionism 
Deductive; testing of 
theory 
 
 
Natural science model, in 
particular positivism 
 
Objectivism 
Source: Bryman (2001), p20.  
 
The advantages and disadvantages of these methods can be briefly summarised. 
Qualitative research is suitable for a wide range of variables and issues, especially those 
which cannot be quantified, and it is useful to study causation and map out a picture of 
real behaviour (Strauss and Whitfield, 1998). With the qualitative method, people in the 
focus groups must be related to each other causally, but are not necessarily typical 
(Sayer, 1992). However, qualitative research is weak on generalisability and the results 
are considered to have limited external validity (Strauss and Whitfield, 1998). Moreover, 
the results of qualitative research, which map out the causality of phenomena, may not 
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be representative. As a result, there is a criticism of the qualitative method in that it is 
neither objective nor scientific (Sayer, 1992). The qualitative approach also suffers from 
a problem with transparency because the findings may be influenced by the researcher’s 
expectations or biases (Strauss and Whitfield, 1998). Hence, it may be difficult to 
replicate the study. 
 
These advantages and disadvantages apply to quantitative methods in a reversed form 
(Sayer, 1992). With the quantitative method the research does not have to focus on 
groups whose members interact with one another, but they must share similar attributes. 
Quantitative researchers are rarely concerned merely to describe how things are, but are 
keen to say why things are the way they are. In quantitative research the researcher is 
usually concerned to be able to say that their findings can be generalised beyond the 
confines of the particular context in which the research was conducted. The concern 
with generalizability or external validity is particularly strong among quantitative 
researchers using cross-sectional and longitudinal designs. However, quantitative 
researchers fail to distinguish people and social institutions from ‘the world of nature’. 
The quantitative method, which is a broad-brush method, lacks sensitivity to detail. The 
measurement process possesses an artificial and spurious sense of precision and 
accuracy. For example, when members of a sample respond to a question on a 
questionnaire, the assumption is that they interpret the key terms in the question 
similarly. Meanwhile, the descriptive generalisations have limited nature.  
 
Many researchers argue that both qualitative and quantitative research can be combined 
within a single research project (Bryman, 2001, Gill and Johnson, 2002). For instance, 
Sayer (1992) argues that qualitative and quantitative methods can work in a 
complementary way to provide concrete explanations of social events. However, this 
multi-method approach is controversial. The integration of the two methods has been 
increasing since the 1980s, but there are two main types of criticism against this 
(Bryman, 2001). First, the use of multi-methods is questioned by those who advocate 
the view that research methods carry epistemological commitments. If every method 
uses each procedure, the integration of two methods could create conflicting 
epistemological implications. Therefore, multi-strategy research risks inviting 
interpretivism, and is unfavourable to positivism. Second, there is a view that qualitative 
and quantitative methods are regarded as different “paradigms” which dictate different 
research procedures and interpretations. An integration of different paradigms results in 
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only superficial results. Additionally, there is a problem with multi-methods because 
they are time-consuming and costly, though their use is recommended for those working 
in research teams (Gill and Johnson, 2002). Thus, this thesis does not adopt multi-
methods because it is beyond the resources of an individual researcher.  
 
This section has outlined the debate surrounding qualitative, quantitative and multi-
methods. The methodological choice should be a conscious choice dictated by the 
philosophical foundations and the nature of the research (Wass and Well, 1994). 
According to Remenyi et al., (1998), four key issues should determine the research 
strategy, namely: the research questions; the costs or budget available to the researcher; 
the time available and the target date for completion; and the skills of the researcher. In 
section 5.3.2, the research strategy adopted in this thesis is addressed, together with 
methodological issues.  
 
5.3.2 Reasons for adopting qualitative approach  
At an abstract level, this thesis considers PFP design and its implementation, and seeks 
to understand the role of management in China’s non-public enterprises. More 
concretely, the aim is to explore PFP practice in China and consider the phenomena at a 
theoretical level. The research objectives are to examine: to what extent PFP is 
important in the knowledge-intensive companies; how PFP plans are designed and 
performances are measured, and how line managers are involved in PFP? In order to 
fulfil these research objectives, a qualitative research strategy was adopted in the thesis 
along with multi-case studies as the research method to study the research questions 
above. The reasons are discussed as below. 
 
First, qualitative research fits the nature of the research questions. Qualitative research 
is suitable for a wide range of variables and issues, especially those which cannot be 
quantified, and it is useful to study causation and map out a picture of real behaviour 
(Strauss and Whitfield, 1998). The questions (i.e., why do firms use PFP, how PFP 
plans are designed, how performance is measured and how line managers are involved 
in PFP?) are sensitive in nature, and cannot be identified precisely through quantitative 
research. Because, as discussed above, quantitative methods cannot provide a clear 
picture of how things are, which is what this research aims to identify - how PFP is 
designed and implemented in the context of China.  
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Second, as discussed in chapter 3 section 3.6, there is a lack of sophisticated theory 
development on PFP in the context of China, which requires more exploratory and 
theory-generating research than purely empirical testing. The qualitative approach 
seems better than a quantitative approach to fill this gap. 
 
Third, qualitative research allows deeper cross-cultural understanding and is less likely 
to suffer from cultural bias and ethnocentric assumptions on the part of the researcher 
than survey instruments. Qualitative research examines organisations and societies ‘on 
their own terms’, rather than imposing one’s own culturally bound concepts and 
theories (Boyacigiller and Adler, 1991). Compared to quantitative methods, qualitative 
research takes a more holistic approach to the research object and studies a phenomenon 
in its context. The thesis aims to explore one of the HRM practices - PFP in the context 
of China, which could involve culture dependent issues and context (see the discussion 
in Chapter 3 section 3.3). Therefore, a qualitative approach becomes a better choice than 
quantitative.  
 
Fourth, qualitative research goes beyond the measurement of observable behaviour (the 
‘what’), and seeks to understand the meaning and beliefs underlying action (the ‘why’ 
and ‘how’) (Buckley and Chapman, 1996). As Wright (1996) explains, qualitative 
research provides answers to ‘messy’ problems and complex issues that are typical for 
international management research. Qualitative methods can take advantage of rich data 
and in this way allow the research to obtain more meaningful results about ‘soft’ inter-
relationships between core factors.  
 
Fifth, research instruments need to be chosen to suit the particular location in which the 
research is being conducted. Qualitative research may be suitable in those cultures in 
which particular emphasis is placed upon the development of social, face-to-face 
relations and trust (Harari and Beaty, 1990). Furthermore, actual pay data is strictly 
confidential in China, and the implementation issues of the management vary under 
different situations. Those constraints make it even more difficult to conduct 
quantitative analysis for this thesis. Based on the above reasons, this study adopted a 
qualitative approach not the quantitative one. 
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5.4 Research method: Multiple-case study 
This section explains the reasons for adopting a multiple-case study method for the 
thesis, and examines the advantages and disadvantages as well as the useful way to 
improve the quality of the research. 
 
5.4.1 Reliability and validity of case study method 
Often the problems about case-study research can be summarised as the lack of 
transparency, objectivity, generalisability and contribution to scientific development 
(Bryman, 2001). The criticism of lack of generalisability of case studies is mainly 
because case studies generate context-dependent knowledge rather than context-
independent information (Abercrombie et al., 1984, Campbell and Stanley, 1966). 
Flyvbjerg (2006) states that predictive theories cannot be found in the study of human 
affairs. Concrete, context-dependent knowledge is therefore more valuable than the vain 
search for predictive theories and universals. Context-dependent knowledge and 
experience are at the very heart of expert activity (Flyvbjerg, 2006).  
 
The closeness of the case study to real-life situations and its multiple wealth of details 
are important in two respects (Flyvbjerg, 2001, Flyvbjerg, 2006). First, it is important 
for the development of a nuanced view of reality, including the view that human 
behaviour cannot be meaningfully understood as simply the rule-governed aspects 
found at the lowest levels of the learning process and in much theory. Second, there 
does not, and probably cannot, exist predictive theory in social science. According to 
Flyvbjerg (2006), social science has not succeeded in producing general, context-
independent theory. Thus, there is nothing else to offer than concrete, context-dependent 
knowledge. The case study is especially well suited to produce this type of knowledge.  
 
As discussed in the literature review, section 3.2, there is no homogeneous model of 
HRM in Chinese enterprises. The HRM practices are somehow formed depending on 
the basis of their existing conditions and the impact of the economic reforms. The pay 
practices of the non-public firms in China could be very context-dependent. Therefore, 
multi-case studies used in this research can be the most appropriate way to explore the 
differences and similarities of pay practices among ownerships of non-public firms. 
 
Moreover, generalisability can be increased by the strategic selection of cases (Ragin, 
1992, Rosch, 1978). As discussed in section 5.5 - sampling, a stratified sample strategy 
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was applied to this study. Cases were specially selected from knowledge-intensive 
industries such as IT, investment and pharmaceutical, where PFP plans were widely 
spread and important in pay systems. Case firms had similar size, age and similar length 
of establishment in POEs and FIEs respectively in order to effectively compare and 
contrast the cases. Thus, the interpretation of such case selection can provide a wealth of 
information on PFP in the non-public knowledge-intensive companies.  
 
The falsification, not verification and subjectivity, is another criticism of the case study 
method (Bryman, 2001). However, according to Flyvbjerg (2006), the question of 
subjectivism and bias towards verification applies to all methods, not just to the case 
study and other qualitative and quantitative methods. Ragin (1992) argues that if one 
assumes that research can be described by the phenomenology for human learning, it 
then becomes clear that the most advanced form of understanding is achieved when 
researchers place themselves within the context being studied. Only in this way can 
researchers understand the viewpoints and the behaviour which characterises social 
actors. From this point of view, we can understand that when there is the lack of 
existing literature on pay system and PFP processes in China (which the literature 
chapter 3 section 3.6 demonstrated is the case), case studies are more likely to provide 
the proximity to reality than other qualitative methods because it generates the learning 
process for the researcher which often constitutes a prerequisite for advanced 
understanding.  
 
Furthermore, Beveridge (1951) concludes that there are more discoveries stemming 
from the type of intense observation made possible by the case study than from statistics 
applied to large groups. From this point of view, we can understand why the researcher 
restructured the research questions after the pilot study and cast off some notions and 
theories, which are explained in section 5.6. Therefore, the researcher agrees with 
Flyvbjerg (2006) who concludes that it is a misunderstanding that the case study 
supposedly contains a bias toward verification and a tendency to support researchers’ 
preconceived ideas. The case study contains no greater bias toward verification of the 
researcher’s preconceived notions than other methods of inquiry. On the contrary, 
experience indicates that the case study contains a greater bias toward falsification of 
preconceived notions than toward verification.  
 
Chapter 5Methodology 
 
 
 109
Case studies often contain a substantial element of narrative, which tends to be seen by 
critics of the case study as a drawback (Abercrombie et al., 1984, Bryman, 2001, 
Campbell and Stanley, 1966). However, Flyvbjerg (2006) has recently suggested that an 
element of narrative is a most useful advantage of case studies. Nietzsche (1974) argues 
that one should not wish to divest existence of its rich ambiguity, so the question is 
whether summarizing and generalisation is always desirable. Peattie (2001) warned 
against summarising dense case studies: “It is simply that the very value of the case 
study, the contextual and interpenetrating nature of forces, is lost when one tries to sum 
up in large and mutually exclusive concepts”(p. 260). Nietzsche (1969) and Rorty (1985) 
similarly advocated a focus on “little things”. According to Peattie (2001), the dense 
case study is more useful for the practitioner and more interesting for social theory than 
either factual “findings” or the high-level generalisations of theory. Therefore, the case 
study is more about diversification rather than generalisation. Summarising case studies 
is not always useful and necessary and may sometimes be counter-productive. 
Moreover, MacIntyre (1984) argues that the human being is a “story-telling animal” 
(pp.214, 216), and the notion of a history is as fundamental a notions as the notion of an 
action. Mattingly (1991) pointed out that narratives not only give meaningful form to 
experiences we have already lived through but also provide us a forward glance, helping 
us to anticipate situations even before we encounter them, allowing us to envision 
alternative futures. So a good case study contains good quality narratives. Flyvbjerg 
(2006) concludes that “it is correct that summarising case studies is often difficult, 
especially as concerns case process. It is less correct as regards case outcomes. The 
problems in summarising case studies, however, are due more often to the properties of 
the reality studies than to the case study as a research method. Often it is not desirable 
to summarise and generalise case studies. Good studies should be read as narratives in 
their entirety.” (p. 241)  
 
In relation to this research, twelve firms were studied in terms of their PFP design and 
implementation. The researcher tended to generalise at a certain level and use narrative 
as a whole, so that different things in different cases are explored and allow the study to 
be different things to different people rather than all things to all people. A multiple-
case study approach was applied to this qualitative research strategy rather than a single 
case study. The advantages and disadvantages of the multi-case study method and ways 
to improve the quality of the research method are discussed below. 
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5.4.2 Advantages of multi-case study method 
First, this research was to discover PFP practices in China’s non-public enterprises, 
which include different ownership types: POEs, JVs and MNCs. A single case can not 
represent all these types of ownerships. Second, the researcher intended to explore how 
PFP plans were designed and implemented from the management perspective. As 
discussed in the literature (see Chapter 3 section 3.6 for details), due to the lack of 
relevant theories on this topic in the context of China, our research questions are 
basically ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions which are more explanatory and likely to lead to 
the use of case studies as the preferred research strategy (Yin, 2003).  
 
Third, in order to explore the design and implementation issues of PFP plans in China’s 
non-public firms, managerial decision making and the current ways of their practice 
were to be studied. The case study is preferred for examining contemporary events; to 
some extent it relies on historical records such as firm documents, but it adds two 
important sources of evidence that are direct observation of the events being studied and 
interviews of people involved in the events. The case study’s special strength is its 
ability to deal with a full variety of evidence – documents, artefacts, interviews and 
observations – beyond what might be available in a conventional historical study or 
survey.  
 
Fourth, due to the lack of research on PFP implementation in both Western and Chinese 
HR literature (as was outlined in chapter 3 section 3.6), we know very little about what 
has happened and what is happening in terms of PFP implementation in China’s non-
public firms. Moreover, the implementation of PFP in China could be very different 
from the practice in Western countries, as suggested by (Baruch, 2004). Interpretive and 
multiple case studies can be the most appropriate method for this thesis compared with 
some other suitable methods because case study has a distinctive place in evaluation 
research (Cronbach, 1980, Guba and lincoln, 1981, Patton, 1990, U. S. General 
Accounting Office, 1990). For instance, a case study can explain the presumed causal 
links in real-life intervention that are too complex for survey or experimental strategies. 
The case study can better describe an intervention and the real life context in which it 
occurred. The case study can better illustrate certain situations in which the intervention 
being evaluated has no clear, single set of outcomes. Furthermore, case studies can be 
conducted and written with many different motives, including the simple presentation of 
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individual cases or the desire to arrive at broad generalisations based on case study 
evidence- sources.  
 
Finally, the multiple-case study has distinct advantages in comparison to single-case 
designs. The evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling, and the 
overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust (Herriott and Firestone, 1983).  
 
5.4.3 Disadvantages of multiple-case study 
Using multiple-case study has distinct disadvantages too. First, getting the access to 
different case firms can be challenging to an individual researcher. Moreover, getting 
the access to pay system and performance management records can be more challenging 
because those rewards are very sensitive data for the company to open to someone who 
is not even a member of the organisation unless the researcher can have a very good 
relationship with their high management. Second, this is similar to the beginning of the 
first disadvantage; the conduct of a multiple-case study can require extensive resources 
and time beyond the means of a single student or independent research investigator. 
Third, the number of cases has to be deemed necessary or sufficient for the research. 
The typical criteria regarding sample size are irrelevant. Instead, the decision has to be a 
reflection of the number of case replications – both literal and theoretical – that are 
needed or preferred to have in a study.  
 
Fourth, researchers such as (1966) and Wieviorka (1992) who have been critical of case 
studies often point to the fact that a case study investigator fails to develop a sufficiently 
operational set of measures and that ‘subjective’ judgments are used to collect the data. 
Finally, there are translation biases in data collection, which are lost before translation 
and lost in translation. This also applies in single case study, however, it might be worse 
with multi-case study due to the large amount of data. 
 
5.4.4 Useful ways of improving the quality of the multiple-case study 
Although there is no perfect means of overcoming the bias, the researcher did adopt 
some useful ways to increase the quality of this multi-case study research. First, there 
are personal accesses for some of the firms selected in this study, and relationship 
building with the management in all the firms was on-going. Second, a pilot field study 
was conducted which was helpful to generate specific research questions, improve the 
further investigation and reduce unnecessary waste of time (see section 5.6.1 for details). 
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Third, the cases selected in this study consisted of some with strong PFP plans and 
some with simple programmes. Fourth, to improve the construct validity the researcher 
selected the events and programmes that were related to the original objectives of the 
study, and the demonstration of those pay plan and practices selected does reflect the 
events. Finally, back translation was used in the thesis as discussed in section 5.6. 
 
5.5 Sampling   
In selecting the population for an investigation the particular setting is defined by the 
research topic (Berg, 2001, Dick, 1990). In this research, the knowledge-intensive 
organisations are the research setting and within this setting, industries such as 
pharmaceutical, IT and investment, were selected (see the discussion in Chapter 2 
section 2.4). Moreover, accesses to case companies from those selected industries were 
available, their managements agreed to make people and documents available. The 
sampling strategy and criteria are discussed in the sections below. 
 
5.5.1 Sampling strategy 
Sample strategies are based on the promise that by using a sample, inferences about 
some large population from which the sample is taken can be made. There are two 
major sampling approaches: (i) probability sampling; and (ii) non-probability sampling 
(Berg, 2001, Dick, 1990).  
 
Probability sampling for multiple case studies, which is based on in-depth interviews, 
was not considered suitable for this research. This is due to the amount of data 
probability sampling would generate, the resources required to manage the data, and the 
ability and possibility to access the cases and population as an individual researcher. 
Therefore, probability sampling was considered too unwieldy and impossible.  
 
Non-probability sampling is based on effort to approach a quasi-random sample that 
may reflect a larger group. Berg (2001) has identified four of the common non-
probability sampling strategies: (a) Convenience sampling: in many research contexts, 
the sample is simply selected by asking for volunteers. (b) Purposive sampling: the 
sample is selected with a purpose in mind. Purposive sampling can be very useful for 
situations where a specific group of people needs to be targeted and where sampling for 
proportionality is not the primary concern. (c) Snowballing sampling begins by 
identifying someone who meets the criteria for inclusion in the study. The researcher 
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then asks them to recommend others who they may know who also meet the criteria. (d) 
Quota sampling is to select people non-randomly according to some fixed quota.  
 
Patton (1990) recommends purposive sampling to select cases with maximum variation 
as the most appropriate strategy for analytical and general purposes. Perry (1998) 
summarises purposive sampling as selecting information rich cases. In consideration of 
the above, both convenience sampling and purposive sampling strategies were adopted 
in this thesis.  Convenience sampling was used to access firms in the pilot, HR 
consultancy firms as well as HR and reward management specialists in the research. See 
the detail in section 5.5.3 – Sample profile. Purposive sampling was used to select the 
cases and interviewees because this research targeted knowledge-intensive industries as 
the research setting and managers as the proposed group of interviewees. The sampling 
criteria and profile of the sample are discussed as below.  
 
5.5.2 Sampling criteria 
This research is about PFP in China’s non-public sector. Ownership types, size, 
industries, age of the firms and the interviewee groups need to be considered. Table 5.3 
shows the summary of the sampling criteria for the thesis.  
Table 5.3 Summary of sampling criteria 
Ownership No. of 
firms 
Size Age Industry Interviewees 
POE and 
FIE (JV + 
MNCs) 
More 
than two 
for each 
type. 
Medium 
to large 
More than 5 
years of 
establishment 
Knowledge-
intensive 
industries  
Focus on senior 
management, 
HR and line 
managers. 
Source: Developed for the thesis. 
 
Ownership types and number of cases  
Based on the definition of the non-public sector in China by Tung (1991), POE, JV and 
MNC were included as the ownership types for the thesis (see Chapter 2 section 2.3 for 
details). Eisenhardt (1989b) states that cases should be added until theoretical saturation 
is achieved. Superimposed on this, however, is the restraint of time and resources (Perry, 
1998). Moreover, Eisenhardt (1989b) recommends between four and ten cases as a 
reasonable minimum for a serious project. Perry (1998) recommends between four and 
six groups. Based on the recommendation above, and in order to get the balance 
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between the ownership types, a minimum of two cases for each ownership type was 
considered to be the number of cases to be studied in this research.  
 
Firm age 
Small sized and newly established firms were excluded in the study due to the 
assumption that PFP programmes may not be mature in new firms. However, the 
definition of firm age varies by countries, industries and time period. In the thesis, the 
criteria of firm age by Ding et al., (2006) was adopted, who recently studied managerial 
rewards in China. Thus, firm age in this thesis was defined as newly established (less 
than 5 years), medium-aged firms (5 to 15 years) and old firms (more than 15 years).  
 
Firm size and location 
OECD (1994) defines establishments with up to 19 employees as ‘very small’; with up 
to 99 as ‘small’; from 100 to 499 as ‘medium’, and with over 500 as ‘large’. Ding et al., 
(2006) also defined firm size as small firms (less than 100 employees), medium-sized 
firms with 100 to 500 employees, large firms with 501 to 2000 employees and very 
large firms with more than 2000 employees. Thus, firm size was defined as medium to 
large (100-500 and above) for the thesis. Case firms and interviews were based in 
Shanghai – the financial centre of China due to the researcher’s personal access to the 
firms and HR consultancies. The background statistics on Shanghai is presented in 
Chapter 2 section 2.5. 
 
Interviewees  
As discussed in Chapter 4 section 4.2.2, this research was on PFP from the management 
perspective, and research question 4 was on line management in PFP. Therefore, the 
focus group of interviewees was from levels of management, such as top management, 
HR managers and middle managers. Employees were not included. In order to develop 
an interview guide and improve the quality of data analysis, some HR and reward 
management specialists from leading HR consultancies were also included in the pilot, 
fieldwork and back-translation process. Moreover, this thesis focused on the 
organisational level only. Managers from unit levels were not included in the focus 
group.  
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5.5.3 Profile of the sample 
This section presents the profile of the sample in the thesis, including the cases selected, 
managers interviewed in the case firms and HR and reward management specialists 
from the HR consultancies.  
 
5.5.3.1 Profile of case firms 
Table 5.4 shows the ownership, industry, country of origin, size and year of 
establishment of each case firm selected in the thesis. All together 12 knowledge-
intensive firms were involved including 5 POEs, 2 JVs and 5 MNCs, which were from 
investment/marketing research (3 firms), IT (4 firms) and pharmaceuticals (5 firms). 
The background information of the industries selected can be found in Chapter 2 section 
2.4.4.  The case firms were all middle-aged with age of incorporation between three and 
fifteen years. Four cases were large firms (POE1, JV2 and MNC4) and others were 
medium to large size. The background information of each case firm is in Appendix 5.1.  
 
Table 5.4 Profile of the case firms 
Firms Industry Country of 
origin 
Size Year of 
corporation 
Employees 
POE1 Investment Domestic Large 1999 >1500
POE2 IT Domestic Medium 1998 >400
POE3 IT Domestic Medium 2001 >300
POE4 Pharmaceutical Domestic Large 1994 >750
POE5 IT Domestic Medium 2003 >300
JV1 Investment China & New 
Zealand
Medium 1996 >400
JV2 Pharmaceutical China & Swiss Large 1994 >1000
MNC1 Pharmaceutical England Medium 1998 >350
MNC2 Pharmaceutical France Medium 1999 >400
MNC3 Medical device Germany Medium 2001 >300
MNC4 IT India Large 2003 >500
MNC5 Marketing 
research 
US Medium 2000 >300
Source: From archival data of the cases. 
 
5.5.3.2 Profile of interviewees 
In total sixty-two interviews were conducted during our pilot study and fieldworks. 52 
interviews were top management (15), HR managers (14) and line managers (23) in the 
case firms (see Table 5.5) and ten interviewees were HR specialists from international 
and local management consultancies such as Mercer, Watson Wyatt and Luowen 
Shanghai (see Table 5.6). Half of them were interviewed twice during the fieldwork.  
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Table 5.5 Profile of the interviewees (52 in total) 
Firms Level and role at time of interview Years 
with firm 
Interview 
times 
POE1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chairman of the board 
Vice president *2 
General manager 
Director of finance dept. 
Director of administrative dept. 
HR manager 
Director of president office 
20 
15 
10 
7 
6 
6 
5 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
POE2 
 
General manager 
HR manager 
Sales manager 
Marketing manager 
10 
7 
5 
5 
2 
2 
1 
1 
POE3 
 
General manager 
HR manager 
R&D manager 
Sales manager 
Customer service manager 
7 
3 
4 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
POE4 
 
General manager 
HR manager 
Sales manager 
Product manager 
10 
4 
4 
7 
2 
2 
1 
1 
POE5 
 
General manager 
HR manager 
5 
2 
2 
2 
JV1 
 
Director Vice president 
Assistant to president office 
Financial controller 
HR manager 
12 
5 
3 
3 
2 
1 
2 
1 
JV2 
 
General manager 
HR manager 
Regional medical & public affairs manager 
8 
3 
6 
1 
1 
2 
MNC1 
 
HR director, China 
HR manager 
HR specialist 
Training manager 
Marketing manager 
Sales manager 
5 
4 
6 
4 
7 
5 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
MNC2 
 
 
 
HR senior manager, Shanghai 
Senior brand manager 
Marketing senior manager 
Sales director 
3 
4 
3 
5 
1 
1 
2 
2 
MNC3  
 
HR director, China 
HR manager, Shanghai 
Policy and government affairs manager  - Eastern region 
5 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
MNC4 HR director, China 
HR manager, Shanghai 
Project manager 
4 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
MNC5 
 
Training and development director, China 
HR senior manager, China 
HR shared service lead 
HR manager, Shanghai 
Project development manager 
Sales manager  
Client solutions manager 
6 
3 
2 
4 
2 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Source: From the interviews. 
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Table 5.6 Profile of HR specialists interviewed 
Firm Title 
Mercer HR consulting Business leader China, Health & benefits 
Watson Wyatt Director Principal consultant 
Shanghai Hui Yuan consulting Co., let General manager 
Beijing Zion consulting Co., Let. Senior consultant 
McDonald HR director, China 
Panthera capital group Director *2 
LuoWen Talent consulting Business development manager *3 
Source: From interviews 
 
5.6 Data collection  
This section discusses data collection methods used for the thesis. Pilot study, primary 
and secondary data collections are described, and the back-translation employed is 
explained. 
 
5.6.1 Pilot study 
Undertaking a pilot case study is strongly recommended by Berg (2001), Dooley (1995) 
and Yin (2003) for qualitative research design as it tests the research design which will 
answer the research questions and issues. A pilot study also has some significant 
advantages. For instance, a pilot study allows the interview protocol to be verified and 
the data collection and reporting systems to be tested for their utility (Berg, 2001, 
Janesick, 1994, Yin, 2003)(Nair and Reige 1994). Some problems can be rectified prior 
to commencing the body of the field work. A pilot study is a key step in establishing 
data validity and reliability (Berg, 2001). Additionally, if no significant refinements 
occur, the pilot study data can also be incorporated into the overall research database 
(Yin, 2003).  
 
In this research, the pilot study was conducted in Shanghai in 2006. The aims of the 
pilot were 1) to check if the proposed research questions are do-able and of interest to 
practitioners; 2) to check if the proposed interview questions are clear enough to 
interviewees; 3) to check if the targeted interviewees – top management, HR and line 
managers are accessible; 4) to check if the possible results of the interviews can answer 
the research questions. Before the pilot was conducted, the drafts of research questions 
and interview questions were pre-tested informally among the HR and reward 
management specialists in the HR consultancy firms, such as Mercer, Watson Wyatt 
and LuoWen (see Table 5.5). While the researcher read out the questions, these 
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specialists were asked to give their understanding of the question, and raise points that 
occurred to them.  
 
From April to May 2006, the pilot was undertaken in four very large and medium-aged 
investment companies (1 JVs, 1 POE and 1 MNC) in Shanghai (see Table 5.7). The 
firms selected and the top managers and HR interviewed in the pilot were solely from 
the researcher’s personal access. The researcher visited the interviewees at each 
company and explained the aim of the research, the type of managers needed to be 
interviewed, the relative firm documents to be collected and elicited potential firms that 
the interviewees might be able to recommend for this research. During the visit, 
informal interviews were carried out. The feedback on the proposed interview questions 
and research questions from these top managers and HR were collected. Additionally, 
the general manager of C1 agreed to join this research as one of the case firms (JV1).     
 
Table 5.7 Profiles of firms and interviewees in the pilot 
Company Ownership 
type 
Foundation 
year 
Industry 
type 
No. of 
employees 
Interviewees 
C1: Yueda 
Real Estate  
JV 1996 Investment 1,050 General 
manager 
C2: Wanyuan 
Group 
POE 2001 Investment 1,500 Financial 
controller  
C3: Ascendas 
Shanghai Co. 
Ltd.  
MNC 1996 Investment  2,000 HR manager 
Marketing 
manager 
C4: KWah 
Group  
JV 1995 Investment 3,079 General 
manager 
Source: From the pilot. 
 
After the Pilot, the four research areas for this thesis were finalised as: the importance of 
PFP, PFP design and implementation as well as line managers’ involvement in PFP. 
Moreover, a case study protocol was fully developed and used throughout the whole 
data collection and analysis (see Appendix 5.2 ‘Case study protocol’). The applicability 
and appropriateness of the protocol guide is vital to the case study, especially where 
multi-cases are utilised, to ensure that consistent application and information richness 
can be gained.  
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5.6.2 Interview questions design 
Healey and Rawlinson (1994) note that interview techniques can be divided into 
standardised and non-standardised (or non-structured), depending on whether or not 
interviews are carried out with an identical set of questions in a fixed order. In 
structured interviewing, the interviewer asks all respondents the same series of pre-
established questions with a limited set of response categories. There is generally little 
room for variation in response except where open-ended questions (which are 
infrequent) may be used. Most structured interviews also leave little room for the 
interviewer to improvise or exercise independent judgment (Fontana and Frey, 2005). 
Unstructured interviewing can provide greater breadth than the structured one. In non-
structured interviews, the exact questions asked may vary from interview to interview. 
Moreover, a non-structured interview is normally interactive and open-ended questions 
are more frequently used (Fontana and Frey, 2005). As a result, the choice of technique 
is closely related to the nature of the research. A standardised interview with fixed 
questions is suitable for the collection of factual, quantitative or non-emotive 
information for taxonomic groups in well-defined topics. In contrast, a non-standardised 
interview is ideal for exploring sensitive and emotive issues.  
 
In relation to the research, qualitative and sensitive information about PFP was sought 
by the researcher, such as reasons for using PFP, the decision making of PFP by 
management and line managers’ commitment to PFP. Standardised interviews can be 
too restrictive as PFP may vary in different firms, whereas non-standardised interviews 
can be too time-consuming and problematic for an individual researcher. Finally, a 
semi-structured interview technique was used in the study. Interviews were carried out 
by using interactive and open-ended questions. The design of interview questions was 
grouped into five sections according to the objectives of the research questions and the 
relevant literature (see Table 5.8).  
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Table 5.8: Interview questions design guide 
Sections What to ask 
Personal 
background 
The section is concerned with individual background, relevant 
working experience, job title and level, duration of present 
employment and the job tasks and responsibilities. These aspects will 
help the researcher to well understand interviewees’ answers for the 
following questions.  
Section A – 
Importance of 
PFP in the pay 
system 
This section is in relation to research question 1, which illustrates the 
proportion of PFP in the pay mix, and the extent to which pay 
depends on performance in the pay structure; and to show how the 
management sees the use of PFP in their rewards setting process. 
Therefore, the interview questions must cover pay mix, pay structure, 
pay determinants and the reasons for PFP.  
Section B – 
PFP design 
This section is in relation to research question 2, which examines how 
PFP is designed by management in the case firms. Therefore, it is 
necessary to identify what kind of PFP plans are adopted by the 
management and what might influence their adoption. Thus, the 
interview questions must cover the PFP plans and the factors that 
were considered in managerial decision making of PFP. 
Section C – 
PFP 
implementation  
This section is in relation to research question 3, which examines how 
PFP is implemented. PA was identified as the major practice to 
measure PFP implementation in this thesis. Thus, the implementation 
of PA and the utility of PA outcomes are to be covered in the 
interview questions.  
Section D – 
Line 
management in 
PFP 
This section is in relation to research question 4, which examines the 
participation of line managers in PFP. Therefore, line managers’ 
knowledge of PFP and their responsibilities, as well as their activities 
in each stage of PFP and the supports and difficulties they have are to 
be included in the interviews. 
Source: Developed for this thesis. 
 
The interview guide and specific questions asked in the study are shown in Appendix 
5.3a (Interview guide and record form), and Appendix 5.3b ‘Interview questions’. The 
interview questions were linked to the research questions prior to the interviews to 
ensure adequate cover was attained to ensure information richness. The linkage is 
shown in Appendix 5.3d ‘Interview questions and research issues matrix’. Moreover, 
during the face to face interviews, the participants were also asked to rank the functions 
of their PA system for research question 3, which is based on the theory of Cleveland et 
al. (1989a) (see Appendix 5.3c ‘Functions of PA’). Full explanation about the content of 
the questionnaire was given when necessary to avoid misunderstandings of the items.  
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5.6.3 Fieldwork 
Contact methods 
As noted in section 5.5.1, purposive sampling was used to select the cases and 
interviewees in this study. However, it was a big challenge for the researcher to get 
contacts for case studies as an individual PhD student. The 12 case firms were selected 
through 1) the researcher’s own access; 2) the researcher’s personal network, from 
which enormous support was given by the researcher’s friends, ex-colleagues, relatives 
and ex-tutors etc.; and 3) both local and international HR consultancy firms, where the 
researcher presented the research proposal at their seminars and joined the business 
network parties to meet HR managers of the consultancy firms’ clients for potential 
contacts.      
 
Fieldwork 
Prior to the interviews, each case firm received a letter of introduction and an overview 
of the study (see Appendix 5.4 ‘Interview cover letter’). Primary data were collected 
through in-depth interviews with people listed in Table 5.5 and 5.6. The first run of 
fieldwork was conducted from February to April 2007. However, there were not enough 
interviews with line managers. Thus, the second run of fieldwork was conducted from 
April to May 2008 focusing mainly on line managers with the same interviews 
questions and techniques as used in the first run of fieldwork. Overall, individual 
interviews lasted between 45 and 120 minutes and were recorded when agreed by 
interviewees. Due to the sensitivity of pay, only 7 interviewees agreed to tape recording, 
therefore, interview notes were taken every time. Table 5.9 presents the summary of 
interviewees, interview times and hours.   
 
Table 5.9 Summary of interviews and hours  
 Interviewees No. of Interviews Hours 
Top management 15 18 32
HRs 14 20 25
Line managers 23 33 30
HR specialists 10 11 15
Total 62 82 102
Source: From interviews. 
 
There were lots of difficulties in undertaking the fieldwork. Apart from the time-
consuming and cost issues, there were four major problems that the researcher had to 
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deal with: (1) Difficulties with getting access to some top managers due to their busy 
work schedule. The researcher made great efforts to impress them with the possible 
benefits that this research might offer to the organisation; (2) huge difficulties with 
getting access to the line managers. Most POEs refused to let the line managers be 
involved in the research because line managers might reveal something that the top 
management thought should not be known by out-siders. Thus, many interviews with 
line managers were taken at informal meetings after work; (3) difficulties with getting 
the data of firms’ pay structures, pay distribution, PA documents and employee 
appraisal records etc. The confidentiality form was not of interest to the case firms. The 
researcher carefully collected secondary data each time with the permission of HR and 
some employees’ records with job titles but names disguised; (4) difficulties with tape 
recordings as most of the interviewees did not feel comfortable with being recorded. 
The researcher made interview notes each time even when tape recordings were taken.  
 
5.6.4 Back translation 
All interviews were conducted in Putonghua, the standard form of the Chinese language. 
Back translations were applied to reduce translation biases in data collection. Factors 
influencing the quality of translation can include ‘gaining conceptual equivalence’ and 
‘the loss of information in translation’ (Temple and Young, 2004). One of the greatest 
difficulties of this research was to gain conceptual equivalence or comparability of 
meaning because key terms such as PFP, incentives or performance pay etc. probably 
did not have the exact same meanings in Chinese, and the techniques used to avoid this 
problem are discussed below. The loss of information in the translation of interview 
scripts can also affect the quality of research because of the grammar and structure 
differences between Putonghua and English.  
 
Two types of translation problem were considered - loss before translation and loss in 
translation. Techniques to deal with these problems involved in the fieldwork and data 
analysis were as follows: (a) The translation of key items such as ‘PFP’, ‘performance 
appraisal’, and specific names of PFP plans from English to Chinese. (b) Pre-checking 
those translated items and questions with HR specialists from management 
consultancies and gate people at the pilot study. (c) Independent translation of those 
back to English. (c) Simplifying interview questions to avoid conceptual 
misunderstanding. (d) Consultation again with HR managers and experts. (e) Pre-testing 
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interview questions at the pilot study, and asking respondents not only for their answer 
but also for their interpretation of the item’s meaning. (f) Confirming interview 
quotations with interviewees to avoid the loss in translation. 
 
5.6.5 Secondary data collection 
Secondary data analysis is the process of exploring survey data which already exists 
(Burton, 2000). Bryman (2001) states that secondary analysis should be considered a 
serious alternative to collecting new data. In this study, three types of secondary data 
were collected from three different sources, including: 1) brochures, newspaper reports, 
employee handbook and HR records etc. from the case firms, 2) pay survey for 
knowledge-intensive industries in China and Shanghai from the consultancies, and 3) 
other case studies and media releases from public publications (See Appendix 5.5 
‘Secondary data document description’).  
 
5.7 Data management and analysis 
Huberman and Miles (1994) define data management as the processes needed for a 
systematic, coherent process of data collection, storage and retrieval. The purpose of 
data management (Huberman and Miles, 1994) is high quality accessible data; 
documentation of analysis undertaken; and retention of data and analysis undertaken 
upon study completion. Three key interactive processes are associated with data 
management: (a) data reduction; (b) data display; and (c) conclusions: drawing and 
verifying. Huberman and Miles (1994) also suggest a data analysis process as shown in 
Figure 5.1. This section presents the process of data analysis in this thesis, including 
data reduction, thematic analysis and conclusion drawing.  
 
Figure 5.1: Components of data analysis interactive model 
 
Source: Huberman and Miles (1994) 
DATA 
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5.7.1 Data reduction 
Huberman and Miles (1994) describe data reduction as focusing, simplifying, 
condensing and structuring the data so that data are managed in units for analysis. Data 
reduction allows the identification of themes and patterns (Neuman, 2000, Yin, 2003). 
Semi-structured and open-ended questions, by their very nature, generate large amounts 
of data. After all the data are considered, data reduction prevents data overload without 
distorting the validity and richness of the gathered data source. The system of data 
reduction should be such that cross referencing and triangulation tests can be easily 
undertaken. In relation to this research, for instance, data on other employee rewards, 
such as base pay and benefits were partially reduced in the analysis, some media press 
data and data on training and development details were also reduced in order to focus on 
PFP design and implementation issues.  
 
5.7.2 Thematic analysis 
Yin (2003) describes data analysis as examining, categorising, tabulating or otherwise 
recombining the evidence to address the research question and issues initially postulated. 
Huberman and Miles (1994) suggest the use of tables, categories, recombination and 
patterns to interpret the data to establish meaning to the questions and issues of the 
research. However, the efficacy is improved if data analysis is done with a pre-
determined strategy (Yin, 2003, Neuman, 2000, Berg, 2001). Thematic analysis was 
adopted in the data analysis for the thesis as demonstrated in the following sections.  
 
Thematic analysis is a poorly demarcated, rarely acknowledged, yet widely used 
qualitative analytic method (Boyatzis, 1998, Roulston, 2001). Qualitative approaches 
are incredibly diverse, complex and nuanced (Holloway and Todres, 2003). Thematic 
analysis is a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within 
data. It minimally organises and describes your data set in rich detail. Thematic analysis 
is widely used, but there is no clear agreement about what thematic analysis is and how 
you go about doing it (Attride-Stirling, 2001, Boyatzis, 1998, Thckett, 2005). Meehan et 
al., (2000) argue that thematic analysis is often not explicitly claimed as the method of 
analysis, when in actuality, a lot of analysis is essentially thematic. At this point, it is 
important to describe what was adopted in the analysis of this thesis. Steps of thematic 
analysis for this thesis are summarised in Table 5.10 and demonstrated below. 
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Table 5.10: Steps of data analysis 
No.   Steps Purpose Description of the data analysis steps 
1. Transcription Getting 
familiar with 
the data 
Transcribing data (if necessary), reading and re-
reading the data, noting down initial ideas.  
Generating 
initial codes 
Open coding – coding interesting features of the 
data across the entire data set, generating categories 
and collecting data relevant to each code under each 
category.  
Searching 
for themes 
Axial coding – collating codes into potential 
themes, gathering all data relevant to each potential 
theme. 
2. Coding and 
pattern 
matching 
Reviewing 
themes 
Selective coding – selecting core categories, 
checking the relationships among them, and 
generating a ‘thematic map’ of the analysis. 
3. Refining and developing 
themes 
To identify the essence of what each theme is about 
and determining what aspect of the data each theme 
captures. 
4. Producing case report - Writing up a thematic analysis for each case; 
- Compare and contrast the analysis cross the 
cases. 
Source: Developed for the thesis. 
 
Thematic analysis step1: Transcription  
The process of transcription may seen time-consuming, frustrating and at times boring, 
but it can be an excellent way to start familiarising the researcher with the data 
(Riessman, 1993). Some researchers even argue that it should be seen as ‘a key phase of 
data analysis within interpretative qualitative methodology’ (Bird, 2005) p.227. In this 
research, interview notes and tapes were transcribed, and the transcripts were checked 
against the notes and tapes for accuracy. Some telephone follow ups were done to 
further confirm the meaning with the interviewees, e.g. the meaning of the specific PFP 
plan – year-end bonus. This process involved the researcher in repeated reading of the 
data, and reading the data in an active way – searching for meanings, patterns, 
similarities and differences within and across the cases and so on. 
 
Thematic analysis step 2: Coding 
The qualitative data analysis package NVivo was considered but not used for the initial 
stage of coding because of the large amount of data from 12 case firms (62 interviews 
and secondary data). Coding and pattern matching were involved in data analysis. Both 
primary and secondary data collected were analysed through coding. Three different 
types of coding were conducted and the inductive method of data analysis was applied. 
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Neuman (2000) notes that there are three types of coding: (1) open, (2) axial and (3) 
selective coding. In open coding data are initially examined to identify and name 
incidents that relate to the phenomena, resulting in concepts. Each category is further 
explored to reveal its properties and dimensions. The properties describe the basic 
nature (i.e. the attributes) of the category while the dimensions refer to the range within 
which a particular property can be placed (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Axial coding is a 
set of procedures whereby data are put back together in new ways after open coding, by 
making connections between categories. This is done by utilising a coding paradigm 
involving conditions, context, action/interactional strategies and consequences (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990). Selective coding is the process of selecting the core category, 
systematically relating it to other categories, validating those relationships, and filling in 
categories that need further refinement and development. The stages of coding involved 
in the thesis are explained below: 
 
The first stage of coding was to generate initial codes by open coding, which fractured 
the data and allowed the researcher to identify some categories, their properties, and 
dimensional locations. The process of open coding was conducted on the data set by 
interview questions to generate the initial codes. Table 5.11 is an example of how open 
coding was done on the data transcript for interview question C15 (see Appendix 5.3b). 
 
Table5.11: An example of initial themes and codes list generating 
Data extract Coded for 
Interview question C15: How does your company appraise your 
performance? 
 
‘..Collaborative effort is one of the major performance measurements for 
my PA because my responsibility is to maintain a good relationship 
between the company and the government, and provide new policies of 
medical device production and sales in Shanghai by the government. 
Therefore, the company wants me to work really closely with the 
technical department managers…’(Public affairs department manager in 
MNC3) 
* PA 
* Collaborative 
effort 
* Working 
relationship 
among line 
managers 
 
Source: From interview transcripts. 
 
The themes/patterns and codes list for the entire data was generated after the open 
coding (see Appendix 5.6: ‘Themes/patterns and codes list’). Strauss and Corbin (1990) 
note that data analysis via coding depends on whether the themes are more ‘data driven’ 
or ‘theory driven’. In the former, the themes will depend on the data, but in the latter, 
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you might approach the data with specific questions in mind that you wish to code 
around. Both ways of generating initial themes and codes were used in this research. 
For instance, as shown in Appendix 5.6, the way that themes/patterns were generated 
for research question 1a, such as pay mix, pay structure, pay ranges and progression 
determinants, was mainly theory driven. The researcher had relevant theories and what 
types of themes to look for in mind when the data was coded. Whereas the way those 
themes/patterns generated for research question 1b was data driven because the codes 
list was developed from the reasons for using PFP by management that interviewees 
frequently mentioned (see Appendix 5.6).  
 
The second stage of coding was to search for themes by axial coding. Axial coding puts 
those data back together in new ways by making connections about the relating of 
several main categories to form an overall theoretical formulation, where this eventually 
forms one of several main categories (Yin, 2003). After the data had been initially open 
coded, the researcher started to analyse the relationships among the codes for each 
research question, and to consider how different codes could belong to a potential theme 
or pattern. This process can be explained by the thematic coding maps for research 
question 2b (see Figure 5.2 and 5.3 below). Figure 5.2 shows that the initial thematic 
map indicates three major themes that impacted on PFP plans design, namely, 
organisation’s environment, organisations’ ownership and its pay strategy. The 
researcher then started to have a sense of the significance of each main theme and sub-
theme in answering the research question.  
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Figure 5.2: Initial thematic map for research question 2b. 
 
Source: Developed for the thesis. 
 
The third stage of coding was to review the themes developed in the second stage and 
explore the relationships by selective coding. During this stage, it became evident that 
some candidate themes were not really themes, or not appropriate to answer the research 
question. Other themes were broken into separate themes. This process can be explained 
by the example in Figure 5.3. The thematic map was developed from Figure 5.2. Finally, 
the three main themes were organisation’s environment (internal and external), pay 
strategy and PFP plan. The ownership became a sub-theme belonging to internal 
environment. The relationships among the themes are illustrated as below. 
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Figure 5.3: Developed thematic map for research question 2a. 
 
Source: Developed for the thesis. 
 
Thematic analysis step3: Refining and developing themes 
This step of data analysis involved two levels. First, the coded data extracts were read 
again for each theme by the researcher to further check whether the themes were put 
under the right pattern or whether they appeared to form another coherent pattern. 
Second, similar activity was done by the researcher but in relation to the entire data set. 
At this level, the researcher considered the validity of each theme in relation to the 
research questions. Therefore, this step was to re-read the data set to confirm whether 
the themes and patterns could answer research questions and to further check if any 
codes or themes were missing. 
 
Thematic analysis step 4: Producing case reports 
After the final thematic map was completed for each research question, the researcher 
started writing a detailed analysis to identify the story for each question, and to ensure 
there is not too much overlap between themes. At the end of this step, a report was done 
for each case firm to illustrate the story and make an argument in relation to the specific 
research questions.  
 
5.7.3 Inductive research process and conclusion drawing 
The whole research process was inductive as summarised in Table 5.12. First, the 
researcher joined a phenomenon of interest – PFP in China – with a theoretical lens, 
Organisation’s 
external 
environment 
Labour 
market 
Industry 
competition 
Region 
Pay strategy 
Organisation’s 
internal 
environment 
Firm 
ownership Product 
characteristics 
Organisational 
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PFP plans 
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such as the controversy over PFP in the literature and the importance of PFP design and 
implementation in practice. The researcher then critically reviewed rewards in general, 
and in Asia and China specifically, to identify gaps in the existing literature (see 
Chapter 3 section 3.6). Second, the pilot study was carried out to finalise the research 
objectives, questions and interview guide, during which top managers, HR and 
specialists from HR consultancies were also involved. Third, the formal fieldwork was 
undertaken twice. Interviewees were enlarged and initial findings and analysis were 
verified at the second run of fieldwork. Fourth, thematic analysis and pattern matching 
were used as the major data analysis strategy with explanation building as a derivative 
strategy once patterns emerged from the data. The analysis process was done as an 
inductive process because patterns and categorises were identified using key phrases 
and comments that were relevant to the research questions. In establishing a process to 
seek pattern, themes and categories, five levels of interrogation for analysis identified 
by Yin (1994) were followed: Level 1: Questions asked of the specific interviews; Level 
2: questions asked of the individual cases; Level 3: Questions asked of the findings 
across multiples cases; Level 4: Questions asked of an entire study; and Level 5: 
Normative questions about recommendations and conclusion. Finally, the empirical 
findings were compared with the theories and reflected back to the existing literature. 
Two questions were asked by the researcher herself in drawing the conclusion: ‘what 
does this tell us that we did not already know theoretically?’, and ‘how do the findings 
differ from other existing studies?’  
 
Additionally, in this study the researcher paid much attention to the problems that 
usually occur in published qualitative research. For instance, the actual methods of data 
collection and actual data collected were unclear, the weak linkages between methods 
citation and what is done in the research; weak descriptions of data analysis, and the 
lack of connection between research questions and what is done. These problems were 
considered in undertaking the study and further verified in later sections. 
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Table 5.12 Research process 
Time Step Activity Reason 
Jul. 2005– Jan. 
2006 
I: Getting started First run literature review 
and preparation for pilot 
study. 
To identify research 
gaps and objectives. 
Apr. – May 
2006 
II: Entering the 
field – Pilot 
Translating interview 
questions and pilot study. 
To make research 
questions more 
focused. 
Feb. – Apr. 
2007 
III: Modifying 
research questions 
and conducting 
field work. 
Case selection and field 
work. 
To collect data. 
Jul. – Oct. 
2007 
IV: First run data 
analysis 
Coding To analyse within 
and across cases. 
Apr. – May 
2008 
V: Second run data 
collection  
Going back to the field To verify findings 
and analysis. 
Jun. -  Oct. 
2008 
VI: Enfolding 
literature and 
reaching closure 
Further data analysis and 
conclusion. 
To complete the 
whole research. 
Source: Developed for this thesis. 
 
5.8 Tests for research design quality 
For any research findings to be applied to support theory, develop theory or contradict 
theory there must be confidence in the data from which conclusions are drawn. This 
section outlines the processes to be used to establish the veracity of data in the research.  
 
5.8.1 Tests for reliability and validity 
In sections 5.3 and 5.4, the challenges to qualitative research and multiple case studies 
were discussed. These can be distilled down to a perceived lack of rigor in the design 
methodology. The tests that are accepted for establishing the quality of the research are 
construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability (Dooley, 1995, 
Huberman and Miles, 1994, Neuman, 2000, Yin, 2003, Ellran, 1996).  
 
The consideration of these criteria is woven into each step of the research design. Table 
5.13 shows these criteria, their definition and the measures utilised in this investigation 
to establish the quality of the data. Neuman (2000) points out that while reliability and 
validity are complementary concepts, reliability is a necessary condition for validity to 
occur. Reliability is a vital step and the review and pilot testing of data collection is 
worthy of significant effort. Construct validity is a key step as failing to establish the 
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correct operational measures will render the investigation invalid (Neuman, 2000, 
Zikmund, 2000).  
 
Table 5.13: Reliability and validity criteria and study tactics 
Reliability & 
validity 
criteria 
Definition Measurement proposed for the thesis 
Construct 
validity 
Establishing correct 
operational measures for the 
concept being studied, i.e. is 
the measure able to test the 
research questions and 
research issues and do the 
indications operate in a 
consistent manner? 
1. Undertake literature review from 
a broad perspective to single 
research question issue.  
2. Establish key concepts PFP,  
3. Use of multiple sets of 
experience. 
4. Established and tested interview 
protocol in the pilot by HR 
consultants. 
5. Review of draft report by key 
informants. 
6. Analysis of data seeking patterns 
that can be cross-referenced. 
Internal validity Establishing causal 
relationship, whereby 
certain conditions are shown 
to lead to other conditions as 
distinguished from spurious 
relationship, i.e. was the 
dependent variable changed 
by a sole cause? 
1. Use of multiple cases. 
2. Analysis of data seeking patterns 
that can be cross-referenced. 
3. Established and tested interview 
protocol in the pilot and by HR 
consultants. 
External 
validity 
Establishing the domain to 
which a study’s findings can 
be generalised to the 
external environment.  
1. Use of multiple sources of 
secondary data. 
2. Use of multiple cases. 
3. Analysis of data seeking patterns 
that can be cross-referenced.  
Reliability Demonstrating that the 
operations of an 
investigation such as data 
collection process can be 
repeated with consistent 
results.  
1. Triangulation (see section 
5.8.2) 
2. Established and tested 
interview protocol in the pilot 
and by HR consultants. 
3. Data collection and coding 
protocol established, 
documented and stored in the 
database. 
4. Review of interview reports by 
key informants. 
5. Research design protocol and 
progress reviewed by 
supervisor. 
Source: Developed for the thesis. 
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5.8.2 Triangulation 
As has previously been stated in section 5.3 and 5.4, a major criticism of qualitative 
approach, in particular case study investigations utilising interviews, is the lack of 
scientific rigour and objectivity. To mitigate this criticism data verification and testing 
for data reliability, rigour and data analysis was used.  
 
In the first phase of data verification Human & Miles (1994) nominate a checklist of 
shortcomings, such as: a) data overload in the field; b) selectivity of over-confidence in 
some data; c) co-occurrences seen as correlations and evidence of causal relationships; d) 
misuse of base rate proportions; e) unreliability of data from some sources; f) over 
accommodation to information that questions an emerging hypothesis; and g) over 
emphasis of first impressions or dramatic incidents. This checklist was used during the 
data analysis phase of the thesis.  
 
The most common strategy for data verification is that of triangulation (Huberman and 
Miles, 1994, Janesick, 1994, Yin, 2003, Neuman, 2000). Triangulation is a term that in 
qualitative research means multi-operationalism or multi-measures. Use of multiple 
sources that establish any themes or features from the data analysis are a trait of the 
investigation and not associated with the measure or any one source (Huberman and 
Miles, 1994). Table 5.14 presents the summary of data triangulation in the thesis.  
 
Table 5.14 Triangulation of data 
 
Data source 
Use of different data sources 
 
Interviewing managers at different times; 
Secondary data were from case firms, HR 
consultancy firms and Chinese publications. 
Method 
Use of different research methods  
Pilot study, interviews and observations.  
Theory 
Use of multiple theoretical perspectives 
Theories and frameworks covered the area 
of PFP, reward management models and 
HRM convergence and divergence 
perspectives. 
Source: Developed for this thesis. 
 
5.8.3 Generalisation of research findings 
The application of the findings of this thesis is constrained by the selection of case study 
methodology utilising interviews. This is primarily because cases can not represent the 
world, but represent the firm itself or to some extent the industry. The analysis of the 12 
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case studies is aimed at gaining understanding of PFP design and implementation in the 
non-public sector knowledge-intensive industries in China, and how the understanding 
supports or contradicts existing theory of PFP. Generalisation is strong within the case 
and progressively weakens as links to the case become more remote (see Figure 5.4).  
 
 Figure 5.4: Generalisation links 
 
Source: Developed for this thesis. 
 
5.9 Ethics and confidentiality 
Dooley (1995) states that ethics is the study of right and wrong conduct and the 
essential ethical question is the reconciliation between two or more conflicting 
preferences and, as such, is a philosophical question (Zikmund, 2000). The major 
conflicts that must be considered are: (1) research goals versus subject rights; (2) 
veracity of research findings versus research motivation; and research claims to original 
work versus attributing work by others. Hence, these concerns revolve around harm, 
consent, deception, privacy and confidentiality of data (Punch, 1994).  
 
In research, the principal purpose of an ethics process is to protect the subjects from 
physical and psychological harm, to ensure the subjects’ rights are not violated and to 
ensure the research findings are based on an appropriate methodology (Dooley, 1995). 
Dooley (1995) further clarifies the focus of ethical research practices as (a) the 
protection of human and non-human subjects; (b) appropriate methodology; (c) 
Case study 
IT and 
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Findings are relevant. 
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inferences, conclusions and recommendations based on actual findings; and (d) 
complete and accurate research reports. 
 
The ethical practices adopted in this research were as follows: (1) Interviewees were 
contacted and given an outline of the interview questions in advance so that they could 
make an informed decision to participate; (2) Participants were free to choose the 
interview time and place, and they could withhold information about which they felt 
uncomfortable; (3) The confidentiality of the identity of information sources was 
maintained. Specific data would not be identified to specific participants or firms; (4) 
The duty and responsibility for gaining the consent and ensuring the confidentiality and 
privacy of the participants lay with the researcher and could not be delegated; (5) 
Interview notes were sent back to participants to ensure nothing was misinterpreted.  
 
5.10 Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the research methodology and design used in the research. The 
research objectives and questions were reviewed, along with the setting of the research 
in order to choose the appropriate research paradigm – the critical realism – for the 
thesis. From this, a qualitative research approach utilising a multiple case study method 
and semi-structured interviews was justified as being appropriate to the research. 
Meanwhile, a detailed research protocol was presented, which covered sampling, data 
collection and analysis, and research process.  
 
In undertaking the multiple case study methodology, the direct process of establishing 
the validity and reliability of data by using a standard research protocol for all 
interviews and set probe questions was applied. The protocol was first tested in a pilot 
study for its functionality and applicability, and by experienced HR consultancies and 
practitioners. Multiple sources of data and coding by pattern seeking were also used in 
data analysis and findings. Triangulation processes from multiple interviews, multiple 
cases and secondary data were also applied to establish data reliability. Additionally, the 
confidentiality issues of the participants and cases were highly considered in the 
research. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
IMPORTANCE OF PAY FOR PERFORMACNE  
IN THE CURRENT PAY SYSTEM 
 
6.1 Introduction 
To explore the research questions identified in Chapter 4, methodological issues were 
discussed in Chapter 5. Chapters 6-9 present empirical findings for each of the research 
questions respectively. This chapter provides the findings for research questions 1: How 
important is PFP in the current pay system? This question is answered by using the 
findings for the two sub-questions, namely, 1a: To what extent is PFP adopted? and 1b: 
Why do firms use PFP? 
 
This chapter consists of three parts. First, the identification of critical employee groups 
among the case firms is presented. The cases are knowledge-intensive organisations in 
investment/marketing research, IT and pharmaceutical industries. Due to the different 
employee posts, this chapter begins with identifying the common critical employee 
groups of each firm. This enables the author to effectively compare and contrast the pay 
systems and PFP within and across the cases throughout the thesis. Second, findings for 
research question 1a are analysed. In order to examine the extent to which PFP is 
adopted in the pay system, several factors within the current pay system are examined, 
including components of pay mix, pay structure and determinants of pay range and 
progression (based on the discussion in Chapter 4 section 4.3.1). The proportion of PFP 
in pay mix, and the significance of performance as a norm for determining pay within 
pay structures are illustrated. The third part concerns findings for research question 1b, 
in which reasons for using PFP by the managers interviewed are demonstrated in 
relation to the possible theoretical explanations of PFP adoption (see the discussion in 
Chapter 4 section 4.3.2).  
 
6.2 Critical positions  
The case firms were from POEs, JVs and MNCs in investment/marketing research, IT 
and pharmaceutical industries (see the sample profile in Chapter 5). Each firm had to 
some extent different names for employee posts. In order to effectively study pay 
systems and PFP within and across the cases, employees were categorised into four 
groups according to the common and critical posts, namely, senior management, sales & 
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marketing, professionals and junior employees (see Table 6.1). This identification of the 
employee groups was confirmed by the HR managers interviewed.  
 
Table 6.1 Critical employee groups in the case firms 
Critical 
positions 
Investment & marketing 
research 
IT Pharmaceuticals 
Senior 
Management 
Senior: CEOs, general managers, managing directors, regional 
managers, financial/HR controllers, head of the department etc.  
Project development, 
marketing research and 
advertising staff. 
IT sales, customer 
service, marketing 
development staff. 
Prescription, 
marketing research 
and management, 
OTC (over the 
counter sales) staff. 
Sales and  
marketing 
Line managers are included. 
Financial specialists, 
venture capital specialists, 
project analysts & 
evaluators 
IT engineers, 
product specialist, 
network 
maintenance, R&D 
staff. 
regulatory affairs, 
quality assurance 
and quality control 
staff 
Professionals 
Line managers are included. 
Junior 
employees 
Administrators, secretaries, assistants, receptionists etc.  
Source: From interviews and HR documents. 
 
The senior management group includes CEOs, vice presidents, general managers, 
managing directors, and department heads etc. Sales and marketing people include line 
managers, IT sales, prescription sales in pharmaceuticals, marketing research and 
management in investment firms etc. Professionals comprise line managers, project 
leaders, HR and financial specialists, IT engineers, financial specialists, regulatory 
affairs, quality assurance and quality control staff etc. Junior employees include 
administrators, secretaries and assistants etc. This categorisation was used throughout 
the whole thesis. 
 
6.3 Findings for RQ1a: To what extent is PFP adopted?   
This section presents findings for research question 1a. Components of pay mix were 
examined to explore the extent to which PFP weighted in pay mix. Types of pay 
structures in the current pay system were identified and determinants of pay range and 
pay progression were also examined to illustrate the extent to which pay depended on 
employee performance within the pay structures.   
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6.3.1 Components of pay mix 
Armstrong & Murlis (2004) divide a pay mix into three key areas: base pay, variable 
pay and employee benefits (see Chapter 4 section 4.3.1). All three taken together make 
up the total remuneration received by the individual. Similar components were found in 
the study. The employee pay mix in all case firms consisted of three components, 
namely, base pay (fixed pay agreed in the employment contract), PFP (payments that 
are tied to performance individually and collectively) and benefits (including 
compulsory and/or additional parts according to Chinese labour law) and allowances 
(payments that are linked to individual positions or jobs). An employee’s total cash 
income was base salary plus PFP. Each component is explained below, and the 
proportion of base pay and PFP within employees’ total cash income is shown in Table 
6.2. 
 
Base pay 
Base salary was the primary component of pay mix which was fixed in the employment 
contract and served as a benchmark for other pay elements. For instance, Chinese labour 
law requires that 8 percent of employees’ base pay should be contributed to their 
medical insurance, and 2 percent of base pay is for their unemployment pension. Some 
firms (POE3 and POE5) set up ceilings for the PFP of sales or executives, which could 
be 200 or 300 per cent of their base salary. Moreover, base salary per month was what 
most Chinese discussed when they compared internal and external equity and 
subsequent employee turnover within peer groups. Although rewards preferences are 
not the research focus in this study, the researcher’s observation to some extent supports 
the results found in previous studies, such as Chiu and Luk (2002) and Chiu, Luk and 
Tang (2001), who note that the pay level of base salary is one of the main determinants 
that employees use when they make an employment decisions.  
 
As shown in Table 6.2, the weight of base pay in total cash income (excluding benefits 
and allowance) varied for each of the critical employee group (see Table 6.1). Base pay 
was about 60 to 80 per cent of the total cash income for top management (50 percent for 
executives in some firms), 50 to 60 percent for sales and  marketing people, 70 to 80 per 
cent for professionals and 80 to 90 per cent for junior employees.    
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PFP  
PFP comprised monthly, quarterly and/or annual payments that were additional to base 
pay but tied to individual or collective performance. In the observation, PFP as a HRM 
concept or management tool was widely accepted by managers and used in the firms. 
PFP policies were written into firms’ employee handbooks or HR documents. PFP plans 
varied for each group of employees. For instance, year-end bonus based on firm 
performance measurement for everyone, sales commissions for sales and marketing 
people, project related incentives for R&D professionals, and cash profit-sharing plans 
for top managers. The specific PFP plans and design are discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
Table 6.2 shows the percentage of PFP in total cash income for different groups of 
employees. PFP usually was about 30 to 40 per cent of the total cash income for top 
management (50 percent for executives in some firms), over 40 to 50 per cent for sales 
and marketing people, between 10 to 20 percent for professionals, and around 0 to 10 
per cent for junior staff. Apparently, PFP was an important part of income for 
employees in the non-public sector knowledge-intensive enterprises. 
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Table 6.2 Weight of base pay and PFP in total cash income in the case firms 
Firms Groups Base salary 
in total cash 
income % 
PFP  
in total cash income  
% 
POE1 Senior management (GMs, 
VPs, Directors) 
Middle management 
Junior staff 
60-70% 
 
70-80% 
90% 
40-30% 
 
20-30% 
10% 
POE2 Senior management 
Professionals 
Sales & marketing 
Junior staff 
70% 
80% 
60% 
90% 
30% 
20% 
40% 
10% 
POE3 Executives 
Middle management 
Professionals 
Sales & Marketing 
Junior staff 
70% 
80% 
90% 
60% 
90% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
40% 
10% 
POE4 Senior management 
Sales & marketing 
Staff during probationary 
period 
70% 
60% 
20-30% 
30% 
40% 
70-80% 
POE5 Senior management 
Sales & marketing 
Junior staff 
70% 
50-60% 
90% 
30% 
40-50% 
10% 
JV1 Management 
Sales & marketing 
Professionals 
Junior staff 
70% 
50% 
80% 
90% 
30% 
50% 
20% 
10% 
JV2 Management 
Sales & marketing 
Non-sales 
70% 
50% 
90% 
30% 
50% 
10% 
MNC1 Management 
Non-management 
85% 
85% 
15% 
15% 
MNC2 Senior Management 
Sales 
Non-sales 
70% 
50% 
70-85% 
30% 
50% 
15-30% 
MNC3 Senior Management 
Sales & marketing  
Professionals 
Junior staff 
80% 
60% 
85% 
90-95% 
20% 
40% 
15% 
5-10% 
MNC4 Senior Management 
Sales 
Non-sales 
80-85% 
60-70% 
85-90% 
15-20% 
30-40% 
10-15% 
MNC5 Senior Management 
Sales & marketing 
Professionals 
Junior staff 
70-80% 
50-70% 
90% 
95-100% 
20-30% 
50-30% 
10% 
0-5% 
Source: From interviews and salary documents. 
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Allowances & Benefits  
Allowances were payments that were linked to employee posts and job activities, such 
as overtime working, mobiles, transportation and company lunch/car allowances, 
business trip allowances, positional allowances, etc. Allowances for posts, such as 
housing, health care and schooling, varied at different level of management posts, which 
was used as one of the motivational tools by employers to attract and retain good 
performers at management levels.  
 
Common benefits included health insurance, housing allotment, pension scheme and 
unemployment compensation. Contributions for benefits were made by both the 
company on behalf of the incumbent and the incumbent themselves as a result of 
Chinese labour law and/or reward strategy. Chinese labour law identifies and updates 
compulsory and additional contributions to benefits each year for employers to apply. 
The bases of these employers’ contributions set by labour law in 2008 were (See Table 
6.3): (a) Medical Insurance: rate contently 8 per cent of base salary (Shanghai was 
higher than 6 per cent in other cities of China); (b) Pension plan: currently 22 per cent 
of base salary: (c) Housing allotment: variable per cent of base salary, as cash allowance 
or loan: (d) Unemployment compensation/severance payment: 2 per cent of base salary. 
 
Every JV and MNC in the sample provided the above basic benefits, and made 
additional contributions for certain groups of people, such as senior management in 
order to motivate them to a greater extent, whilst some POEs did not fully supply what 
the labour law required, such as POE1, POE3 and POE5 (see Table 6.3).  
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Table 6.3 Benefit schemes in the case firms 
Firms Medical 
insurance 
8% 
Pension 
plan 
22% 
Housing 
allotment 
 
Unemployment 
 
2% 
Additional 
housing & 
pension 
POE1 √ × × √ × 
POE2 √ √ √ √ × 
POE3 × × × × × 
POE4 √ √ × √ × 
POE5 √ × × √ × 
JV1 √ √ √ √ √ 
JV2 √ √ √ √ √ 
MNC1 √ √ √ √ × 
MNC2 √ √ √ √ × 
MNC3 √ √ √ √ × 
MNC4 √ √ √ √ × 
MNC5 √ √ √ √ × 
Source: From interviews and reward documents. √ Present practice, ×No present practice.  
 
It was observed that providing less or no benefits schemes as required by labour law did 
exist in many other POEs in general, the main reasons given by managers in POEs were:  
 
(1) Employees preferred a better cash income package to benefits schemes. The cash 
mentality was confirmed by most of the top managers in POEs; (2) Benefits schemes 
were a big financial burden for some large employers like POE1. Moreover, the future 
returns of those benefits schemes were poor or unknown. Because the contributions by 
the employer to benefit schemes were based on employees’ base pay level, many POEs 
set very low base pay level for their employees in order to avoid high contribution to 
their benefits. Therefore, the future return of those benefit schemes would not be 
attractive to employees. The top management in POE1 explained their concerns as 
below:   
 “….providing benefits costs a lot of money… but we are 
considering that and perhaps it would be given to employees some 
time next year…However, on one hand, employees would not get a 
good return from their benefits in future. On the other hand, our 
corporate culture is ‘honesty, loyalty and devotion’, our employees 
are expected to understand that they gain a lot through working for 
us because of the high reputation we have in not only the industry but 
also China, which is more than any financial benefits.” (Chairman of 
the board of directors in POE1) 
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(3) Some private owners’ beliefs determined their employees’ benefits options and the 
HR was not strong enough to influence the top management as the HR manager in 
POE1 pointed out: 
“We advised our boss several times over the last two years to provide 
at least the basic pension plan to meet the requirement of labour law, 
but line managers like me are too small to make it happen, our boss 
has his own way of making decisions. So we do tell our candidates 
that we don’t offer pension schemes while recruiting them through 
interviews. But because we are such a big and top leading firm, 
normally candidates would still want to join us because our 
reputation would add excellent value to his/her CV.” (HR manager in 
POE1) 
 
(4) IT and pharmaceutical industries had more relatively young employees than other 
traditional industries. Some POEs believed that those young employees’ first priority 
was good posts or titles for future career development rather than current pension plans 
as stated by the general manager in POE3 below. 
 
“…in POEs, we emphasize pay or base pay rather than 
benefits…cash income and job opportunities are more important 
sometimes for sales people, they can buy social insurance and 
pension schemes by themselves anyway when they have a very good 
income…” (General manager in POE3) 
 
There were additional benefits available in some cases, for instance; presents for 
holidays such as birthday, Valentine’s day, Children’s day, Christmas and New year’s 
day, special gifts for newly married people, new born babies, women’s day, and 
mother’s day etc., shopping, gym, club cards and parties organised by the firm to 
entertain young IT staff or for them to meet new female friends as IT is a male 
intensive industry. The above benefits mainly happened in JVs because of the 
influence of their Chinese parent companies, and private firms like POE1, where the 
owner was from the SOE sector.  
 
6.3.2 Pay structures  
Main types of pay structures are identified by Armstrong and Murlis (2004) as graded, 
broad-banded, career family and job family (see Chapter 4, section 4.3.1). Two major 
types of graded and broad-banded pay structures were found in the case firms. The 
summary of the pay structure in each firm is shown in Table 6.4. Graded structure was 
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the dominant pay structure, altogether 9 (4 POEs, 1 JV and 4 MNCs) companies out of 
12 used graded structures, and the other 3 companies applied broad-banded structure.  
 
Table 6.4: Summary of pay structures in the case firms 
Firms Pay system Grades and bands 
POE1 Broad-banded 3 bands with 4 levels in each band.
POE2 Informal graded* 4 grades 
POE3 Informal graded* 4 grades 
POE4 Informal graded* 6 grades 
POE5 Informal graded* 6 grades 
JV1 Graded 10 grades 
JV2 Broad-banded 3 bands with 4 levels in each band.
MNC1 Graded 11 grades 
MNC2 Graded 8 grades 
MNC3 Graded 20 grades 
MNC4 Graded 11 grades 
MNC5 Broad-banded 3 bands with 2-4 levels in each 
band. 
Source: From interviews and HR documents.  
* No formal structured written polices and display of their graded structures, data from 
interviews only. 
 
Graded pay structure  
Graded pay structures were found in POE2, POE3, POE4, POE5, JV1, MNC1, MNC2, 
MNC3 and MNC4 (See Appendix 6.1a). Graded pay structures in POEs were informal 
as the pay structure was graded by employee education certificates rather than a job 
evaluation. Moreover, there was no written document about the pay structure displays.   
 
Graded structures in JVs and MNCs were formal (see Appendix 6.1a). Jobs were 
allocated to job grades on the basis of an assessment of their relative size and all jobs 
allocated to a grade are treated the same for pay purposes. Moreover, the pay structure 
was allocated according to their organisational structure. For instance, in JV1 (see 
Appendix 6.1a) grade A is for directors with pay range between RMB 200k and 400k. 
Grade B is for senior managers with pay range between RMB 140K and 250K. Grade C 
is for middle managers with pay range between RMB 100 and 180K. Grade D and E are 
for junior managers with pay range between RMB 60 and 120K. Grade F, G and H are 
for professional and technical staff with pay range between RMB 24 and 120K. Grade I 
and J are for junior officers and staff with pay range between RMB 20 and 60K.  
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The pay range attached to each grade defined the minimum and maximum amount for 
any job in the grade and also indicated the scope provided for job holders to progress 
through the range. Pay increases to individual job holders and progression within a 
range varied according to assessments of performance, contribution, skill or competence 
and, to some degree, length of service or time in the grade. For instance, the graded pay 
structure in MNC1 showed that there were 11 grades for staff from junior officers to 
VPs, grade 1 to 3, 4 to 5, 6 to 7, 8, 9, and 10 to 11 are for junior staff, professionals, 
senior professionals, engineer managers, line managers and senior managers 
respectively (see Appendix 6.1a). The minimum and maximum pay range was attached 
for each grade which guided the future pay increases.   
 
Broad-banded pay structure  
Broad-banded pay structure can also be called a variant graded structure, which was 
found in case firms POE1, JV2 and MNC5 (see Appendix 6.1b). Their pay structures 
had similar characters. First, each structure had a limited number of bands. There were 
three or four bands to cover all employees in the above three firms. Second, the range of 
salary in the band was 100% or more. Third, a large overlap between bands of 5 percent 
or more – this provided room for individuals in a band to continue receiving ‘career 
development’ pay increases without having to be upgraded. Fourth, broad bands 
adopted in the cases did not have midpoints, as in a conventional graded pay structure, 
to provide a basis for the traditional control systems of compa-ratios and mid-point 
management. Fifth, target rates of pay might be assigned to individual jobs or generic 
roles with are determined by reference to market values or job evaluation – but the 
range of pay around this target rate which can be earned by individuals may not be 
defined.  
 
Examples can be found in Appendix 6.1b. The broad-banded pay structure in POE1 
applied to every staff member including its subsidiaries all over China. The pay 
structure consisted of a sequence of job grades to each of which is attached a pay range 
and pay ranges were overlapping. The pay structure had three bands and 11 grades all 
together. Employees were divided into three bands. Band A was for senior management, 
5 grades were set for this band including VP, managing director, deputy VP, financial 
controller and VP assistant. Band B was for middle management with 5 grades. Band C 
was for junior staff set with 5 grades. Band D was for others such as securities and 
cleaners. A pay range was attached to each grade in the band. JV2 had a similar broad-
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banded structure to POE1. There were 3 bands with 4 pay levels in each band, G1-G4 
were set for general staff, P1 to P4 were set for professionals and M1-M4 were for 
management staff. Jobs were allocated to band ranges on the basis of an assessment of 
their relative department or subsidiaries size and all jobs allocated to a grade were 
treated the same for pay purposes. 
 
6.3.3 Pay determinants within the pay structures 
Within the graded and broad-banded pay structures, the important factors adopted by 
employers to determinate the pay ranges for each pay grade or band, and the important 
determinants of deciding employee pay progress, and moving people within or across 
grades and bands are discussed below.  
 
Pay range determinants 
Senior managers and HR were asked to give at least three factors that they thought were 
important to determine employee pay ranges. The results are listed in Table 6.5. The 
important determinants of pay range for each grade or band within the pay structure 
were external factors such as market rate and relevant information about competitors; 
internal determinants were job evaluation/scope and individual working experiences and 
qualifications that related to the post.  
 
Table 6.5 Important pay range determinants in the case firms 
Firms Market 
rates 
Competitor Job 
evaluation 
Qualification Experience Pay 
consultant 
Firm 
revenue 
POE1 √ √ √ √ √ × × 
POE2 √ √ √ √ √ × √ 
POE3 √ √ √ √ √ × × 
POE4 √ √ √ √ √ × × 
POE5 √ √ √ √ √ × √ 
JV1 √ √ √ √ √ × √ 
JV2 √ √ √ √ √ √ × 
MNC1 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
MNC2 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
MNC3 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
MNC4 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
MNC5 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Source: From interviews with managers. √ - Very important, × - not very important.  
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It must be noted that market rates were highly valued in setting pay by employers and in 
pay range determination. Most of the case firms used the annual salary survey of 
Shanghai or their specific industries’ provided by international HR consultancies, such 
as Mercer, Wyson and Hewitt as a helpful reference to decide their pay rate. Meanwhile, 
JVs and all MNCs joined the pay survey by Mercer each year. The pay levels of their 
competitors were inclusive and strongly valued in positioning pay strategies by the case 
firms. Individual experiences and qualifications highly influenced the pay range level. 
Examples of the importance of experiences and qualifications in setting pay ranges for 
HR, sales and marketing, professionals and administration employees in the case firms 
can be found in Appendix 6.2(a-d). In sum, these determinants indicated that the pay 
range was basically related to the job based on its relative value, which was assessed 
internally and externally. Internal value was determined based on job evaluations, and 
external value was determined based on market value of the assigned job.  
 
Pay progression determinants 
The managers were also asked to give the importance factors that influenced employee 
pay progression. The results are listed in Table 6.6. The top factors that determined pay 
progression were individual performance, firm revenue and cost. Person factors were 
used for pay progression; in other words, the current value of employees determined 
their pay progression. Individual performance was the most important factor in deciding 
pay progression at all levels, which was given much more prominence than other input 
measurements such as years of service, competencies and skills. Different emphasis was 
also put on the importance of the labour market and the performance of the enterprise. 
This can be demonstrated by some managers’ points below.  
 
“…our philosophy of pay is just as what we put on our website - 
‘Salary is determined by job related performance and achievement, 
promotions are determined by competences.” (General manager of 
JV1) 
 
“As a private owner like me, the way I measure my people (the key 
managers that work for me) is to see whether they can solve the 
problems very well for me within a certain period of time. I don’t 
really care what they do or how they do…” (Owner of POE2) 
 
“…we tend to give new staff especially sales people low base pay to 
start during their probationary period, so if they want to earn more 
they really have to work very hard to get the commission and show 
good results to convince us to increase their base pay level.”  
(General manager of POE3) 
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Table 6.6 Pay progression determinants in the case firms 
Firms Firm 
revenue 
Individual 
performance
Cost Inflation 
rate 
Service 
length 
Skill/ 
competence 
POE1 √ √ √ √ × √ 
POE2 √ √ √ √ × × 
POE3 √ √ √ × √ × 
POE4 √ √ √ × × × 
POE5 √ √ √ √ × × 
JV1 √ √ √ √ √ × 
JV2 √ √ √ √ √ × 
MNC1 √ √ √ √ × √ 
MNC2 √ √ √ √ × √ 
MNC3 √ √ √ √ × × 
MNC4 √ √ √ √ √ √ 
MNC5 √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Source: From interviews. √ - Very important, × - not very important. 
 
Characteristics of the current pay structure 
The literature shows that there are three factors that determine pay structures – job, 
market and person (Suda, 2007) (see Chapter 4 section 4.3.1 for details). Labour 
markets are generally divided into two types: external labour markets and internal 
labour markets (Doeringer and Piore, 1971, Williamson, 1975). As discussed above, job, 
market and person factors were interrelated in determining pay range and progression 
within both graded and board-banded pay structures in the case firms. The job itself 
such as its scope, the market rate for a specific job position including the rate of 
competitors and individual criteria such as working experiences and certificate (see 
Table 6.5) determined pay ranges. Those determinants were based on job evaluation and 
external market value. Base pay levels were determined by job evaluation and external 
market value, which was the integration between the market and the job itself. Pay 
progression depended on individual job related performance and contributions which 
were the integration between job and person factors (see Table 6.6).   
 
Figure 6.1 illustrates how pay range and pay progression were determined by factors of 
the market, job and person in the case firms. The discussion in Chapter 4 section 4.3.1 
shows that there are two basic types of pay structure - job-based and person-based 
(Lawler, 1990, Milkovich and Newman, 2002, Lawler, 2000). The author argues that 
based on the findings, factors related to jobs were emphasised more that the person 
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factors. Although there is no clear cut distinction between a job based and a person 
based pay structure, still the current pay structure in the non-public sector knowledge-
intensive firms of China is more job based rather than person based.  
 
Figure 6.1 Pay range and pay progression determination in the case firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Developed for the thesis. 
 
6.4 Findings for research question 1b: Why do firms use PFP? 
This section presents empirical findings for reasons that the case firms adopted PFP 
plans. Three types of relevant theories were introduced in the literature review as 
possible explanations for why companies use of PFP schemes: agency theory, 
motivation theories (expectancy, equity), and institutional and legitimacy theories (see 
Chapter 4, section 4.3.2 for details). In the study, each case firm used both short term 
and long term PFP plans. During the interviews, participants were asked to give reasons 
why their firms used PFP. In coding the interviews, the author considered whether and 
how the managers’ answer could be explained by the existing theories. Apart from 
extensive interview notes taken by the author, the documentary sources were also used. 
These included the companies’ financial statements for the current and preceding years, 
consultancy reports, and internal documentation surrounding the pay setting process etc. 
The managers’ explanations of using PFP plans are discussed as blow.  
 
PFP as a motivator 
PFP was used for motivational purposes as believed by quite a few managers. Below is 
the typical expression of this belief, which is a basic assumption agency theory view 
that paying individuals to achieve results will motivate them to work harder and result 
in better outcomes for the organisation, as the general manager in POE4 noted:   
 
Market 
Job 
Person 
Pay range 
determination 
Pay promotion 
determination 
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“Our sales people actually desire a higher variable pay level and 
that if their base pay is too high they won’t do anything.” (General 
manager in POE4) 
 
However, some managers took the view that PFP might motivate people but did not 
retain staff in the longer run. This is seen in the next quote: 
 
 “I do not apply incentive plans to my senior managers but the 
lower staff. Those people are the king posts in my company and I 
motivate them by building up a good relationship with them, 
making them happy to work for me and promising to provide 
future stock options after we become listed company. Money can 
be an incentive but not a real motivator for the long term.” (The 
general manager in POE2) 
 
A HR specialist also responded with similar views that incentives in the current pay 
systems of knowledge-intensive firms seemed to be overplayed. The management 
obviously had too much expectation of their PFP plans without taking enough 
consideration for other possible long term rewards as stated below: 
 
“There is a trend in IT and Pharmaceutical industry of Shanghai 
that the quantity of incentive in pay package is getting larger, and 
reaching almost half of the total cash income. But it is surely for 
the short term motivation only, not a good idea for retaining good 
performers in the long run.” (Principal consultant of Watson Wyatt 
Shanghai) 
 
 
Retaining staff 
Similar to the motivational purposes discussed above, PFP plans were also taken as the 
alternative to training and other rewards to keep the good performers, as the sales 
manager in POE2 mentioned below:   
 
“We know money can not keep good performers for long, probably 
attractive training and development programmes would be much 
better than PFP. However, if we train our IT engineers, they would 
leave for other competitors with what they have learnt afterwards 
to get better job position or pay etc. Therefore, we offer them PFP, 
even though it is for the short term.” (Sales manager in POE2) 
 
Promoting business strategies  
PFP plans were applied to sell the new organisational mission to employees as the HR 
specialist in MNC1 said:  
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“In order to promote our business focus – ‘Sales Guarantee’ this 
year, new PFP plans were applied to sales & marketing staff. The 
specific PFP plan gives employees the message of our new 
mission.” (HR specialist in MNC1) 
 
A similar purpose for using PFP plans to encourage firms’ annual business objective 
was also found in the explanation by the HR director in MNC3 as below: 
 
“We are a European company; therefore, our PFP plans are not 
aggressive compared to American firms. However, we use PFP to 
drive certain business focus each year. For instance, last year was 
‘cash flow’, this year is ‘cost control’. Therefore, the business 
focus becomes one of the important measurements of PFP.” (HR 
director in MNC3) 
 
An effective management tool 
Some HR managers seemed to love PFP as an easy and useful management tool to tie 
people closely to their outputs. Those managers strongly supported results orientated 
PFP systems as explained by the HR manager in MNC5:  
 
“I highly support the philosophy – managing people by measuring their 
results. Output orientated is one of our key HR characteristics. I think 
PFP is an effective management tool which made my life a lot easier.” 
(HR manager in MNC5) 
 
However, many others managers expressed the opposite opinion, especially line 
managers. One of the HR specialists argued that the statement above only revealed that 
the HR manager was too naïve or lacked a strategic mind.  Many interviewees did not 
believe that PFP influenced effort especially at a senior level of the business as 
mentioned by the finance manager in JV1:  
“I’m not sure that anyone believes in practice PFP makes very 
much difference, especially at the very senior level of the 
organisation. In my view, senior managers are motivated by 
something other than money.” (Finance manager in JV1)  
 
Some managers even at senior level understood the reason for using PFP but they were 
not very confident or did not believe the expected effect would come out, as the senior 
manager in JV2 wondered below: 
 
“I’m highly sceptical myself as to how much extra people really 
put in. PFP has an impact, it does have an impact, or sometimes 
PFP is an effort bargaining. But I think it can be overplayed.” 
(Senior manager in JV2) 
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A good communication tool 
Most of the line managers mentioned PFP as a good communication tool to improve 
their working relationship with team members regularly, and make them focus a lot 
more on the team business targets. This can be seen in the quote below by the sales 
manager in MNC1. 
 
“PFP plans forced me to have meetings with my team time to time, 
so that I make sure they understand the target and things are 
moving forward. This is the only great benefit I can think of PFP, 
or the main reason why we should use PFP.” (Sales manager in 
MNC1) 
 
Market practice 
The reasons discussed above suggest that PFP was used in order to encourage certain 
behaviour from the management, which was a matter internal to the company with pay 
being the principal link between the individuals and the company. However, the 
research indicated that external factors also came into play when companies were 
deciding whether to implement a PFP scheme.  
 
Many interviewees mentioned that they had a PFP scheme because it was market 
practice so to do. MNCs in the study all joined the annual pay survey by the global 
leading HR consultancy – Mercer or Watson Wyatt. The management usually updated 
their PFP plans with external information from the consultancies. Other case firms 
followed public pay information or suggestions from the local HR consultancies.   
 
Best practice 
Many participants, mostly from POEs, pointed out that use of PFP was because that was 
seen as ‘best practice’. Some of the POEs copied the practice from their competitors and 
believed PFP was a good way of managing companies. This can be found in the 
following:  
 
“We do not join any pay survey with external HR consultancies. 
However, I can tell PFP is necessary to be offered to employees 
when I interview candidates. It’s seen to be a good thing.” 
(Director in POE1) 
 
“I’ve worked in MNCs before I joined this firm, the PFP system 
we are using now is actually the copy of what I did in the previous 
company. We need a bonus structure, and I think it’s a 
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conventional wisdom and a good way to pay people.” (The general 
manager in POE4) 
 
In sum, three main reasons for adopting PFP schemes by management can be 
summarised from the data analysis above. The first concerned external factors - market 
practices/best practices, the other two factors were internal reasons – the need to attract 
and retain good performers as well as the need to improve employee performance. PFP 
plans were used to set certain targets for employees and adopted as an effective 
communication tool for managers to monitor their people. Moreover, the PFP awards 
were not only regarded as monetary rewards, but also the recognition of individual 
success, the promotion of firm missions and business objectives. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented empirical findings for research question 1a – To what extent is 
PFP adopted? And 1b - why do firms use PFP? Three steps were taken in the analysis. 
First, employees in the cases were categorised into four groups, namely, senior 
management, sales & marketing, professionals and junior staff in order to effectively 
compare and contrast their PFP schemes in this thesis.  
 
The second step was that the importance of PFP was examined in the pay mix and pay 
structure. Employee pay mix in the case firms consisted of base pay, PFP and benefit 
and allowances. PFP was obviously an important component for the four employee 
groups because PFP was about 30 to 40 per cent of the total cash income for the top 
management, over 40 to 50 per cent for sales and marketing people, between 10 to 20 
percent for professionals, and around 0 to 10 per cent for junior staff. Moreover, graded 
and broad-banded pay structures were identified in the case firms. It was also found that 
the current pay structures in the non-public sector knowledge-intensive companies of 
China were job and market based rather than person based. Individual previous 
experiences and current performance/achievement were important determinants in 
setting employee pay range and pay progression.  
 
The third step was analysing the reasons for using PFP in the cases. The findings 
indicated that many companies adopted PFP despite a belief that money was not a long 
term motivator. Importantly, institutional factors such as market practice / best practice 
were the main external reasons, since companies used PFP because their competitors 
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did or else it was from the survey by certain HR consultancies. Internally, companies 
adopted PFP to attract and retain good performers, and improve performances, which 
could be explained by motivational theories such as expectancy issues. However, there 
was very little evidence to support legitimacy. This could be simply because of the 
absence of government guidance on PFP for non-public enterprises.  
 
Chapter 7 will further analyse findings for research question 2, the PFP plans adopted 
by the case firms and factors that impact on adoption.    
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
PAY FOR PERFORMANCE PLANS AND DESIGN 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents empirical findings for research question 2 regarding the design 
issues of PFP in China’s non-public sector knowledge-intensive industries. Findings are 
displayed for the two sub-questions 2a: What types of PFP plans are adopted? 2b: What 
are the contextual factors that impact on the adoption?  
 
This chapter consists of three parts. First, the meanings of PFP plans found in the case 
firms are clarified. Second, specific PFP plans for each of the critical employee groups 
identified in Chapter 6 section 6.2 are discussed. The forms, focus and characteristics of 
PFP plans for senior management, sales and marketing, professionals and junior staff 
groups are analysed. The second part of this chapter is the examination of contextual 
factors that affect the design of PFP plans adopted in the case firms. Factors of 
organisational environment, organisational characteristics and pay strategies are 
discussed.  
 
7.2 Findings for RQ2a: what types of PFP plans are adopted? 
The exact names and meanings of PFP plans can be complicated. Therefore, in the 
interviews the researcher provided definitions of PFP plans by Brown and Armstrong 
(1999) and asked HR managers to confirm if the PFP plans adopted by the case firms 
matched the meanings that were defined in the literature. PFP plans such as commission, 
year-end bonus, cash profit sharing, project/group based bonus and stock plans were 
found in the case firms. The name and definition of each PFP plan were agreed by the 
HR managers in the case firms, which are listed in Table 7.1 below.  
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Table 7.1 Definitions of PFP plans 
PFP plans Definitions agreed by HR managers  
in the case firms 
Performance 
measure level 
Commission A cash bonus to the results achieved by the 
individual and/or team. For instance, sales 
commissions and project based commissions.  
Individual/team 
performance 
Year-end bonus Non-recurring cash lump sums related to the 
performance achieved by the team and/or 
organisation at the end of the financial year. It’s 
paid in cash with a fixed percentage or 
discretionary.  
Team or 
organisational 
performance 
Cash profit 
sharing 
Schemes which share a proportion of a 
company’s profit with employees, typically on a 
common basis. It is a result-oriented plan that 
depends on collective performance. It’s paid in 
cash and often covers senior management or 
above with a fixed percentage or discretionary. 
Team and/or 
firm 
performance 
Project/Group  
based bonus 
A results-based programme that links pay to 
performance at a collective level. It often covers 
project teams or professionals when certain 
objectives are achieved during a time period.  
Team 
performance 
Stock plans Stock plans are based on a results-oriented 
measure at a collective level (stock price 
appreciation or stock price appreciation plus 
dividends). Those plans are heavily weighted 
toward executives and pay is linked to stock 
performance but with no actual option or 
ownership. 
Organisational 
performance 
Source: From Brown and Armstrong (1999) p.20 and interviews. 
 
According to the literature, the three major types of PFP plans are: payment by results 
schemes, performance schemes and financial participation schemes (Reilly, 2005) (see 
Chapter 4). The sections following present specific PFP plans adopted for each 
identified critical employee group (senior management, sales and marketing, 
professionals and junior staff respectively).  
 
7.2.1 PFP plans for senior management 
The types of PFP plans adopted for senior management in the case firms are listed in 
Table 7.2. 
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Table 7.2 PFP plans for senior management in the case firms 
Firm Payment-by-
result schemes 
Performance schemes Financial participation 
schemes 
POE1 - Cash profit sharing  
 
Stock options – Key share 
holders, 4 people 
POE2 - Year-end bonus Stock options – Key share 
holders, 6 people 
POE3 - Year-end bonus, 10-20% 
of total cash income 
- 
POE4 - Year-end bonus, 33% of 
total cash income 
Stock options – Key share 
holders, 6 people 
POE5 - Year-end bonus - 
JV1 - Year-end bonus  - 
JV2 - Year-end bonus - 
MNC1 - Cash profit sharing by firm 
sales volumes and profit 
margin 
Company share option plan 
(from 2007) 
MNC2 - Cash profit sharing by 
business unit achievement 
- 
MNC3 - Year-end bonus, 20-35% 
of total cash income 
- 
MNC4 - Year-end bonus, 1-2 
months salary 
- 
MNC5 - Year-end bonus Stock options. 
Source: From interviews and HR documents. 
 
The characteristics of PFP plans for senior management are discussed below.  
(1) Performance schemes, such as year-end bonuses and cash profit sharing, were the 
main types of PFP plans for senior management. Cash profit sharing and year-end 
bonus were short term orientated and based on the achievements made by senior 
management within a year or two. Payment-by-result schemes were not used for senior 
management.  
 
(2) Financial participation schemes, such as stock option plans, were not widely adopted. 
Stock option plans were long term (on average 3.5 years) based, and applied to very few 
key leaders in some of the cases only (POE1, POE2, POE4, MNC1 and MNC5). Stock 
option plans were not favoured by every case firm because of the tax problems, contract 
issues and other practical concerns by the owners as explained by the general manager 
in POE2 below.  
 
“Tax and practical issues can be the big problem in China for 
implementing stock option plans. For instance, once the stock 
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shares were sold, high ‘capital gain tax’ would be charged by the 
government. Shares in some companies were not allowed to be 
sold within 5 years, but the employment contract is normally for 3-
5 years. Moreover, owners of POEs tend to offer stock option plans 
to very limited people, such as the key leaders. Therefore, the stock 
option plans do not really attract most of the senior management.” 
(General manager in POE2) 
 
There was evidence that executive stock ownership was related to measurable gains in 
shareholder value. However, the findings could not support that the case firms were 
likely to perform consistently with shareholder interests when executives or others in 
the workforce had stock options in the company because this research did not examine 
effectiveness of the PFP plans. It was observed that owners and senior managers who 
had stock option schemes were lacking in confidence about stock ownerships. This can 
be understood from what the general manager in POE4 stated below:   
 
“We offer stock option plans to six of our key senior staff only. I 
personally am not very positive about stock options because it only 
is attractive to employees when it’s a big amount of shares. 
Otherwise, stock option plans would have too many practical 
problems and little financial return.” (General manager in POE4) 
 
(3) Discretionary year-end bonuses were most frequently provided to senior 
management in order to recognise some extra effort or a job well done, especially in 
POEs. However, this type of linking pay to performance caused internal inequity and 
de-motivation problems. Discretionary year-end bonuses were often reactive and 
subjective in the amount and its distribution and did not always differentiate on the 
basis of performance. Thus, high performing senior managers might feel that their 
particular contribution was not being sufficiently recognised. This can be illustrated by 
two senior managers’ comments below.  
 
“I’m not happy about the annual bonus given by the general 
manager. It was RMB 70,000 for me, but I think it supposed to be 
RMB 100,000. The boss didn’t tell me how the bonus arrived at 
that figure.” (Financial controller in JV1) 
 
“Our bonus system doesn’t recognise the top people. It all depends 
on our boss’s mood and your personal relationship with him 
because it’s his money and his company too.” (VP in POE1) 
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(4) In order to make the PFP plans attractive and competitive, other relevant 
considerations were provided to support PFP plans for senior management as explained 
below. 
 
Special benefits and allowance packages  
Special benefits were offered to senior management aligned with the PFP plans. Those 
benefits covered not only the compulsory contributions required by Chinese labour law 
but also additional ones such as long term pension plans. Moreover, post-related 
allowances were provided too, including company car, entertaining fees, company loan 
with no or very low interest rates to support senior managers to have a good condition 
of living and work environment.  
 
Long-term assignment  
It has been recognised by POEs and FIEs that problems of recruiting and retaining 
employees, particularly highly skilled senior managers, are raising the cost of doing 
business in China. “If you think that China is a cheap place for labour, think again,” 
says Mr. Jeffrey Fan, the business leader of Mercer human-resources consultancy 
Shanghai. The particular shortages mentioned most often by the interviewees were of 
creativity, of an aptitude for risk-taking and, above all, of an ability to manage in 
everything from HR and accounting to sales, distribution, branding and project-
management. As China entered the WTO and more foreign investments poured into 
China, the demand for Chinese executive talent has been even further increased and the 
labour market has been tightened up too. As a scarce commodity, Chinese executives in 
knowledge-intensive companies have become even more valuable and their price and 
cost to employers thus increase. With the dramatic changes occurring in China, one key 
aspect has remained the same: apart from the competitive PFP plans, a successful 
Chinese assignment for senior management must be a long-term one in both POEs and 
FIEs. The Mercer business leader in Shanghai made his points below. 
“Culturally, bureaucratically and professionally, business in China 
must be conducted over the long term – typically, longer term than 
in most other countries. Companies must determine, therefore, 
whether some PFP plans and allowances are required to 
compensate for the extended duration of a Chinese assignment”. 
(Mercer business leader in Shanghai China) 
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Improved PFP systems needed for Chinese returnees 
‘Chinese returnees’ are those Chinese who once studied, lived and/or worked overseas, 
possess a foreign passport or residency, and then return to participate in the growth of 
China’s market and benefit from the career opportunities available. As part of the 
general upward trend of expatriates in China's major cities, there has been an increase in 
the return of overseas Chinese (e.g., Mainland Chinese with overseas education and 
employment background, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong). There has been a debate 
over whether the Chinese returnees should be considered expatriates or locals. The 
current tendency is to treat them as local Chinese. It was found that FIEs in the study 
owned many more Chinese returnees than POEs. For instance, the CEO and general 
manager in JV1 were both local Chinese who possess MBAs and residency 
requirements for New Zealand. The HR VP in MNC2 and marketing managing 
directors in MNC1 and MNC5 were Shanghai local with English Masters degrees. 
However, returnees in POEs were obviously less satisfied than those in MNCs about 
their PFP plans just as the general manager in POE1 pointed out below: 
“…I studied my PhD at King’s college in London, and then joined this 
company. I personally think that HR or performance evaluation in this firm 
is far behind what we say in strategic HRM because the management style 
here is just too paternalistic. Boss decides everything, the recruitment of 
senior staff and the bonus schemes etc. In a way this kind of management 
style worked in the past and perhaps still working now. However, for the 
long run, he seriously must consider at least to have a formal HR 
department as we are such a large company now. We need a formal and 
proper PFP system. So I would suggest that it may not be a good idea for 
you to join a POE after your PhD…” (General manager in POE1) 
 
7.2.2 PFP plans for sales and marketing 
PFP plans adopted for the sales and marketing group in the case firms are listed in Table 
7.3.  
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Table 7.3: PFP plans for sales and marketing in the case firms 
Firm Payment-by-results schemes Performance schemes Financial 
participation 
schemes 
POE1 Commission - - 
POE2 Commission = (Sales profit – 
sales target)*commission rate 
- - 
POE3 Commission = (Sales profit – 
sales target)*commission rate 
- - 
POE4 Commission = Sales profit * 
(individual sales profit/total 
sales department sales profit) 
- - 
POE5 Commission = Sales profit * 
(individual sales profit/total 
sales department sales profit) 
- - 
JV1 Commission = (Sales profit – 
sales target)*commission rate 
- - 
JV2 Commission Individual performance 
bonus + team bonus 
- 
MNC1 Commission Gain-sharing 
Payment by team targets 
- 
MNC2 Commission (20-30%)* 12 months 
salary 
- 
MNC3 Commission Department group bonus - 
MNC4 Commission Department group bonus - 
MNC5 Commission Individual performance 
bonus + team bonus 
- 
Source: From interviews and HR documents. 
 
The characteristics of PFP plans for the sales and marketing group are discussed below.  
(1) Compared to the other three critical employee groups, sales and marketing staff had 
substantially low base pay but high PFP in their pay mix. The average contribution of 
PFP to total cash income for sales and marketing was in between 40 and 70 per cent.  
 
(2) Payment-by-results schemes, such as commissions, were the main type of PFP plans 
for the sales and marketing group. Sales commission rates were very market sensitive 
and tailored to meet specific company needs.  MNCs and JVs provided performance 
schemes, such as individual and/or performance bonuses to sales and marketing, 
because the marketing people might not gain as much commission as the sales. 
However, POEs offered commissions only to the sales and marketing people.  
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(3) In order to effectively link pay to sales volumes, several ways were used by 
management to monitor their sales forces. The most frequent methods are as follows 
(see Table 7.4). 
 
Table 7.4 Methods used to monitor the sales force in the case firms 
Methods Firms used 
Meeting sales objectives ALL 
Turnover against set targets ALL 
Call rates IT and pharmaceutical case firms 
Market share ALL 
Customer relations ALL 
Internal relations ALL 
Gross profit per order ALL 
New account ALL 
Source: From interviews and HR documents. 
 
(4) Additional allowances were also integrated with PFP plans for sales and marketing 
staff. In addition to base pay and pay for performance sales representatives receive other 
benefits and allowances. Companies regarded benefits required by Chinese labour law 
as additional standard industry payments to their employees and, thus, not as incentives.  
Allowances received by the sales and marketing force are listed in Table 7.5. 
 
Table 7.5 Allowances received by the sales force in the case firms 
Allowances Companies provided 
Company car/car scheme - 
Company mobile phone  POE2, POE4, JV2, FIE2, FIE4, FIE5. 
Phone allowance ALL 
Transportation allowance ALL 
Expense allowance ALL 
Over time working allowance ALL 
Source: From interviews and HR documents. 
 
Every firm provided phone, transportation, expenses and over time working allowances 
to their sales and marketing people. No firm gave company cars to their sales, but did 
cover taxi fees. The driving factors for the companies to adopt these variable plans were 
to direct the efforts of the sales force and to reward the good performers as their sales 
and HR managers identified. Thus, the case firms used PFP not only to influence 
behaviour positively, but also to reward them appropriately. 
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(5) Non-financial rewards (see Table 7.6) consisting mainly of promotion opportunities, 
recognition programmes, such as annual ‘Top sales’ award and training, were adopted 
for improving sales skills. However, non-financial rewards were obviously seen as less 
important than financial incentives and not widely used in every case firm, especially 
not in POEs. Training was provided mainly for new sales via on the job training 
programmes.    
Table 7.6 Non-financial rewards for sales & marketing in the case firms 
No-financial rewards Companies adopted 
Promotions ALL 
Top sales ALL 
Excellent employees ALL 
Training programmes POEs – on the job training for new staff in probationary  
JV and MNCs – on the job training, sending sales to head 
office for training 
Talent pool MNC3, MNC4, MNC5 for sales & marketing managers. 
Source: From interviews and HR documents. 
 
7.2.3 PFP plans for professionals 
PFP plans adopted for professionals in the case firms are listed in Table 7.7.  
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Table 7.7: PFP plans for professionals in the case firms 
Firm Payment-by-results 
schemes 
Performance schemes Financial 
participation 
schemes 
POE1 - Year-end bonus. No specific 
scheme for professionals.  
- 
POE2 Project based 
commission schemes 
(0-1.5)* one month salary - 
POE3 Project based 
commission 
schemes. 
- - 
POE4 Product based 
commission 
schemes. 
- - 
POE5 Project based 
commission 
schemes. 
- - 
JV1 - No specific scheme. Maximum 
two months salary 
- 
JV2 Product based 
commission 
schemes. 
- - 
MNC1 - 2-3 months salary - 
MNC2 - Year-end bonus 
(20-30%)* 12 months salary 
- 
MNC3 - Year-end bonus  
(20-40%)* 12 months salary 
- 
MNC4 - Annual bonus 
1-2 months salary 
- 
MNC5 (1-3%)* project sales - - 
Source: From interviews and HR documents. 
 
The Characteristics of PFP plans for professionals are discussed below.  
(1) A good design for PFP schemes for professionals can be very critical because of the 
special characteristics of their work. For instance, professionals’ work processes are not 
easy to check, their achievement and working time are hard to measure. Moreover, 
professionals can be very demanding in the job market and many of them probably 
work with relatively low job titles, which may not offer them many posts-related 
benefits or allowances. Thus, well designed PFP schemes become extremely significant 
to make their pay package competitive. However, compared to management and sales 
forces, PFP plans for professionals in the case firms seemed to be much simpler and less 
sophisticated.  Performance schemes, such as group base bonuses and/or individual 
year-end bonuses, were the main type of their PFP plans (see Table 7.7). 
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(2) Professionals’ skills and knowledge were rewarded in base pay, which was much 
higher than was that of sales forces. However, PFP schemes were designed to reward 
their projects’ completion by project based commissions and to reward team 
achievement by team performance schemes (see Table 7.7). It was found that short-term 
PFP plans were adopted as the primary performance pay solution for professionals in 
the case firms. However, the PFP plans were too results orientated, which did not 
encourage professionals to further development or update their existing competence, 
skills and knowledge, which could be rather valuable to the firms’ development. This 
can be found in the statement made by the quality assurance manager in MNC2 below.   
 
“Our PFP schemes are based on team or company performances, 
which do not encourage us to further update our knowledge about 
new standards of product quality etc.” (Quality assurance manager 
in MNC2) 
 
It was also observed that on one hand, the case firms were aware of the challenges of 
recruiting and retaining desirable talents. For instance, the turnover rate in IT firms like 
POE3 and MNC4 was about 30 to 40 percent per year. On the other hand, the case firms 
offered only results orientated PFP plans to their professionals. No special awards were 
offered to reward professionals who stayed for the term of a customer project, which 
would make it more challenging to a competitor to take a key professional away. This 
can be found in the points below made by the project manager in JV2. 
 
“At the moment I feel it’s hard to hire a good IT professional under 
our current pay system because our PFP is bonus based only, 
although the benefits are better than average in the industry. I think 
our PFP plans are a bit like the system in SOEs, probably because 
two of our general managers are from SOE sector.” (Project 
manager in JV2) 
 
7.2.4 PFP plans for junior staff 
PFP plans adopted for junior staff in the case firms are listed in Table 7.8. The 
characteristics of PFP plans for junior staff are discussed below.   
 
(1) The main type of PFP plans for junior staff was performance schemes, such as year-
end bonus or annual double pay. No other particular PFP plan was designed for junior 
employees. Year-end bonus was normally 7 to 10 per cent of the total annual cash 
income or one more month pay depending on the organisational performance, which 
was decided by the management at the end of the year.  
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(2) The PFP scheme for junior staff became a fixed payment in some case firms because 
it was only linked to organisational performance. When the organisational performance 
was successful, every junior staff was entitled to have the PFP scheme. In JV1 and 
MNC5, even when the organisational performance was unsuccessful, the junior staff 
still got a similar amount of year-end bonus as usual. 
 
(3) Some POEs deduced 10 per cent from monthly salaries to be the amount of PFP at 
the end of the year, which dissatisfied junior staff to a great extent, as seen in the 
complaint made by the HR manager in POE1.  
 
“Junior employees have 90 per cent of their monthly salary, and the 
employer keeps the other 10 percent. At the end of the year, the 
rest of salary will be rewarded according to the individual 
performance appraisal as the PFP for junior staff. This means that 
some junior staff that do not perform very well would have lower 
pay at the end of the year than what is agreed in the contract. This 
really de-motivated those junior staff.” (HR manager in POE1) 
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Table 7.8: PFP plans for junior staff in the case firms 
Firm Payment-by-
results schemes 
Performance schemes Financial participation 
schemes 
POE1 - Year-end bonus 
(10% of monthly salary 
was deduced each month to 
be the year-end bonus). 
- 
POE2 - Year-end bonus 
(One month salary) 
- 
POE3 - Year-end bonus 
(7% of  annual cash 
income) 
- 
POE4 - Year-end bonus 
(One month salary) 
- 
POE5 - Year-end bonus 
(8% of annual base pay) 
- 
JV1 - Year-end bonus 
(50% of one month salary) 
- 
JV2 - Year-end bonus 
(0-1.5)*one month salary 
- 
MNC1 - Year-end bonus 
(10% of annual base pay) 
- 
MNC2 - Year-end bonus 
(10% of annual base pay) 
- 
MNC3 - Year-end bonus 
(12-20% of annual base 
pay) 
- 
MNC4 - Year-end bonus 
(one month salary) 
- 
MNC5 - Year-end bonus 
(40-90% of one month 
salary) 
- 
Source: From interviews and HR documents. 
 
7.3 Findings for RQ2b: what are the contextual factors that impact on the 
adoption? 
This section analyses findings for RQ2b regarding the contextual factors that influence 
management’s design of PFP plans in the case firms. Relevant literature was reviewed 
in Chapter 4. During the interviews, managers were asked to give the reasons why a 
specific PFP plan was introduced and the elements that they considered important. It 
was found that factors in the organisation’s environment influenced management in 
building external competitiveness in the firm’s PFP plans. Factors in the  organisations’ 
characteristics influenced internal alignment. The above two types of factors directly or 
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indirectly formed organisational pay strategies, which had a direct impact on specific 
PFP plans in the case firms. This can be found in the following sections.   
 
7.3.1 Factors in the organisation’s environment: External competitiveness 
In terms of an organisation’s environment factors, competitiveness and industry 
characteristics were the main elements that directly impact on pay strategies and 
indirectly determine PFP plans design.  
 
Environmental competitiveness 
As an investment firm, POE1 had business in various areas including clothing, 
technology, trading and Bio-chemistry. Cash profit sharing and stock option plans were 
adopted by POE1 for senior management and executives, who were the main focus of 
their PFP system. POE1 itself invested in different types of business through 
establishing JVs with their business partners. Therefore, effectively motivating POE1’s 
senior management in their JVs became the key pay strategy which highly impacted on 
the PFP plans adopted. Moreover, investment is an extremely competitive industry, the 
more competitive the market conditions, the greater the match between employers’ PFP 
plans and the organisation’s environment (Miceli and Heneman, 2000). Thus, senior 
management in POE1 was the owner’s favourite group to implement a sophisticated 
PFP scheme. 
 
Industry  
Some 5 out of 12 of the case firms were from the pharmaceutical industry, including 1 
POE, 1 JV (China and Switzerland) and 3 MNCs (England, US and Germany). 
Interviews with HR managers in those companies revealed their consideration of 
following or competing with competitors’ PFP plans in the industry to design their own 
programme. This can be found in the following: 
 
“There is no big difference of short term PFP plans among 
pharmaceutical firms in Shanghai but the proportion and long term 
plans because most of the companies joined salary survey with 
global HR consultancies such as Mercer, therefore we know what’s 
popular in the market and adjust our plans according to those 
survey reports each year.” (HR director China in MNC1) 
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Region 
Firms’ location also affected the adoption of PFP plans. The HR director China in 
MNC3 pointed this out:  
 
“Our subsidiaries covered at least 5 major cities of China. However, 
the PFP plans for each location have to be slightly different not 
only because of the living expenses or cost concern in each place, 
but the management’s buy-in as well. For instance, managers in 
Shanghai have high ability of buy-in HR knowledge. Whilst in 
Wuhan (south east China) and Shenyang (northern China), it was 
really hard for us to promote the PFP plans. Unlike managers in 
Shanghai, those managers are highly knowledgeable about 
pharmaceuticals but not aware of motivating their staff to focus on 
financial results etc...” (HR director in MNC3) 
 
Labour market 
Some 4 out of the 12 case firms were from the IT industry, which was extremely fast 
developing and competitive. The average staff turnover in the four IT cases was above 
40 per cent per year, which was much higher than 10 to 20 percent in other labour 
intensive industries (Survey by Mercer, 2007). This was because there was not a big 
shortage of lower level IT skilled workers but only the experienced IT professionals. 
The case firms had to offer competitive PFP plans to IT professionals. Some POEs were 
afraid of providing training to IT professionals because of the high turnover rate. 
Therefore, the labour market issue strongly impacted on PFP plans in the four IT case 
firms. This can be found in the following 
 
“…I tend to give sales and marketing people good incentives 
based on their achievement, we don’t train them because the 
more you train them the more frequently they go to other 
competitors for better pay and position etc. But we do offer a 
good pay package to my key senior staff” (General manager in 
POE3).   
 
7.3.2 Factors of organisation’s characteristics: Internal alignment 
In terms of an organisation’s characteristics, companies’ business strategy, ownership 
and organisational culture played a great role on PFP plan design. The inter-relationship 
among these factors can be illustrated in Figure 7.1 below. The integration of 
organisational culture, structure and business strategy was observed in management’s 
decision making of PFP plans in the case firms.  
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Figure 7.1 Internal alignments in PFP design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Developed for the thesis. 
 
The following explains how business strategy, organisational culture and ownerships 
influenced management in deciding PFP plans of the case firms. 
 
Business strategy 
POE3 (IT) and MNC5 (marketing research) adopted a business strategy of attracting 
and motivating high-performing employees at a lower cost because they were start-up 
companies in those industries. Therefore, a low cost pay strategy was applied in the two 
firms. POE1 (investment) and POE3 (IT) advocated small pay gaps for performance 
among junior employees due to their corporate culture that emphasized self-motivation 
and commitment to the organisation. Behavioural performance measures dominated in 
the performance appraisal of MNC1 (pharmaceuticals) and MNC3 (Medical device) 
because of the long term orientated philosophy of both of the firms.  
 
Organisational culture 
Organisational culture did influence the characteristics of PFP plans. For instance, 
POE1 wanted to encourage the long-term relationship with their senior management, 
therefore, their PFP system focused on the top management much more than other 
levels of employees integrated with attractive long-term assignment and allowances. 
Stock option plans were offered to general managers in POE3 and POE4 in order to 
promote the high commitment culture. MNC favoured less competitive PFP plans than 
other medical device companies in the industry, but an attractive training programme 
because of their organisational culture emphasised individual development, and 
knowledge workers’ ongoing learning.  
Organisational 
Culture 
Organisational 
structure 
Business 
strategy 
 
Firm pay 
strategy 
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Organisational ownership 
Organisational ownership types had extremely high impact on it PFP design. For 
instance, it was found that the pay strategy of the head office had very strong influence 
on the PFP plan in the MNCs, just as the HR director in MNC3 (the French medical 
device company) pointed out: “Our PFP plans are not very aggressive compared to 
American firms in Shanghai, which is quite common in European MNCs.” The PFP 
strategy in JV2 (pharmaceutical) was highly influenced by their American parent 
company. However, in POEs PFP plans somehow depended on the private owners. For 
instance, the amount and distribution of the discretionary bonuses for CEOs in POE1 
and POE3 were decided by their owners only. 
 
7.3.3 Factors of organisation’s pay strategies 
In terms of organisation’s pay strategies, it was found that environmental factors mainly 
external as well as organisation characteristics give employers more actual latitude to 
select optimal pay strategies in our case firms, which directly impact on the PFP plans 
design. For instance, MNC2 (pharmaceutical) adopted the cash driven and short term 
focused PFP system because of the competitor who was the leading firm in the market. 
MNC2 had to recruit high performers via short term effective incentive plans in order to 
enlarge their market share at the present time. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter presented and discussed empirical findings in relation to how PFP plans 
were designed. Specifically, the chapter analysed the types of PFP plans adopted in the 
case firms and the main contextual factors that affect the adoption.   
 
Specific PFP plans adopted in cases for their senior management, sales & marketing 
people, professionals and junior staff were identified. The main PFP plans were 
commission, year-end bonus, cash profit sharing, group based bonus and stock plans. 
PFP plans for the senior management were performance schemes such as cash profit 
sharing and financial participation schemes such as stock options; PFP plans for sales & 
marketing were highly commission based; PFP plans for professionals were heavily 
project commission scheme based, which was much simpler than the senior 
management and sales & marketing group; and PFP plans for junior staff were year-end 
bonus only. The characteristics of PFP systems were demonstrated to be results and 
short-term orientated and cash driven, with bonus as the major payment method, and 
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poor connection of PFP plans to long-term cognitive learning and development, 
especially for professionals in those knowledge-intensive companies.  
 
Contextual factors in terms of organisational environment, pay strategies and 
organisational characteristics that affected PFP design in the case firms were analysed. 
It is evident that for instance, organisational environmental factors (such as 
competitiveness, region, labour market and industrial factors) and organisation 
characteristics such as business strategy, ownership and organisational culture were 
associated with organisational pay strategy, which directly impacted on firms’ PFP 
plans. 
 
The next chapter will provide empirical findings for research question 3 concerning how 
PFP plans are implemented.  
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CHATPER EIGHT 
IMPLEMENTATION AND FUNCTIONS  
OF PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Chapters 6 and 7 analysed findings for the importance of PFP in the current pay system 
of China’s non-public sector, and the types and design choices of PFP plans. This 
chapter presents empirical findings for research question 3 regarding the 
implementation of PFP in the case firms. PA was defined as the key part of PFP 
implementation in this thesis (see Chapter 4 section 4.5). Therefore, two aspects of PA 
are examined to answer research question 3, namely, the implementation of PA (RQ3a) 
and the functions of PA in PFP (RQ3b).  
 
PA is currently being promoted as a modern western HRM concept in China. This is in 
spite of the fact that performance practices have long existed in China with strong 
Chinese characteristics. The existing literature shows that there are numbers of factors 
that influence PA in China, mainly in the design of the performance indicator, and the 
process of conducting PA. Moreover, the results of PA have not been widely utilised by 
companies in China (see Chapter 4, section 4.5 for details). Therefore, this chapter 
demonstrates findings for PA practices in China’s non-public sector knowledge-
intensive industries. First, empirical findings of elements of PA implementation in the 
case firms are presented with regard to aspects of performance measured, criteria for 
performance judgement, appraisal instruments and the process of performance 
measurement. Second, the utility of PA outcomes by the case firms is discussed in 
relation to PA functions listed by Cleveland et al., (1989). Moreover, the development 
of PA and challenges to implementation and functions of PA are further examined.  
 
8.2 Findings for RQ3a: In what ways is performance measured?  
This section analyses findings for ways that PA was implemented in the case firms. 
Development and challenges to PA implementation are also explored.  
 
8.2.1 Implementation of PA 
Every case in the study had a formal PA process as one of their management tools. 
Employee performance used to be measured within two different employee groups – 
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cadres and workers before the economic reforms in China, which still exist in present 
SOEs (see Chapter 4 section 4.5 for details). However, the distinction between cadres 
and workers was no longer the case in the firms studied (POEs, JVs and MNCs). 
Employees belonged to either managerial/executive or non-managerial/executive groups. 
Except POE1, other companies had formal appraisal forms for managerial and non-
managerial groups. The ways that PA was conducted in the case firms are shown in 
Table 8.1 and discussed below.   
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Table 8.1: PA implementation in the case firms 
Firm What aspects of performance are appraised? Is performance 
described as 
narrative? 
(ranked or rated) 
Criteria of 
judgements 
(Behavioural or 
results) 
Conductors of 
appraisal 
Frequency of 
appraisal 
Comments 
POE1 
 
Performance measured by job descriptions for non-
executives  
Performance measured by the achievement of ‘sales, 
profit, stock and cash flow’ for executives 
No Results Self-
assessment 
Appraisees’ 
managers  
Once a year Vague criteria 
Results based 
only  
POE2 
 
Performance – Responsibility, quality of work and 
efficiency 40% 
Attitudes and competency – pro-activity, 
coordination and self-discipline 30% 
Ability – dealing with daily job and writing skill 
20% 
Attendance 10% 
Ranked  60% - results 
40% - 
behavioural 
Self-
assessment 
Appraisees’ 
managers 
Customers 
Monthly for product 
dept. 
Twice a year for 
others 
Heavily 
focused on 
sales & 
marketing staff 
POE3 
 
Task achievement – 70% 
Work attitudes – 10% 
Competence, knowledge, self-motivation – 20%  
Ranked 
 
 
70%-results  
30%-behavioural 
Self-
assessment 
Appraisees’ 
managers 
Customers 
Monthly for workers, 
quarterly for sales and 
yearly for others. 
Heavily 
focused on 
workers and 
sales. 
POE4 
 
Performance measured by company profit for 
management 
 
Performance measured by set targets for sales 
No Results Appraisees’ 
managers 
Quarterly for sales  
Yearly for others 
Heavily 
focused on 
sales 
POE5 
 
 
 
Performance measured by company profit for 
management 
 
Performance measured by set targets for sales 
No Results Appraisees’ 
managers 
Quarterly for sales 
and  
yearly for others 
Heavily 
focused on 
workers and 
sales 
JV1 
 
Basic assessment – Attendance, responsibility, 
planning, knowledge. 
 
Performance assessment – Work load, efficiency, 
cost control ability, coordination, leadership etc.  
Rated  Behavioural  Self-
assessment 
Appraisees’ 
supervisor and 
manager 
Yearly for 
management and 
quarterly for non-
management 
Very detailed 
and 
behavioural 
based 
JV2 
 
 
 
Achievement – 50% ( 90% measured by KPI ) 
Competence – 30% 
Attitude – 20% 
Rated  50% by results 
50% by 
behaviour  
Self-
assessment 
Appraisees’ 
manager 
Customers 
Quarterly for sales 
and yearly for others. 
Newly 
designed by 
professional 
consultancy 
KPI applied 
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Firms What aspects of performance are appraised? Is performance 
described as 
narrative? 
(ranked or rated) 
Criteria of 
judgements 
(Behavioural 
or results) 
Conductors 
of appraisal 
Frequency of 
appraisal 
Comments 
MNC1 
 
KPI measurement 60% 
Corporate value, leadership and functional 
development 40% 
Balance score card implied 
Yes, 
performance is 
rated and the 
overall score is 
ranked 
60% results 
40% 
behavioural 
Self-
assessment 
Appraisees’ 
manager 
Quarterly for 
marketing staff and  
twice a year for 
others 
Good design 
but poor 
implementation 
MNC2 
 
Individual performance objectives 70% 
 
Knowledge, skills and leadership 30% 
 
 
 
Yes, 
performance is 
rated and the 
overall score is 
ranked 
60-80% 
quantified, 
20-40% 
qualified. 
Self-
assessment 
Appraisees’ 
manager 
Customers 
Monthly for sales 
and yearly 
performance review 
for everyone 
 
 
Well designed 
and clear 
linkage among 
performance, 
rewards and 
development. 
MNC3 
 
Individual performance objectives 60% 
Knowledge, competence 30% 
Attitudes 10% 
 
 
Yes, 
performance is 
rated and the 
overall score is 
ranked 
60% results 
40% 
behavioural 
Self-
assessment, 
Appraisees’ 
manager. 
Customers 
Monthly for sales 
target review and 
yearly for everyone. 
Well designed 
with training 
programme for 
implementation. 
MNC4 
 
Individual performance objectives 60% 
Working activity 30% 
Attendance 10% 
 
 
Yes, 
performance is 
rated and the 
overall score is 
ranked 
60% results 
40% 
behavioural 
Self-
assessment, 
Appraisees’ 
manager. 
Customers 
Monthly for sales 
target review and 
twice a year for 
everyone. 
Well designed 
and consistent 
appraisal 
system review 
applied. 
MNC5 
 
Results, skills and behavioural based 
measurements 
 
 
Yes, 
performance is 
rated and overall 
score is ranked. 
60% results 
40% 
behavioural 
Self-
assessment, 
Supervisors 
Twice a year for 
everyone. 
Well designed 
appraisal forms. 
Source: From interviews and HR documents. 
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Aspects of performances measured 
As shown in Table 8.1, three major aspects of employee performance in the cases were 
measured: working attitude/attendance (weighting 10% on average), individual 
knowledge and competence (weighting 20-30% on average), and targets/goal 
achievement (weighting 60-70% on average). It was observed that JVs and MNCs had 
clear documents of what to measure and how to measure employee performance, 
whereas POEs (especially POE1, POE4 and POE5) used job descriptions as their 
performance measurement documents.  
 
Description of the expected performance 
As shown in Table 8.1, POE1, POE4 and POE5 did not describe the expected 
performance as ranked or rated, so that the measurement was vague and hard to be 
implemented and controlled by managers. JVs and MNCs had proper descriptions of the 
expected performance. Performance was described as rated in most of the firms and the 
overall rate of the individual’s performance was ranked, such as: excellent, very good, 
satisfactory, improvement needed and unsatisfactory. The distribution of those ranking 
results was reported to HR head office and the balance of the distribution for each 
department was required in MNCs.  
 
Criteria in performance judgement 
As shown in Table 8.1, both behaviour-oriented and results-orientated performance 
measures were adopted in the case firms. However, more than 50 per cent of the 
measurements were results based. For instance, POE1, POE4 and POE5 were fully 
results orientated; MNC2, MNC4 and MNC5 strongly focused on results too.  
 
Conductors of appraisals 
Table 8.2 shows the summary of conductors of PA in the case firms. PA was primarily 
under the control of appraisees’ managers or supervisors, apart from self-assessment. 
The HR department was mainly responsible for promoting and organising the appraisal 
process. Although HR managers in MNCs reported that proper training programmes for 
appraisal were offered to line managers each year, however, the actual delivery of this 
type of training was not recognised by their line managers during the interviews. Only 
one out of the twelve firms had involved peer groups in their PA, and three out of 
twelve firms applied customer feedbacks, in this case to assess their sales people’s 
achievement of relationship building with customers (See Table 8.2).  
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Table 8.2 Appraisers of PA in the case firms 
Organisational role Contributions 
Appraisee Self-assessment 100% 
Appraisee’s manager 100% 
Appraisee’s peers Only one company used 
Appraisee’s employees No contribution 
Customers 3 companies used for their sales only 
Source: From interviews. 
 
The multi-source feedback system (MSFS) - 360 degree appraisal - was not used in the 
cases. The reasons were the time required, heavy paperwork, and lack of transparency 
of feedback, which can be found in the following:  
 
“360 degree measurement is too time-consuming and managers 
probably think it’s too much paperwork. Additionally, 360 degree 
appraisal won’t work well because there is no effective 
communication channel in the firm. The feedback won’t be delivered 
to the appraisees appropriately.” (Marketing manager in MNC1). 
 
Some other managers mentioned that personal relationships (guanxi) between the 
appraisers and the appraisees could distort the results of MSFS. The quality of 
customers’ feedback was also problematic as the HR manager in MNC2 
(pharmaceutical) explained below:  
 
“We tried to apply 360 degree measurement a few years ago. However, 
it was found that some sales and marketing (comprising Prescription) 
staff were given very high rates by their external appraisers – the 
doctors in the hospitals who were our customers. We then realised that 
the hidden reason was that those doctors had commissions from our 
sales and marketing people, therefore, they gave our sales very good 
rates for appraisal. So, 360 degree measurement was stopped 
afterwards because we couldn’t really trust the rates given by our 
customers.” (HR manager in MNC2) 
 
Frequency of appraisals 
As shown in Table 8.1, PA was generally conducted once a year for each member of 
staff in the cases, or twice a year in some firms, and quarterly and monthly even for 
sales and marketing staff. The mid-year assessments were basically target checks, while 
annual appraisals were linked to pay.  
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Appraisal instruments applied 
The combination of two methods was used in case firms: Management by Objectives 
(MBO) and PA ratings (PAR). Figure 8.1 shows the processes of the two PA methods. 
MBO was used for senior management and based on evaluation by the degree of goal 
accomplishment, which was linked to their annual PFP scheme. For instance, “Total 
Budget Control” was the strategic goal in POE1 to measure their top managers’ 
performance. Similarly, increasing regional sales and market share was the main goal to 
measure the performance of regional managing directors in MNC2, MNC3 and MNC5.  
 
As shown in Figure 8.1, the appraisal of senior management was often conducted by 
owners or head offices. In the beginning of a performance review period, the employee 
and their supervisor or owner discuss performance objectives and meet to record results 
formally. Results are then compared against objectives, and a performance rating was 
then determined based on how well objectives were met. Such performances are 
evaluated at the end of the year in terms of accomplishment of objectives. 
 
PAR was used for mid and lower level staff in the case firms, appraising performance 
by the following formula (shown in Figure 8.1): performance (40-60%) via key 
performance indicator (KPI) set in advance, ability/competences and knowledge (20-
30%) and attitude (40-10%). For instance, KPIs for sales and marketing people are 
objective based, such as meeting sales objectives, turnover against set target, call rates, 
market share, customer relations, internal relations and group profit per order and new 
accounts development. Competences and knowledge are measured by selling skills, 
knowledge of products. Attitude includes lateness, absence, discipline and cooperation 
with colleagues. The results of ratings were linked to individual PFP, such as year-end 
bonus, team based gain sharing and commissions etc. 
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Figure 8.1 PA processes in the case firms 
 
Source: From interviews. 
 
8.2.2 Development and challenges for PA implementation 
Chapter 4 section 4.5 reviewed the history of PA in China before and after the economic 
reforms in 1978. PA practices in China have been developing. Notwithstanding these 
changes, PA practices are different from those practices in the West even though they 
are, in many cases, adaptations of Western practices (Deng et al., 2003). As Saha (1993) 
argued, environment, national culture and organisational characteristics shape HRM 
practices in a country. In particular, the Chinese institutional environment, cultural 
values and type of firm ownership have influenced the adoption of Western HRM 
practices. So, if changes in the PA system have indeed occurred, which elements of the 
system have changed (change content)? The difficulties in executing PA are widely 
reported in the literature. Given the fact that knowledge-intensive organisations are 
characterised by a large number of highly skilled employees, it could, therefore, be 
expected that performance evaluation for intangible intellectual skills would be even 
more difficult there. So, what factors have facilitated or hindered the implementation of 
new PA (change context)? The development and challenges to PA implementation are 
discussed as below. 
Assessing Achievement of 
Objectives 
Strategic goals 
Main goals 
Basic goals
Assessing by Key Performance 
Indicators 
Performance (40-60%) 
Skills and competences (20-30%) 
Attitude (40-10%)
Appraising by general 
managers and/or CEOs 
Deciding appraisal grades by 
Managers and supervisors 
Counting Appraisal Grades 
distribution by HRs 
Deciding Appraisal Grades 
By Head office 
Performance Based Bonus Performance Based Annual 
Salary 
A
ppraisal
 
 
Process
Individual Appraisal Individual Appraisal 
PA 
(Appraisal method for non-
senior management) 
A
ppraisal 
Process
Management by Objective 
(Appraisal method for senior 
management) 
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Development of PA 
In the case firms, it was observed that there were changes in all key elements of the PA 
system. Table 8.3 is the comparison among PA in China before the economic reforms in 
1978, PA in the 1980s and 90s, and the current PA practices in the case firms. It is 
evident there has been PA content change in the areas of the focused groups of PA, the 
performance measurement, the appraisal instruments, process and the emphasis of the 
PA system. For example, the criteria of judgement changed from political loyalty and 
work attitude to performance results, skills and competency. Rates expanded to include 
people from different feedback sources (e.g. peer group, subordinates, and external 
clients). Both hard quantitative financial objectives as well as soft qualitative 
competence and skills were considered. The results of evaluation were, to various 
degrees, linked to reward and personal development.  
 
Table 8.3 Development of PA elements 
 Before 1978 
 
1978-1990s Current practice  
Covered 
groups 
Workers and cadres Workers and cadres Managerial and non-
managerial 
Frequency Yearly Yearly or semi-yearly Monthly  
Quarterly 
Yearly 
Criteria Heavily reliant on 
political loyalty and 
seniority 
Good morals, adequate 
competence, positive 
working attitude and 
strong performance 
rewarded 
Attitude, competence, 
leadership and 
productivity 
according to 
individual KPIs. 
 
Methods Superior-rating-
subordinate 
Management by 
objectives 
Internal subcontracting 
Results and 
behavioural based 
measurements 
Process Self-evaluation - peer 
group opinions – 
department 
assessment 
Self-evaluation - peer 
group opinions – 
department assessment 
Self-evaluations and 
supervisor assessment 
Emphasis Driven by political 
ideology. 
Evaluation rather than 
developmental or 
communication 
purposes 
Linking appraisal to 
pay and development 
and achievement was 
given priority in 
appraisal. 
Source: Developed for the thesis. 
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Challenges to PA implementation 
The challenges to PA implementation were also obvious in the case firms as discussed 
below:  
 
Performance objectives 
Performance objectives were solely set by the board of directors in POEs. Managers had 
no input in setting the objectives. Staff like the deputy managing director in POE1 and 
the general manager in POE4 believed that there could be unexpected events that were 
beyond management control and could affect the attainment of rigid performance 
objectives.   
 
Performance measures and MSFS 
Since performance was mainly evaluated on ‘hard’ figures, especially in POEs, the 
‘soft’ aspects (such as leadership, teamwork, customer relationship) were largely 
ignored.  The general manager in POE5 felt that a new PA system could not give a fair 
and comprehensive evaluation of employees.   
 
There has been very little literature on the use of MSFS or 360 degree appraisal in 
China. Zhang (2001) provides, to the best of the author’s knowledge, the only study 
looking at the rating tendencies of Chinese evaluators participating in 360 degree 
appraisal. In this research, no adoption of MSFS was found in the case firms. The 
findings also showed that the main challenges to adopting MSFS by the case firms were 
managerial support and the politics of evaluation. For instance, organizations like POE1 
were characterized by a strict hierarchy and, as commented on by one participant, the 
‘absolute power’ of the leader would mean that his own acceptance and support of 
certain HR practices would determine the adoption of MSFS. Moreover, another reason 
that no MSFS was taken was because the politics of evaluation could be intense. Three 
interviewees mentioned the impact of ‘Guanxi’, or the emphasis put on preserving 
social harmony in Chinese culture, on rating inflation. Along similar lines, two 
interviewees discussed the ‘Golden mean’ (Zhong Yong in Chinese) which leads to a 
lack of differentiation between ratees. For these reasons, the outcomes of MSFS may 
not be very reliable.  
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HR’s strategic role 
HR departments can play a critical role during the change process, affecting the pace of 
development and institutionalising change at a deeper level (Chang and Chi, 2007). 
During the PA process, the HR can work to create a culture for development, bridge the 
gap between different levels, and add value to a business by building organisational 
capability (Poon and Others, 2009). Whether HRM performs a strategic role in 
providing guidance to the line managers and communicating the PA system can affect 
the effectiveness of change.  
 
The idea of the knowledge economy places great importance on HRM. Nevertheless, 
HR departments have generally been underdeveloped and most HR personnel 
emphasised the specialised functional aspects of their work – compensation, benefits, 
recruitment, training, etc. HRM practices have exhibited reactive and highly 
operationally oriented characteristics. However, the level of HRM sophistication varies 
across POEs, JVs and MNCs. When the company does not have a proper HR 
department (as in POE1 and POE4), the relationship between the line managers and HR 
can be problematic. The implementation of PA can be hampered. There are examples of 
this below.  
 
“There was no formal HR department in our firm. The administration 
department performed HRM functions. However, the administration 
department was fully occupied in dealing with public affairs, 
recruitment, organisation structure and corporate culture. The 
administration department has hardly had time to properly roll out the 
new PA system or seriously considered career development of 
employees” (Deputy managing director in POE1). 
 
The implementation of the PA system was not successful because the HR department 
was not properly functioning in MNC2. There was a lack of strategic role for the HR 
department. HR only performed a supportive role, and did not act as the agent between 
top management and employees or the bridge between the head office and its China 
subsidiary. The training manager attributed the reasons for this isolation to the fact that 
HR staff were not exposed to change in the PA system. This can be found in the 
following: 
 
“The average age of our HR staff is about 27 years old. They are too 
young and not experienced enough to implement firm policies. They 
cannot perform the change agent role in the PA system. They have not 
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even held any single meeting with me to explain the change in the PA 
system. Generally, I feel there is a lack of communication between the 
line managers and HR department.” (Training manager in MNC2) 
 
Firm Ownerships 
Different types of firms used PA differently. Although PA practices in POEs and JVs 
have become more formalized than before, their practices are still primitive ones 
compared to those used in MNCs. The case firms show that firm ownership can be an 
institutional factor affecting PA implementation. For example, the pluralistic 
management style in POEs, owners’ interests of objectives and their beliefs in PA can 
also influence process, measurements and rewards. On the other hand, country-of-origin, 
dominance effects, and pressures on international integration (Edwards and Ferner, 
2002), can affect MNC’s ethnocentric strategy in the adaptation of PA to local 
situations (as in MNC1, MNC2 and MNC3).  
 
Inertia and Resistance 
It was found that organisational inertia, deeply rooted in the institutional heritages of 
companies, can act as a brake on the full absorption of HRM changes (Ding et al., 2000). 
Rules, standard operating procedures and patterns of decision making were emphasised 
and inhibited divergent changes. Organisations remained committed to retaining past 
proven competencies because doing so was more efficient than trying to develop new 
ones (as in POE2). In the knowledge-intensive industries, being innovative to create and 
promote a learning environment and motivate and maintain knowledge workers are keys 
to success. Organisational inertia and resistance to change in turn stifled companies’ 
ability to alter knowledge companies’ current strategies. 
 
Manager ownership of PA 
Resistance of line managers to the change process could hinder change in PA content. 
For example, line managers resisted change because they thought that the new PA 
system required them to do more work in discussing objectives with employees and 
filling more evaluation forms than before. As a result, the new PA schemes never got 
popular and were not internalised.  
 
Furthermore, the involvement of management in the implementation of PA could affect 
the internalisation process. In POE1, POE3, POE4 and JV2, line managers had little 
participation in goal setting and performance evaluation, except passively allocating 
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pre-determined objectives. Since line managers did not bear the responsibility in the 
process, they had little incentive to implement PA. As line managers were not required 
either to be accountable for the attainment of objectives or to monitor the progress, they 
did not have dedication to the new PA system, but rather held a partial, pragmatic 
commitment to the change.  
 
8.3 Findings for RQ3b: What functions does PA serve in PFP? 
This section analyses findings for research question 3b, which explores the functions of 
PA in the case firms. During the interviews, managers were asked to fill in a form to 
indicate the functions of PA in their company in terms of the 19 items developed by 
Cleveland et al. (1989a). A five-point scale rating, from (1) No impact to (5) Primary 
determinant was applied to each item. The meaning of each item was explained by the 
researcher in the interviews in order to control misunderstanding by the managers and 
improve the quality of the response. Table 8.3 presents the information of managers’ 
ratings and the average of each item in the case firms. However, we must bear in mind 
when we read those ratings that to some extent ratings could be managers’ thoughts 
rather than the reality.  
 
8.3.1 Functions of PA  
It is clear from Table 8.4 that the functions of PA related to salary administration, 
recognition of individual performance (between individuals), evaluating goal 
achievement (system maintenance) and documenting personnel decisions 
(documentation) were rated highest in the case firms, while functions of PA related to 
evaluating personnel system, reinforcing authority structure and identifying 
organisational development needs (system maintenance) were rated the lowest in the 
case firms. 
 
It is also clear from Table 8.4 that the functions PA served in PFP seemed to be 
different among POEs, JVs and MNCs. For POEs, PA results had very little impact on 
within-individuals factors, such as performance feedback and identifying individual 
training needs, and also very little or no impact on documentation and system 
maintenance use. Salary determination and goal achievement were the main functions of 
their PA systems. This is to say that PA outcomes in POEs were used mainly as a salary 
administration option. PA outcomes were not closely related to other key HR decisions, 
such as training and development and personnel planning. This can be found in the 
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following. For instance, PA results were mainly used for the recognition of individual 
performance in POE1 as pointed out by its HR manager:  
 
“PA is mainly focused on team and general managers in terms of sales, 
profit, stock and cash flow. Staffs below deputy general manager level 
are assessed within the department or JVs according to their job 
descriptions. PA for junior staff is somehow paper work only, which is 
not closely linked to individual pay and recruitment and selection.” (HR 
manager in POE1) 
 
PA results were mainly used for salary administration in POE2 as the HR manager 
mentioned:  
 
“PA has a high impact on salary administration as it directly affects 
individual’s bonus. For instance, in sales and R&D departments, the 
manager would have a formal meeting with staff in the beginning of the 
month to set up their target and review at the end of the month too. Thus, 
PA strongly affects salary administration and recognition of individual 
performance (goal achievement basically).” (HR manager in POE2) 
 
PA results were mainly used to recognise individual performance in POE3 as the HR 
manager stated:  
 
“Our sales and marketing people are measured by targets, and senior 
managers are appraised by our boss, the owner, and I don’t even know 
the result beforehand.” (HR manager in POE3) 
 
For JVs, PA outcomes were highly related to salary administration and goal achieving. 
PA seemed to have moderate impact on identifying poor performance (between 
individuals), personnel planning (system maintenance) and determining transfers and 
assignments (within individuals). PA had very little or no impact on meeting legal 
requirements, criteria of validation research, reinforcing authority structure. This is to 
say that PA served mainly for pay administration and personnel planning. However, 
their parent company had a strong influence on the functions of PA just as the HR 
manager in JV1 stated below: 
 
“PA is conducted differently in our firm because there are two systems. 
People from the Chinese partner such as the financial controller, 
secretary of board of directors are appraised by their managers in our 
Chinese parent company. Staff from the foreign partner are appraised by 
the foreign parent company. However, the appraisal in the foreign parent 
company has a training and development part, but the form in our 
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Chinese parent company hasn’t got an evaluation of employees’ future 
needs. Therefore, the PA systems in the parent companies could be quite 
different.” (HR manager in JV1) 
 
For MNCs, the average ratings of functions of PA seemed to be higher than POEs and 
JVs. Obviously, PA results had a very high impact on salary administration and 
evaluating goal achievement, and over-moderate impact on promotion, recognition of 
individual performance and identifying poor performance (between individuals), 
performance feedback (within individuals), identifying organisational needs (system 
maintenance) and documenting personnel decisions (documentation). This is to say that 
PA outcomes were used not only for managing pay, but also for key HR decision 
making, such as training and development. Moreover, PA results were seen as a virtual 
necessity in maintaining HR systems and documentation.  
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Table 8.4: Summary of functions of PA in the case firms 
  
Use of PA factor 
POE1 POE2 POE3 POE4 POE5 AVERAGE JV1 JV2 AVERAGE MNC1 MNC2 MNC3 MNC4 MNC5 AVERAGE 
  
Between-individuals 
                              
1 Salary administration 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4.5 4 3 5 4 4 4 
2 Promotion 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 4 3 4 4 4 
3 Retention or termination 1 1 2 1 1 1.2 1 1 1 3 4 4 4 3 4 
4 
Recognition of individual 
performance 3 4 5 4 3 3.8 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 
5 Lay-offs 3 2 3 2 3 2.6 2 2 2 4 4 3 2 4 3 
6 
Identifying poor performance 
1 3 4 3 1 2.4 4 3 3.5 3 4 2 5 4 4 
  
Within-individuals 
                              
7 
Identifying individual 
training needs 
1 1 2 1 1 1.2 1 2 1.5 3 2 3 3 3 3 
8 Performance feedback 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1.5 4 4 5 4 4 4 
9 
Determining transfers and 
assignments 2 1 1 1 2 1.4 3 2 2.5 3 2 4 2 3 3 
10 
Identifying individuals’ 
strengths and weaknesses 
1 2 1 2 1 1.4 2 1 1.5 3 3 5 4 4 4 
  System maintenance                               
11 Personnel planning 1 2 3 2 1 1.8 3 2 2.5 3 2 3 2 3 3 
12 
Determining organizational 
training needs 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1.5 3 2 4 3 3 3 
13 Evaluating goal achievement 2 4 4 4 2 3.2 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 
14 Evaluating personnel systems 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1.5 2 2 2 2 2 2 
15 
Reinforcing authority 
structure 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 
16 
Identifying ٛ organisational 
development needs 
2 3 1 3 2 2.2 1 2 1.5 2 1 3 2 2 2 
  Documentation                               
17 
Criteria for validation 
research 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 
18 
Documenting personnel 
decisions 1 2 3 2 1 1.8 3 3 3 4 4 5 5 3 4 
19 Meeting legal requirements 1 2 2 2 1 1.6 4 2 3 4 3 2 3 2 3 
Source: From questionnaire results conducted during the interviews. 
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8.3.2 Development and challenges for functions of PA 
Development of PA functions 
In the literature, Ding et al. (1997) note that PA in the 158 FIEs in southern China is mainly 
used to determine pay. Chou (2005) addresses the finding that PA is often seen as a waste 
of time and not taken seriously by either the appraisers or appraisees. The lack of utility of 
PA as perceived by appraisers and appraisees remains a severe barrier to the effective 
implementation of PA. In the case firms, the results of PA were mainly used for 
determining promotability, identifying strengths and weakness, setting appropriate pay 
level and evaluating subordinates’ goal achievement, which corresponded to the PA system 
prevalent in the West. In MNCs, PA also functioned as a salary administration tool and 
feedback source (or between-individuals and within-individuals functions in Cleveland et al. 
1989 terms). Documenting performance and developing a plan were viewed as the least 
important in POEs. Performance in MNCs has high impact on promotion (between 
individuals), performance feedback (within individuals), and identifying organisational and 
individual needs (system maintenance), and legal compliance (documentation). It seemed 
that POEs, JVs and MNCs somehow used PA outcomes differently. 
 
Challenges to PA functions 
It was observed that some PA systems focused more on results and short term achievement 
than long-term learning and development. The connection between PA outcomes and 
cognitive learning / career development plan was somewhat missing, especially in POEs. 
The case firms were knowledge-intensive organisations, who required a large human 
capital investment. It is, therefore, essential for knowledge-intensive companies and their 
top management to induce change in utilising the PA results. For instance, PA in the case 
firms need to better serve functions in PFP, including addressing development needs and 
career aspirations of employees to encourage knowledge workers to update product 
knowledge, improve long-term skills and enhance competencies. Furthermore, system 
maintenance and documentation are functions that need special attention to be integrated 
with PA outcomes.   
 
8.5 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed empirical findings about PA issues in terms of its implementation 
and functions. Key elements of PA including aspects of performance measured, criteria, 
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conductors and appraisal instruments applied, and functions in terms of between-
individuals, within-individuals, system maintenance and documentation in PA were 
examined.   
 
Previous literature showed that performance practices in China have been changing since 
the economic reform and open door policy in 1978. The findings supported that there has 
been sweeping development in both the element and functions of PA in the case firms. 
However, PA was implemented differently in POEs, JVs and MNCs. Major challenges to 
implementation and functions of PA came from the issues of managers’ input and 
ownership of PA, HR’s strategic role as well as the firm ownership influences. The 
functions PA served in PFP systems also seemed to be different among POEs, JVs and 
MNCs. It is evident that the use of PA results needs to be more closely related to training 
and development rather than pay administration in the case firms.  
 
The next chapter will present empirical findings for research question 4 regarding line 
managers’ involvement in PFP design and implementation. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
LINE MANAGEMENT IN PAY FOR PERFORMANCE 
 
9.1 Introduction 
Chapters six, seven and eight provided empirical findings for research question 1-3, 
regarding the importance, the design issues and the implementation of PFP in China’s non-
public sector knowledge-intensive industries. This chapter presents empirical findings for 
research question 4 concerning the line managers’ involvement in PFP design and 
implementation. Findings are discussed in two aspects, line managers’ understanding of 
their role in PFP and the key supports they received and barriers they had in PFP.   
 
The existing literature (see Chapter 4 section 4.6 for details) shows that the devolution of 
HR policies to line managers has become one of the key characteristics of HRM since the 
1990s. However, there has been a lack of empirical material on the role of line managers 
within HRM in comparison with other HR areas, such as the link with business strategies. 
Nevertheless, the crucially important issue of line managers’ approach to implementation of 
PFP has not received much attention in the Western, Asian and Chinese contexts. Research 
question 4 explores the line managers’ involvement in PFP in China’s non-public sector 
knowledge-intensive firms. This examines line managers’ views on PFP, their participation 
in the different stages of PFP design and implementation. In order to explore this, a group 
of line managers in the case firms who participated in PFP programme were interviewed.  
 
This chapter first provides a profile of the HR and line managers involved in the interviews. 
The chapter is then followed by the examination of line managers’ understanding and views 
on PFP. Last, the participation of line managers in different stages of PFP design and 
implementation is examined, and the key supports and barriers to their involvement in PFP 
are demonstrated.  
 
9.2 Profile of HR and line managers interviewed 
18 HR directors and managers and 23 line managers in sales and marketing, project 
development, customer service and finance departments etc. in the case firms were 
interviewed (see Table 9.1). Each interview lasted from 40 minutes to 1 hour. The 
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interview questions included line managers’ description of their tasks and responsibilities, 
their view of the PFP system and their activities in PFP plans determination and PA 
practices.  
Table 9.1 Profile of HR and line managers interviewed in the case firms 
Firms HR managers Line managers 
POE1 HR manager Finance manager 
Administration manager 
POE2 HR manager Sales manager 
Marketing manager 
POE3 HR manager R&D manager 
Sales manager 
Customer service manager 
POE4 HR manager Sales manager 
Product manager 
POE5 HR manager Project manager 
JV1 HR manager Manager of president’s office 
Financial manager 
JV2 HR manager Regional medical & public affairs manager 
MNC1 HR director, China 
HR manager 
HR specialist 
Training manager 
Marketing manager 
Sales manager 
MNC2 HR senior manager, 
Shanghai 
Senior brand manager 
Senior manager 
MNC3 HR director, China,  
HR manager, Shanghai 
Policy & government affairs manager   
MNC4 HR director, China, 
HR manager, Shanghai 
Project manager 
MNC5 HR senior manager, China 
HR shared service lead 
HR manager, Shanghai 
Project development manager 
Sales manager  
Client solutions manager 
Source: From interviews. 
 
9.3. Findings for RQ4a: How do line managers understand their role in PFP? 
This section examines how line managers understood PFP and their responsibilities in the 
system.  
 
9.3.1 Conceptualisation of PFP by line managers 
To understand the role of line management in PFP design and implementation in China’s 
non-public sector knowledge-intensive companies the researcher first examined how 
managers understand their work responsibilities with PFP. In was observed that in general 
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there was no significant difference between HR and line managers’ beliefs on the 
importance and necessity of PFP in the case firms. HR and line managers both viewed the 
issue of developing and maintaining good performers via PFP as a critical issue for their 
daily operations and long-term strategic plans of the organisation, although the line 
complained about HR’s support and guidance on PFP, and HR had some dissatisfaction 
with the line’s commitment and efficiency in PFP. These complaints are discussed in later 
sections of the chapter.   
 
It was also highly obvious that the managerial thinking of the line managers was driven 
foremost by a pragmatic commitment to finding ways of improving productivity. Line 
managers viewed PFP as a useful tool that they either hoped or believed would motivate 
employees, and although the current PFP could be problematic to some degree, it was better 
than nothing. Line managers were not driven primarily by a deep philosophical 
commitment to PFP. In other words, line managers were more committed to the objectives 
they intended to achieve rather than to PFP systems. However, the researcher does not 
conclude that PFP plans did not have the effect of motivation. Indeed, the initial 
performance improvements observed by line managers suggested that PFP did to some 
extent motivate those behaviours desired by the management.                 
 
In general, line managers were either directly or indirectly involved in PFP plan design, 
appraisal and the development of their subordinates in the case firms. These areas were 
clearly viewed as being the responsibility of the line in MNCs and JV2, in which the 
general view from both line managers and HR specialists was that line managers should 
‘own’ these activities because it was they who worked directly with their staff on a daily 
basis and who were ultimately responsible for the performance of staff in their 
departments/areas. However, most of the line managers in POEs did not have the same 
awareness as those in MNCs. Line managers in POEs more heavily focused on productivity 
than on their responsibility of people management.  
 
During the interviews, line managers were asked to raise the top three positive and negative 
views about PFP in their minds (see the summary in Table 9.2). Most of the points were 
negative; few line managers in POE1 and POE5 could give any positive points about PFP 
plans. A lack of initiative and certain awareness of responsibilities were also noted among 
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line managers in POEs. However, every line manager was still willing to implement and 
support their PFP systems, and they somehow believed that it was certainly better than 
nothing because employees needed to be measured, otherwise employees probably would 
not want to do anything.                                  
 
As shown in Table 9.2, the most common positive view on PFP by the line was that PFP 
systems worked or would work in the short term, and PFP did encourage line managers to 
effectively focus on goal achievement and pay more attention to communicating with their 
people.  The most frequent negative views raised by the line were that PFP plans were too 
results orientated, some plans were too complicated to be calculated and the system gave 
them to some extent too much paper work. It was evident that even though line managers 
had lots of negative views on PFP, they were still not against the PFP system itself.  
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Table 9.2: Summary of line managers’ view on PFP in the case firms 
 
 POEs JVs MNCs 
Positive 
views 
- Results orientated 
 
- Encourages line 
managers to focus on 
targets 
 
- Very formal and 
complete appraisal 
and pay system for 
manual workers 
rather than others. 
- Well written 
documents. 
 
- System works for 
the short term, but we 
are not quite sure 
about the long term 
issue. 
- Well designed system by 
the head office. 
- Individual targets are easy 
to measure as they are linked 
to results. 
- Reinforcing line managers’ 
focus on team and firm 
goals. 
- Encouraging line managers 
to communicate with their 
people. 
-  System works for the short 
term. 
Negative 
views 
- System is led or 
heavily relies on 
owners’ view or 
preferences.  
- Boss’ impression of 
individuals means a 
lot in pay for 
performance. 
- Not very well 
designed, e.g. 
training and 
development is not 
included. 
- Not a good system, 
but better than 
nothing and it works 
at the moment at least 
or for the short run. 
- Good incentives 
schemes for senior 
managers and sales, 
but not for everyone.  
- Nothing special, it 
all depends on 
results. 
- Bonuses promised 
by the general 
manager did not 
materialise.  
- Unfair measurement 
- The strong 
influence from the 
parent company 
makes the pay for 
performance plans 
not very practical in 
JVs.   
 
- System is too results 
orientated. 
 
- It definitely works at the 
moment but may not be for 
the long term. 
- Grading system is too 
complicated. 
- Too much paper work for 
line managers. 
- HR organises training for 
line managers but does not 
support the line in practice 
very much. 
- HR staff is far too young to 
guide and support us in 
doing pay for performance. 
- Some incentive schemes 
are too complicated to 
understand such as the team 
based sales commission 
scheme.  
Source: From interviews. 
Chapter 9 Line management in PFP 
 196
9.3.2 Line managers’ understanding of their responsibility in PFP 
Line managers were asked to describe in their own words the job tasks or activities in 
which they were regularly engaged. Line managers were then asked to describe how their 
performance was evaluated and whether their PFP plans were associated with the 
evaluations. Here the researcher sought to learn 1) whether the description of tasks and 
activities were more specific in companies with well-developed and mandated PFP plans 
and PA schemes, and 2) whether an acknowledged, well-understood PFP system focused 
managers’ attention on their work activities.  
 
No manager described fewer than two tasks and activities and non more than five. PFP 
plans and PA were always elicited after the tasks and activities had been described in detail. 
No attempt was made to determine if they were effective managers, though some of them 
had been promoted to current responsibilities after several years of experience in their 
company. Task and activity descriptions were scored by the researcher using a naive 
scoring system: 1 = very specific description of task, activity, and supporting information; 2 
= less specific description of activity; 3 = vague description of task or activity or general 
activity with no focus.  
 
An example can clarify how the researcher scored descriptions of tasks and activities. The 
product manager in POE4 described three activities: daily team monitoring, tracking 
projects, and corporate management responsibilities. The first task was scored 1 because 
the manager specifically described the sources of data and the procedures used to monitor 
team activities. The second activity was scored 2 because it was non-routine and relied on 
occasional memoranda and informal communications. The third activity was scored 3 
because no specific activities were described and information was sought as received or as 
needed. For this manager, the average score for specificity of tasks and activities was 2, and 
scores were averaged with those of others at the firm to obtain a measure of a corporate 
score. The results of the case firms are as shown in Table 9.3. 
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Table 9.3 Specificity of task scores of case firms 
With well-defined PA scheme With more ambiguous PA scheme 
JV1 1.80 POE1 1.68 
JV2 1.77 POE2 1.92 
MNC1 1.89 POE3 1.88 
MNC2 1.83 POE4 1.81 
MNC3 1.80 POE5 1.60 
MNC5 1.82 MNC4 1.81 
Source: From interviews. 
 
The data collected in the interviews offered limited support to an argument that a well-
developed performance evaluation scheme understood by manages helped them to describe 
their tasks and activities more specifically. Data also showed no apparent differences in 
hard task/objectives description between companies in which PA were well defined (such 
as JV2, MNC1, MNC2, MNC3, and MNC5) or more ambiguous (such as POE1, POE3, 
POE5). However, line managers in those companies with clear PA schemes were more 
specific or aware in describing their task in managing their people through leadership and 
coaching than those in the companies with ambiguous appraisals. Furthermore, sales, 
product and finance managers in the case firms seemed to be more specific about the goals 
than did professionals from marketing and investment and development. This result could 
be because of the nature of the job and also the companies’ focus of PFP. But the data was 
not enough to draw a conclusion about the manner in which a PFP plan was best used in 
conjunction with a PA scheme.  
 
9.4 Findings for RQ4b: what are the key supports and barriers to line managers’ 
involvement in PFP design and implementation? 
This section presents how line managers participated in different stages of PFP and further 
illustrates the supports and barriers to their involvement. Table 9.4 indicates line managers’ 
specific activities in PFP design and implementation, including; organisational pay 
strategies design, performance goal setting, performance review, pay adjustment, future 
development plan and follow up activities. The discussion of each stage of line managers’ 
involvement is as below. 
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9.4.1 Line managers’ participation in PFP 
Organisational pay strategies design 
It was observed that line managers in all cases had very limited involvement in PFP design. 
In POEs, the owners and partners were the decision makers in pay strategies and plans, in 
JVs and MNCs the head office were the final decision makers in pay plans design. The 
local CEOs and HR departments provided salary market survey and other related 
information to assist the pay decision. Even the PA forms were transferred from their head 
office to host countries with sophisticated implementing and training guidelines. Line 
managers did not have a voice in pay plans decision making but in providing feedbacks in 
PFP plans evaluation. PFP design in POEs was highly controlled by their owners or top 
management.  Line managers had no involvement in decision making. The sales manager in 
POE3 recalled that line managers sometimes did not even know how their employees were 
rewarded eventually because of the intervention of top management and the lack of 
transparency in pay decision making.  
 
Performance goal setting 
In the case firms, team goals were set according to firms’ annual business objectives. Line 
managers had very little participation in goal setting, but allocated the tasks and conveyed 
information to individuals in the department. There was not much negotiation between the 
department and the firm about the goals, unless the line managers felt it was absolutely 
unachievable. MNCs did require and reinforce a joint effort and accountability between 
manager and employee to establish and update goals and to give and ask for feedback in a 
written document, but the communication channel in reality to some extent did not fully 
satisfy their line managers as the marketing manager in MNC1 pointed out below: 
 
“I think the target for my team last year was too high because we 
had to consider some unexpected possibilities. But my boss did not 
listen to me. Therefore, I’m not happy with my performance rating 
by him.” (Marketing manager in MNC1) 
 
Another role of line managers in goal setting was to reinforce the importance of the goal to 
the organisation and help develop necessary proficiencies for goal accomplishment. Most 
of the line managers were aware of this responsibility, and had regular or instant meetings 
with their team member to discuss how to fulfil their objectives. In companies like MNC4, 
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MNC5, line managers spent lots of time on deciding staff KPI (key performance indicators). 
The finance department in POE1 followed PDCA (Planning, Do, Check and Action) as the 
process of performance management, and their line managers were involved in each step.  
 
Performance review 
Evaluating employees’ performance was the major responsibility for line managers in PFP 
systems. Line managers were involved to a great extent in communicating with their team 
members at work, and managing their performance through goals and task tracking, as 
commented on by the sales manager in MNC1: 
 
“The most useful thing about PA is that it pushes me to have regular 
meetings with my team members, and monitor their activities and 
discuss future plans with them.” (Sales manager in MNC1) 
 
However, not every line manager liked their job of reviewing the performance of their team 
members due to the heavy paper work caused by PA and other difficulties as stated below. 
 
“Too much paper work for us because our HR wanted us to review 
sales’ performance each month or each quarter. Although the PA in our 
company is well written, still checking or evaluating goal achievement 
does not necessarily encourage better performance because there are 
unexpected reasons and things that are out of our control.” (Sales 
manager in POE2) 
 
Impression management in measuring performance was one of the difficulties as stated by 
the project development manager in POE5: “Being seen to be working and developing a 
high profile might, therefore, contribute towards a higher performance rating, but it does 
not necessarily lead to a higher level of individual performance.”  In addition, the relatively 
high degree of autonomy in some forms of work made it more difficult for managers to 
judge the performance of professionals. A degree of self-reporting was required and the 
different personalities of employees could distort the result.  
 
Subjectivity was another difficulty in measuring the competencies, skills and contribution 
by research professionals, whose work was not easily measurable. This can be seen in the 
views of one manager below. 
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“Things like the commitment and skills in communication were hard to 
rate. You can have someone who’s incredibly bright and able, but sits in 
the corner all day with no progress. To measure research professionals’ 
contribution to a certain project is even harder. Someone might provide 
a very smart idea to the project team. However, we don’t keep the 
written records on ideas. He/she might be forgotten by the performance 
reviewer unless that person makes him/herself very visible or apparently 
active all the time at work.” (Project development manager in POE5) 
  
In addition, line managers were reluctant to use the full range of performance rating 
categories when the outcome of the rating may mean more than just a smaller than average 
increase in pay, or when the ratings might be used to make decisions about who might or 
might not be retained in the event of redundancies.  
 
Pay adjustment 
Line managers had very little involvement in pay adjustment but made suggestions to the 
annual pay review. The major problem in determining the appropriate outcome of any pay 
review by the line can be illustrated via the situation in case MNC3. Like other 
pharmaceutical firms, MNC3 adopted a matrix management system. This meant that 
individuals were situated in a discipline-based department – chemistry or virology for 
instance, but worked in one or more multidisciplinary project groups. However, their pay 
was probably reviewed by department managers who might not exactly know the person’s 
performance who was not on the spot.  
 
Future development plans 
Linking performance to personal development plans was observed in JV2 and MNCs, but 
in POEs there was no written document concerning employee development by the HR 
department, line managers had no involvement in making future development plans for 
their team members after the performance review. By contrast, line managers in MNCs 
were encouraged to discover future development areas for their people during performance 
review. Yet, the training and development programmes provided by the company did not 
exactly meet the specific individuals’ future needs. It was observed in MNC2, MNC3 and 
MNC5 that training courses for sales people were too basic and more entry level, which did 
not suit the experienced sales staff. For professionals, there was a lack of tailor made 
courses provided to update their knowledge and motivate their cognitive learning. For line 
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managers, there were more courses available on management skills such as leadership than 
their own professional areas. Attending international conferences and management training 
at head office was also regarded as one of the rewards for line managers’ development.   
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Table 9.4 Line managers’ participation in PFP in the case firms 
Firms Organisational 
pay strategies 
designer 
Performance targets 
setting 
Performance 
review 
Award / pay 
adjustment 
Future 
development plan 
Follow up 
activities 
POE1 Owners No participation. Rating  No  No No 
POE2 Partners Setting individual targets Rating No No No 
POE3 Owner + four 
key senior 
managers 
Allocating targets Rating Suggestions. No No 
POE4 Owner + unit 
general 
managers 
Allocating targets Rating No No No 
POE5 Partners Allocating tasks Rating No No No 
JV1 Parent company Allocating tasks Rating No No No 
JV2 Parent company  Allocating tasks Rating Suggestions Future goals setting Following 
arrangements by 
HR 
MNC1 Head-office Allocating tasks and 
making action plan with 
employees 
Rating Suggestions Identifying Training 
& development and 
training needs  
Following  
arrangements by 
HR 
MNC2 Head-office Allocating tasks and 
providing feedbacks for 
future targets setting 
Rating Suggestions Identifying Training 
& development and 
training needs  
Following  
arrangements by 
HR 
MNC3 Head-office Allocating tasks and 
providing feedbacks for 
future targets setting 
Rating Suggestions Identifying Training 
& development and 
training needs  
Following  
arrangements by 
HR 
MNC4 Head-office Allocating tasks and 
providing feedbacks for 
future targets setting 
Rating Suggestions Identifying Training 
& development and 
training needs 
Following  
arrangements by 
HR 
MNC5 Head-office Allocating tasks and 
providing feedbacks for 
future targets setting 
Rating  Suggestions Future goal setting Following  
arrangements by 
HR 
Source: From interviews. 
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9.4.2 Key supports and barriers to line managers’ involvement  
Looking at the case firms, one thing should be commented on first before any further 
discussion. Projects had become increasingly important in the case firms; especially in the 
IT and pharmaceutical industries, many business activities were project and/or product 
based. The researcher observed that the projects and heavy workload could influence the 
line managers’ HR input and the function of the HR department.  
 
9.4.2.1 Key supports in line managers’ involvement in PFP 
HR support for projects in business units 
In pharmaceutical MNCs, such as MNC1, MNC3 and MNC4, the top management and HR 
functions made great efforts to restructure their HR departments and support project 
operations. For instance, in MNC1 the HR department was divided into different HRM 
competence areas, which worked on a consultancy basis for the line units. In order to 
support the project operations, a separate unit consisting of HR specialists was created to 
specialise on project management support issues, such as recruiting project professionals, 
project management development, PA, learning and development, and knowledge 
management.   
 
In MNC3 and MNC4, no specific unit was set up, but the HR department was changed 
from centralised to de-centralised in order to effectively support the line units. HR people 
were trained to have more product and project knowledge, and work more closely with 
project-based units. For instance, some HR specialists were sent to the business units to 
help line managers deal with HR activities, such as recruitment and appraisal, they were 
also the coordinators between the HR and the line unit, who were responsible for aligning 
HR functions and line management.    
 
Leadership trainings for line managers 
The development of line managers’ leadership competencies was emphasised in MNCs and 
JV2. For instance, MNC1, MNC2 and MNC5 stated that leadership on all levels was a core 
competence that needed to be developed. Short-term training courses or seminars on 
leadership were provided to the line to improve their competencies in managing people. 
The purpose of this type of training was to refine line managers’ understanding and 
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awareness of the formally assigned HRM responsibilities to them, so that they would take 
more HR orientation in their daily work at the project-based units.  
 
Career paths 
Developing career paths for line managers was stressed in those project intensive case firms. 
Internal transfer and job enlargement and enrichment were applied to line managers. Sales 
and project managers in the IT, pharmaceutical and investment industries usually worked 
on short term based products or projects. Therefore, these managers were those who had to 
further plan their career development for the long term. Certain encouragement and 
development opportunities were delivered to line managers by top management and HR. 
For example, the marketing manager in MNC1 was transferred from the sales department; 
the marketing manager in MNC2 was transferred to be the training manager. The job of 
project manager in POE5 was enlarged to be in charge of projects in Shanghai and other 
regions. However, some of the line managers complained about the timing of this type of 
internal transfer because some of them had to wait for 5 – 6 years to get transferred, as the 
marketing manager in MNC1 pointed out.   
 
Collaborative efforts evaluation 
The development of line managers’ competencies was highly emphasised. For instance, 
MNC3 and JV2 put greater pressure on collaborative efforts between managers in the 
project-based units, and between managers in supporting departments and projects and/or 
product departments, as the manager in the public affairs department of MNC3 stated:  
 
“Collaborative effort is one of the major performance measurements for 
me because my responsibility is to maintain the good relationship with 
the government and update the company with new policies of medical 
device production and sales in Shanghai, therefore, the company wants 
us to work really closely with the line.” (Public affairs department 
manager in MNC3) 
 
9.4.2.2 Barriers to line managers’ involvement in PFP 
Conflicts between HR and the line 
That HR people did not speak the same language as the line was a big impression obtained 
by the research in the interviews and during observations.  These were conflicts between 
the HR based and task based way of thinking. HR wanted to promote their activities, while 
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line managers could not buy in. Another problem seemed to be the HR department’s lack of 
competence when it came to project-related activities and co-worker problems that arose in 
a project-based environment. A HR manager in MNC3 pointed out: “we can not be 
involved in measuring some professional managers’ performance, because we do not 
understand the technical criteria.” 
 
Problems with project based work nature 
Knowledge-intensive companies, such as IT, often involved projects. For instance, MNC4, 
POE3, POE4 and POE5 experienced that well-functioning project activities had become 
increasingly important, especially in their IT R&D unit, where projects predominated. 
However, the powerful projects created a project based nature of work, which caused a 
series of problems in PFP.  
 
The project based nature of work made it necessary for the line managers to assume a 
greater responsibility for HRM, specifically in PFP. Such a work nature made it impossible 
for the HR department to keep full track of employee performance and development. For 
instance, R&D people in POE2 were only in the Shanghai office once in 3 months because 
of their IT projects. Therefore, HR had almost no idea about these R&D staff’s work and 
performance except from the line managers. Thus, HR based logic for the line was expected 
by the HR department. However, line managers were supposed to be promoted based on 
their professional excellence, but they now needed to improve their so-called ‘soft skill’ 
and HRM competences. Line managers were not always happy about assuming these HRM 
responsibilities. Their main interest and main skills lay within specific IT or investment 
areas, not within HRM. For instance, line managers in POE2 were specialised in IT for 
bank networking design, line managers in POE5 were specialised in IT for insurance 
software.  Therefore, line managers followed a task or project based logic in their daily 
work, which was oriented differently from HR type work. There were very rare examples 
of line managers and HR managers who had a balance between the HR and task logic.  
 
Problematic relationships between line managers and project leaders 
In cases like POE2, POE5 and MNC4, IT engineers, specialists and after sales service 
professionals worked together to design the specific IT software for banking and insurance 
firms. Due to the fact that the people involved were across departments, the relationship 
Chapter 9 Line management in PFP 
 206
between line managers and project leaders became problematic. For instance, the project 
team members were supposed to have meetings with their line managers as well as their 
project leaders to set goals. It was the line managers’ responsibility to get all the 
information and undertake employees’ performance reviews, but they also had to get input 
from the project leaders. However, based on this type of work situation, employees became 
confused sometimes about who to turn to when they could not work very well with the 
project leader, and when they were not satisfied with the performance review feedback etc. 
Nevertheless, conflicts between the line and the project leaders were observed when they 
needed the same company resource and/or the same person to work for their tasks.  
 
Issues of top management input 
Lack of top management’s input in PFP was mainly found in POEs. For instance, a 
paternalistic management style was observed in POEs, where the owners believed in their 
personal charisma more than the management, as stated by the owners of POEs below.   
 
“The key line managers have been working hard because of me since 
the firm was established, and I’m here everyday to know what they are 
doing and how happy they are with me. I’m the best motivation for 
them.” (Owner of POE2)  
 
“There are two types of people in the firm, technical and managerial. 
We can train technical staff to know more about management, but 
leadership skill cannot really be taught, it’s something you are born 
with. I believe that in the company my charisma has been the key to 
hold line managers together, which is better than any type of PFP 
plans.” (Owner of POE1) 
 
Problems in goal setting 
As discussed in section 9.4.1, line managers’ participation in goal setting was to allocate 
the tasks set by the companies. However, task allocation was less than enough. As the goal 
allocation must be accompanied by a deep understanding of organisational objectives, 
information about translating them into action, and support for meeting goals. Line 
managers’ further participation in goal setting was needed in the case firms, not only 
because participation by itself is inherently motivating, but also because it provides them 
with an increased understanding of expectations and strategies for goal accomplishment.  
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9.5 Conclusion 
This chapter explored how line managers were involved in PFP design and implementation 
thus answering RQ4a: How do line managers understand their role in PFP? and RQ4b: 
What are the key supports and barriers to line managers’ involvement in PFP? The first step 
of the analysis was line managers’ views on PFP and their understanding of their own 
responsibilities within this framework. The findings supported a general observation in the 
literature about the transfer of HRM responsibilities to line managers (Larsen and Brewster, 
2003), who acknowledged that PFP was a useful tool, although a large amount of negative 
views were also observed. The ownership of PFP by the line was limited because they still 
reported an ongoing gap between the espoused theory of PFP and what was delivered in 
their eyes. The research here argued that project intensification could be an important factor 
that impacted on line managers’ understanding and responsibility in PFP. In some cases, 
line managers were identified as ‘the critical communicators’ and the ‘enactors of strategy 
set by the top management’. However, the empirical findings show us that line managers 
were much more committed to their project or team goal achievement than to PFP itself.  
 
The second step of the analysis in this chapter concerned the supports and barriers to the 
involvement of line managers in PFP. Line managers in POEs, JVs and MNCs were 
involved in three stages of PFP (Kessler and Purcell, 1992). The first stage was the 
determination of individual performance criteria, the second stage was the individual 
performance assessment and the third stage was when the pay adjustment was linked to the 
result of the first two stages. In the cases where line managers were highly involved in the 
first two stages, actually pay distribution was decided by the top management team.  
 
Goal setting and reviewing, monitoring in achieving objectives and appraising employees’ 
performances were line managers’ main responsibilities under PFP systems. Line managers 
had little ownership of PFP systems, but they were incredibly positive about the 
clarification of their work objectives during implementing PFP. Performance measurement 
and evaluation were taking up a growing amount of managerial time. Firms encouraged 
their line managers’ earlier attention to potential problems than offered by a more 
traditional annual appraisal process. Line managers reported that setting goals which 
encouraged team working and co-operation had been a general trend, but still many of them 
felt that their PFP systems encouraged too great a focus on personal targets, which in turn 
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resulted in inflexibility. This outcome was also seen as reducing innovation when 
individuals perceived they were more likely to be rewarded for conformity than risk taking, 
especially where results could be less easily measurable and more unpredictable for 
professionals in pharmaceutical and IT firms.   
 
HR support for the business units, leadership training, career development and 
collaboration were identified as the key supports for line managers in PFP. 
Misunderstandings between HR staff and line managers, the lack of top management’s 
input, and the lack of congruence between line managers and the project leader in PFP were 
the key barriers to line managers’ involvement in PFP design and implementation. These 
supports and barriers were closely related to the project-based nature of work in the case 
firms. Line managers who mainly focused on the technological and scientific development 
in the line unit followed a task based logic, while HR followed a management based logic. 
A greater balance between a HRM and task focus is needed for both the line and the HR in 
PFP systems.  
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CHAPTER TEN 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
 
10.1 Introduction 
The Economic reforms and the opening up to the outside world have made profound 
changes to the economic and social development of China. The most dramatic changes 
have been in three areas. One is the rapid development of the Chinese economy. The other 
change has been in the ownership structure of enterprises, which caused the flourishing of 
the non-public sector including POEs, JVs and MNCs. Another major change has been in 
pay systems. The ‘Iron-wage’ system based on seniority and job rank has been gradually 
phased out (Zhu and Warner, 2000, Zhao and Nichols, 1996) and reformed to a non-
egalitarian system which linked employee earnings to their performance both at individual 
and organisational levels. More recently, trends towards a more knowledge-based economy 
has brought the fast growth of knowledge-intensive industries in China. Also, increased 
competition under globalisation led to greater challenges in attracting and retaining good 
performers through competitive employee rewards, which has become critical in high-
value-added and knowledge-intensive industries.  
 
The existing literature on rewards in China is heavily focused on the evolution of the 
traditional pay system, with little attention paid to PFP. Therefore, the aim of this thesis 
was to explore PFP design and implementation in the context of China, principally in non-
public sector knowledge-intensive companies. In order to do so a review of the literature 
was carried out, on the basis of which were developed research objectives and four key 
areas identified, namely: the importance of PFP, PFP plans and design, PFP 
implementation, and line managers’ involvement in PFP.  
 
This research primarily used data obtained from case studies of 12 knowledge-intensive 
firms of investment/marketing research, IT and pharmaceutical industries in Shanghai. In-
depth interviews were conducted with 52 top management, HR and line managers as well 
as 10 specialists in local and leading international HR consultancy firms. The empirical 
findings were analysed in chapter 6 – 9.  
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The aim of this chapter is to outline the main conclusions of the research. For this purpose, 
this chapter is structured as follows: Section 10.2 discusses the key findings and arguments 
in relation to the research questions. Section 10.3 involves a demonstration of empirical, 
theoretical contributions and managerial implications of the thesis. Section 10.4 and 10.5 
summarise some limitations of the study and provide possible suggestions for further 
research in the future.  
 
10.2 Discussion of empirical findings 
This section gives an overview of the empirical findings in the study. It draws only the core 
findings, remarks that are more detailed are in the data display and analysis of Chapter 6-9. 
Table 10.1 presents a brief summary of empirical findings in relation to research questions 
of the thesis as below. 
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Table 10.1: Summary of findings in empirical analysis 
Research question How and where addressed Findings 
Research question 1: How important is PFP in the current pay system? 
RQ1a: To what extent is PFP 
adopted?  
The proportion of PFP in pay mix and the 
extent to which pay depends on performance 
in pay structures were examined (see relevant 
literature in Section 4.3). 
Chapter 6 PFP was an important component in pay mix 
and performance was one of the key factors in 
determining pay range and progression.  
RQ1b: Why do firms use 
PFP? 
The reasons for using PFP were examined by 
theoretical explanations (Agency theory, 
Expectancy and Equity theory, and legitimacy 
and institutional factors. See relevant 
literature in Section 4.3). 
Chapter 6 Two major sets of reasons emerged: 
HR/motivational purpose and responding to 
institutional factors or legitimacy. 
Research question 2: How is PFP designed? 
RQ2a: What types of PFP 
plans are adopted? 
Types, coverage, and focuses of PFP plans 
were identified (see relevant literature in 
Section 4.4). 
Chapter 7 Payment-by-results, performance schemes and 
financial schemes were found. PFP system was 
results-oriented, short term based and cash 
driven. 
RQ2b: What are the 
contextual factors that 
impact on the adoption? 
Factors that influenced the management to 
adopt certain PFP plans were examined (see 
relevant literature in Section 4.4). 
Chapter 7 Factors in terms of organisational environment, 
organisational characteristics and pay strategies 
were found. 
Research question 3: How is PFP implemented? 
RQ3a: In what ways is 
performance measured? 
Types of performance measures and 
instruments adopted were identified (see 
relevant literature in Section 4.5). 
Chapter 8 Changes and challenges of PA implementation 
were identified. 
RQ3b: What functions does 
PA serve in PFP? 
Four types of functions of PA were examined 
(see relevant literature in Section 4.5). 
Chapter 8 Salary administration, recognition of individual 
performance and evaluating goal achievement 
were identified as the major functions of PA. 
Research question 4: How are line managers involved in PFP? 
RQ4a: How do line 
managers understand their 
role in PFP?  
Line managers’ conceptualisation of PFP and 
their responsibilities in PFP were examined 
(see relevant literature in Section 4.6) 
Chapter 9 Line managers were much more committed to 
project and team goal achievement than to PFP. 
RQ4b: What are the key 
supports and barriers to line 
managers’ involvement in 
PFP? 
Supports and barriers to line management in 
pay design, implementation and follow up 
activities were examined (see relevant 
literature in Section 4.6) 
Chapter 9 Supports: HR supports, leadership training, 
career development and collaboration; 
Barriers: Misunderstanding between HR and 
line managers, lack of top management input, 
and the congruence between line managers and 
the project leaders. 
Source: Developed for the thesis. 
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10.2.1 RQ1: How important is PFP in the current pay system? 
Research question 1 explored the importance of PFP in the current pay system of China’s 
non-public sector knowledge-intensive firms. This question was answered by examining 
the importance of PFP in employee pay mix and pay structures (RQ1a), and identifying the 
reasons for using PFP by the management of the case firms (RQ1b) (see Chapter 6 for 
details).   
 
RQ1a: To what extent is PFP adopted? 
The proportion of PFP in the pay mix and the extent to which performance was important 
in determining pay within the pay structures of the case firms were examined. In order to 
effectively compare and contrast PFP among the case firms, employees were categorised 
into four groups based on the common and critical posts, namely: top management, sales 
and marketing, professionals and junior staff. It was found that employee pay mix consisted 
of base pay, PFP and benefits and allowances. PFP was a highly important component in 
the pay mix for the four employee groups. In particular, PFP accounted for 30 to 40 per 
cent of total cash income (base pay plus PFP) for top management, 40 to 60 per cent for the 
sales and marketing group, around 20 per cent for professionals and 10 per cent for junior 
staff.  
 
Furthermore, graded and broad-banded pay structures were found in the case firms. Pay 
levels were closely attached to currently assigned jobs. The pay range was attached to each 
grade or band with a minimum and maximum amount which indicated the scope provided 
for job holders to progress through the range. The top three items for determining pay range 
identified by managers were: market rate (information from HR consultancies, such as 
Mercer and/or the competitors), individual working experiences (previous performance) 
and qualifications. The top three factors for determining pay progression identified by 
managers were: individual performance, firm performance and cost for PFP. Therefore, 
individual performance was one of the key factors in determining employee pay range and 
pay progression within the graded and broad-banded pay structures.  
  
Figure 10.1 further illustrates the changes of pay determinants from the traditional ‘Iron 
Wage’ system before the economic reform to the current pay system in China’s non-public 
sector. The ‘Iron Wages’ system was state-administrated, guided by a low wage policy, 
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involving flat wage structures and complicated and inflexible wage schemes (see Chapter 3, 
Section 3.4 for details). Key determinants of pay in the ‘Iron Wage’ system were morally 
and spiritually based, and pay progression was seniority-based (Cieri et al., 1998, Cooke, 
2004b, Warner, 2003a). In contrast to this, the current pay structures in the non-public 
sector were identified as a job and market based structures which were much less 
complicated, highly decentralised and performance orientated (see the discussion in section 
6.3.3). The ideology of pay was changed from ‘to each according to their need’ to ‘to each 
according to their performance and contribution’.  
 
Moreover, PFP practice in China used to be under strong state control (see Chapter 3, 
Section 3.5 for details). Under the post-reformed pay model in the 1980s, enterprises were 
allowed to distribute bonuses from their retained profits, with the total amount not 
exceeding two-months of wages. Under the post-reformed pay model in the 1990s, 
enterprises had to follow the official wage guideline of the government which influenced 
their pay level, structure and growth (Zhu, 2005, Ding et al., 2001). However, enterprises in 
the current non-public sector have full autonomy to set PFP levels in the pay mix. Pure 
ability/performance was highly valued instead of seniority in the pay structure. 
Nevertheless, financial flexibility in the current pay structure was higher than any previous 
pay models. Except on the national minimum wage, there was no other guideline from the 
government to impact on pay decisions of the non-public sector enterprises. Therefore, it is 
concluded that PFP was widely adopted in non-public sector knowledge-intensive firms as 
an important component of the employee pay mix. PFP also played a role as a key norm in 
employee pay determinants.  
 
Figure 10.1: Changes of pay determinants 
Financial Flexibility Pay basis  
Low Medium High 
Pure job and seniority based Iron wage system Post-reformed pay 
model in 1980s 
 
Seniority and 
ability/performance mixed 
 Post-reformed pay 
model in 1990s 
 
Pure ability/performance 
based 
  
Current POEs, JVs and MNCs  
Source: Developed for this thesis. 
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RQ1b: Why do firms use pay for performance? 
Although studies on PFP in China covered PFP practice in SOEs, the sports industry and 
MNCs, there has been extremely little literature on the reasons for adopting PFP by 
management. Four possible theoretical explanations for companies’ using PFP schemes 
were discussed: agency theory (Prendergast, 1999), motivation theories (expectancy, equity) 
(Vroom, 1964, Adams, 1963, Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002), institutional (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983, Scott, 1995) and legitimacy theories (Harrison, 1987, Suchman, 1995) (see 
Section 4.3). Main reasons which emerged for using PFP by the management were: 
HR/motivational purpose and responding to institutional factors or legitimacy (see Chapter 
6 for details).  
 
Agency theory forms the basis for most of the academic literature on rewards. A standard 
explanation for using PFP by agency theory is to align the agent’s goals with shareholders. 
Certain aspects of this were seen in the way in which executives’ contracts were 
constructed to link PFP to shareholders’ interests in the case firms. The findings also 
suggested that agency theory was relevant in relation to the multi-tasking issues, where 
performance measures and targets were designed to focus managers’ efforts in the direction 
desired by the Board of Directors. Of the motivational theories considered, there was little 
evidence of equity theory as a driver for using PFP by management, but considerable 
evidence for expectancy theory. This was shown in the need for retaining and motivating 
good performers. The final theoretical lens was that of institutional theory and legitimacy. 
Implementing PFP to follow market practices and/or best practices by the case firms could 
be explained by institutional theory. However, there was almost no empirical evidence to 
support the legitimacy reason because there was no government policy or guidance for 
implementing PFP plans. The companies had full autonomy to decide on pay systems.  
 
In summary, three main reasons for adopting PFP schemes by management were found in 
the data analysis. The first concerned external factors - market practices/best practices; 
while the other two factors were internal reasons – the need to attract and retain good 
performers as well as the need to improve employee performance. PFP plans were used to 
set certain targets for employees and adopted as an effective communication tool for 
managers to monitor their people. Moreover, the PFP awards were not only regarded as 
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monetary rewards, but also the recognition of individual success, the promotion of firms’ 
missions and business objectives. 
 
Whilst this small sample of case studies and interviews may not be generalisable, the 
findings informed theories. It demonstrated how agency theory, motivation theories and 
institutional theory and legitimacy had a role to play in explaining what was happening. 
Each of these theories on its own was an incomplete explanation of why companies used 
pay for performance, but together they explained the behaviours by management in the case 
firms more fully.  
 
10.2.2 RQ2: How is PFP designed? 
Research question 1 identified the importance of PFP in the case firms. However, the 
previous studies on PFP in China focused on employees’ preferences and acceptance (Chiu 
and Luk, 2002, Baruch et al., 2004). The exact way PFP plans were adopted and how they 
are applied to certain employee groups have been left unexplored in the context of China. 
Research question 2 focuses on the design issues of PFP in China’s non-public sector 
knowledge-intensive industries. This question was answered by identifying the types of 
PFP plans applied to each critical employee group (RQ2a), and examining the contextual 
factors that impact on management’s adoption of PFP plans (RQ2b) (see Chapter 7 for 
details).  
 
RQ2a: What types of PFP plans are adopted? 
PFP plans, including payment-by-results schemes, performance schemes, and financial 
schemes (Reilly, 2005), were applied to the critical employee groups, with different 
methods and emphasis on linking pay to performance for each group. The summary for the 
PFP plans are shown in Table 10.2. In particular, PFP plans for senior management were 
highly focused on rewarding their short term (1-2 years) achievement. Performance 
schemes (e.g. cash profit sharing) were the main type for senior management, financial 
participation schemes (e.g. stock option plans) were not widely used and favoured by the 
case companies because of tax and practical issues. The method of linking pay to 
performance for senior management was aligning their interests with the performance of 
the organisation by sharing in some portion of the profits made, or in the reduction of costs. 
This method emphasises employee commitment rather than employer control. Moreover, 
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the PFP plans were integrated with other arrangements, such as special benefits & 
allowances, long term assignment, and other localisation considerations to attract and retain 
more Chinese returnees in senior management.  
 
PFP plans for sales and marketing people were highly focused on rewarding their volumes 
sold. Payment-by-result schemes (e.g. commission) were the main type, and aligned with 
specific allowances, and non-financial rewards to make the PFP plans more effective. This 
method of linking pay to performance was providing a very direct message to sales and 
marketing staff: ‘if you achieve this level of performance, you will receive this amount of 
reward.’ The PFP plans relied on some formal means of measuring and rewarding 
performance to target. Performance measures at the supervisor level and below were related 
to the specific job or work role. Sales people typically had a significant portion of their pay 
set against such criteria as personal sales volume and revenue, sales growth and new 
business.  
 
PFP plans for professionals were highly focused on rewarding existing skills and 
competencies. Like the sales, payment-by-result schemes (e.g. project based bonus) were 
the main type for professionals in those knowledge-intensive companies, which was often 
based on the projects they completed and occurred simply according to the specific 
schedule of their projects. There was almost no sophisticated performance scheme available 
for the professionals. Year-end bonus was one of the most popular bonus schemes that was 
used in every case firm for junior employees. Every employee was entitled to it when the 
firm achieved certain business objectives at the end of the year or financial year, which was 
how it was named.  
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Table 10.2 Summary of PFP plans in case firms 
 Year-end 
Bonus 
Individual 
performance 
based pay 
Commission Project based 
commission 
Cash profit 
sharing 
Stock 
options 
Type Performance schemes 
 
Payment-by-result schemes 
 
Performance 
schemes 
Financial 
participation 
schemes 
Coverage Junior staff Individuals Sales and 
marketing 
Professionals Senior management 
 
Payment 
methods 
Bonus Bonus Bonus Bonus Bonus Equity 
changes 
Payout 
frequency 
Annually Semi-
annually or 
annually 
Monthly, 
quarterly or 
yearly 
Monthly or 
quarterly 
Semi-annually 
or annually 
When stock 
sold 
Performance 
measurement 
Firm profit Individual 
performance 
rating 
Individual 
performance 
rating 
Team 
performance 
Firm 
performance 
Stock value 
Source: Developed for the thesis. 
 
The characteristics of PFP adopted in the case firms can be summarised as below. First, 
PFP plans in the case firms were results-orientated. For instance, financial and operational 
goals of the organisation, such as market share, cash flow, return ratios, profit in excess of 
cost of capital, and quality, efficiency and delivery cost etc, were strongly emphasised in 
linking pay to performance for senior management. Other categories of performance 
measurement in addition to financial measures, particularly future-focused strategic 
directions, people, values and performance initiatives, such as workforce satisfaction, 
retention, re-skilling, and product and service innovation etc., were not highly emphasised. 
Moreover, the current PFP plans for senior management needed to be paid not merely for 
taking risks but also for stabilising company performance over time. For example, if 
company performance improves moderately (say from the 50th to the 70th percentile of 
performance as compared to peers), the PFP for CEOs escalates significantly. However, if 
the company performance drops from the 50th percentile to the 30th percentile, there was no 
penalty for this.  
 
Second, a short term oriented and cash driven PFP philosophy dominated in the non-public 
sector. For instance, PFP plans for sales and marketing people in the case firms strongly 
relied on commission schemes. The sales staff in pharmaceuticals (POE4, MNC1, MNC2 
and MNC3) were of two types, OTC (over the counter) and prescription. While OTC sales 
workers were volume selling ‘consumer products’, prescription sales demanded a detailed 
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product knowledge and ongoing customer service. However, the pay mix was the same 
(50/50 – base pay/PFP) for both OTC and prescription groups in those firms. Placing both 
pay mixes under a high PFP of pushing volume and cash driven was a long term 
disincentive for the prescription-sales forces.  
 
Third, the poor connection between PFP and learning and career development was most 
visible in the case firms. For instance, projected based incentives were the main type of 
PFP plans for professionals. However, this type of PFP rewarded professionals’ existing 
skills and competencies rather than long term learning and development. In the long run, 
this type of PFP does not fully develop an organisation’s core human capital. PFP plans for 
professionals in knowledge-intensive firms, such as IT engineers, compliance and quality 
control specialists in pharmaceuticals, must foster organisational learning and career 
development for succession. Then the professionals will concentrate on developing more 
intensive product knowledge and customer service relationship, as opposed to strictly 
pushing project achievement for short term profitability or start-up. Moreover, most of the 
managers regarded company paid training and development courses as part of their PFP. 
However, the training provided to sales and marketing staff and professionals were mostly 
regarding technical aspects and job-related skills only (e.g. POE1, POE2).  
 
RQ2b: What are the contextual factors that impact on the adoption? 
Organisational factors, such as ownership, firm size, location and industry type, may affect 
the level of rewards (Cole and Healy, 2000, Tang et al., 2000, Chiu and Luk, 2002). The 
literature identified factors that affected managerial rewards in the context of China (Ding 
et al., 2006). This question examined internal and external contextual factors that impacted 
on the case firms’ adoption of PFP. Figure 10.2 illustrates the relationship among the main 
factors. It is evident that organisational factors and organisational characteristics were 
associated with organisational pay strategy, which directly impacted on firms’ PFP plans. 
In particular, labour market, competitiveness and industry were the major macro and micro 
environmental factors.  
 
Organisational characteristics, such as culture, ownership, and size were the major factors 
affecting PFP plans indirectly through its impact on the organisation’s pay strategies. The 
environment also affected other organisational characteristics, which in turn affected pay 
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strategies, and ultimately, PFP characteristics. It is interesting to note that the findings show 
that organisational culture or management style played a more important role than national 
culture in adopting PFP. The findings also support the contingency theory of rewards 
strategy, which holds that the characteristics and effectiveness of a reward strategy depends 
on the fit among environment, organisation and strategy.  
 
Figure 10.2: Main factors that affect PFP adoption in the case firms 
 
Source: Developed for the thesis. 
 
10.2.3 RQ3: How is PFP implemented? 
Research question 3 moved on to the implementation issues regarding PFP in non-public 
sector knowledge-intensive industries. This question was answered by the examination of 
the ways that performance is measured (RQ3a) and the functions PA served in PFP 
programmes (RQ3b) (see Chapter 8 for details).  
 
RQ3a: In what ways is performance measured? 
Elements of PA adopted were examined. In comparison with the historical view of PA in 
China (see Section 4.5.1), there were a lot of changes in the ways that PA was implemented 
in the firms. For example, the evaluation criteria changed from political loyalty and work 
attitude to performance results, skills and competencies. Ratees were expanded to include 
people from different feedback sources (e.g. peer group, subordinates and external clients). 
Both hard quantitative financial objectives, as well as soft qualitative competence and skills, 
were considered. The results of evaluation were, to various degrees, linked to rewards and 
Macro 
environments 
* Rapid economic 
growth 
* Labour market
Organisational 
characteristics 
(Ownership, 
culture, business 
strategy) 
Micro 
environment 
Competitiveness, 
Industrial factors 
Firm pay 
Strategies 
PFP plans 
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personal development. It was evident that managers in both POEs and MNCs became more 
receptive towards performance–oriented rewards through PA, and welcomed career 
development opportunities through the implementation of PA.  
 
However, the implementation of PA in the case firms was challenged by a number of 
factors, mainly in the design of the performance indicators and the process of conducting 
PA. While some of these factors were generic to PA in many parts of the world, others 
were specific to the context of China. In particular, poor performance objective and 
measurement setting was obvious in most of the POEs, whereas JVs and MNCs often 
adopted well designed PA systems transferred from their head offices. Lack of HR’s 
strategic role and line managers’ ownership of PA also challenged the implementation of 
PA systems. Interestingly, it was observed that Chinese traditional cultural values seemed 
to have much less profound and enduring influence than did firm ownership throughout the 
various stages of PA systems, which was more or less the opposite to other studies 
conducted in SOEs (Cooke, 2007). It was perhaps because a more reward-driven PA 
system was adopted in such non-public sector enterprises, where PA was seen less as a 
formality and punctuated with a greater level of subjectivity.  
 
RQ3b: What functions does PA serve in PFP? 
The functions of PA in terms of between-individuals, within-individuals, system 
maintenance, and documentation (as proposed by Cleveland et al., (1989a), which was 
already tested in other Asian contexts), were examined in the case firms. The most common 
strongest functions of PA in POEs, JVs and MNCs were salary administration and 
recognition of individual performance (between individuals comparisons), evaluating goal 
achievement (system maintenance) and documenting personnel decisions (documentation). 
The most common weakest functions of PA in POEs, JV and MNCs were identifying poor 
performance (between-individuals comparisons), identifying individual training needs 
(within-individuals comparisons), evaluating personnel systems (system maintenance), and 
criteria for validation research (documentation).  
 
In general, PA as a modern Western HRM concept and technique was being embraced 
unquestioningly by the case firms, and it was also evident that the PA systems adopted in 
the case firms were reward driven and tended to focus on the person and goal achievement. 
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However, the type of PA promoted in the Western HRM literature more often takes a 
development approach and focuses on the alignment between individual performance and 
organisational goals. More attention needs to be paid to functions of PA in terms of system 
maintenance, such as personnel planning, identifying training and development needs, in 
China’s non-public sector. Furthermore, firm ownership was still a factor that highly 
impacted on the functions served in PFP systems. For instance, PA in MNCs had formally 
designed training needs analysis procedures, whereas PA in POEs did not.    
 
10.2.4 RQ4: How are line managers involved in PFP? 
Research questions 1-3 basically discussed the importance of PFP, the plans adopted and 
performance measurement. Research question 4 further explored the key deliverer -  line 
managers’ involvement in PFP, which was answered by the understanding of PFP by line 
managers (RQ4a) and the key supports and barriers to line managers’ involvement in PFP 
(RQ4b) (see Chapter 9 for details).  
 
RQ4a: How do line managers understand their role in PFP? 
The findings supported the general observation about the transfer of HRM responsibilities 
to line managers. Both line managers’ conceptualisation, their views of PFP and 
understanding of their responsibilities in PFP were examined. First, it was observed that 
there was no significant difference between HR and line managers’ belief on the 
importance and necessity of PFP in the case firms. However, line managers’ understanding 
and ownership of PFP were generally less close to the company’s position than the HR. 
Second, line managers were much more committed to their project or team goal 
achievement than to PFP itself. The HR department’s perceptions of line managers’ 
responsibility in PFP were apparently greater than the line managers’ perception. Third, the 
line managers viewed PFP systems negatively while they continued to support the principle 
of a PFP system which recognised individual contributions. In addition, line managers in 
the companies with clear PA schemes were more specific or aware of describing their tasks 
in managing people through leadership and coaching than those in the companies with 
ambiguous appraisals.  
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RQ4b: What are the key supports and barriers in line managers’ involvement in PFP? 
Line managers’ participation in different stages of PFP was examined and the supports that 
line managers received in PFP and barriers they had in the involvement in PFP were 
identified. In general, line managers in POEs, JVs and MNCs were involved in three stages 
of PFP (Kessler and Purcell, 1992). The first stage was the determination of individual 
performance criteria, the second stage was the individual performance assessment and the 
third stage was when the pay adjustment was linked to the result of the first two stages. In 
the case firms, line managers were highly involved in the first two stages, but the actual pay 
distribution was decided by top management.  
 
It was evident that project or product based nature of work in the knowledge-intensive 
industries such as IT and pharmaceuticals highly influenced line managers’ HR input and 
the function of HR department. Line managers were quite technically orientated under this 
type of work, whereas HR managers were management orientated in daily work. The case 
firms provided some support to line managers in PFP, such as sending HR specialists to 
business units, offering leadership training courses, encouraging the collaboration between 
technical and supporting departments, and developing career paths for line managers. 
However, there were still many difficulties that line managers had to deal with in PFP. For 
instance, the misunderstanding between HR and the line managers, the lack of top 
management’s input in PFP especially in POEs, and the problematic relationships between 
the professionals and line managers. These supports and barriers were closely related to the 
project-based work nature in the case firms. Line managers who mainly focused on the 
technological and scientific development in the line unit followed a task based logic, whilst 
HR managers followed a management based logic. The researcher argues that a balance 
between the HRM and task focus is needed for both line managers and the HR in PFP of 
the case firms. 
 
10.3 Contributions of the thesis 
This section summarises the empirical, theoretical and methodological contributions of the 
thesis as well as the managerial implications.  
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10.3.1 Empirical contributions 
The thesis makes two major empirical contributions to the existing research on PFP and 
reward management (see the relevant literature in Chapter 3). First, this thesis helps to fill 
some of the empirical research gap in the area of PFP. Most of the research and discussion 
on PFP in the literature has involved studies performed in Western nations such as USA, 
the UK and Australia (Heneman, 1992, Bartol and Locke, 2000). Wei and Rowley (2009) 
also note that although PFP in Asia has been one of the major areas covered by researchers, 
it still far from being well studied. The existing studies on rewards in China have 
concentrated on the evolution of reward systems and the public sector (see Chapter 3, 
Section 3.6 for details). This thesis helps to fill the empirical gap by exploring the nature of 
PFP practices in non-public sector knowledge-intensive firms. Moreover, this research 
examines PFP at different levels (see Figure 10.3). In particular, at principle level the 
research examined the reasons for the management’s adoption of PFP and the importance 
of performance as a norm in determining employee pay in the current pay system; at policy 
level, this research illustrated the proportion of PFP in the pay mix and specific PFP plans 
and the characteristics for the critical employee groups; at practice level, this research 
discussed the factors that impacted on the PFP adoption, the PA implementation and 
functions served in PFP, and line managers’ participation. Therefore, this study not only 
fills the gap of research about PFP, but also provides a picture of PFP in the non-public 
sector knowledge-intensive firms of China at different levels.  
Figure 10.3: Levels of PFP studied in the thesis 
 
Source: Developed for the thesis. 
Principle 
Policy 
Practice
Product/effectiveness
Reasons for PFP adoption and the 
importance of performance in pay 
norms 
Specific PFP plans for the critical 
employee groups  
Factors impact on PFP design and 
PA implementation and functions 
Not included in this study 
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Second, this thesis contributes to the empirical research on HRM devolvement to the line. 
Involving and inviting line management to actively participate in designing and 
implementing HR activities is seen by some as a key to success in HRM. However, there is 
still a remarkable lack of empirical material on the role of line management within HRM 
(see discussion in Section 4.6). Similarly in reward management, whilst there has been an 
increasing amount of studies on rewards in the Western and Asian contexts, there has been 
a lack of research on the vital role that line managers play in designing and implementing 
reward strategies and policies. The existing research in the field of rewards in the context of 
China has left unexplored questions regarding the extent to which line managers respond to 
rewards policies and their impact on rewards practices (Wei and Rowley, 2009). Therefore, 
to the researcher’s best knowledge, this thesis is one of the first studies that explore the 
critical role of line management in PFP in China’s knowledge-intensive industries. The 
relationship among PFP plans and the HR and line managers’ critical roles was illustrated. 
Lessons and tips can be drawn out from the case studies on line managers’ understanding of 
PFP, and the key support and barriers to their involvement in PFP.  
 
This thesis supports the restructuring of HR functions and devolvement of people 
management responsibilities to the line. This research may have resonance for 
organisations seeking to devolve their HRM or reward management to the line, 
notwithstanding the inherent limitations of case study work. The results reported in this 
thesis can also serve as important steps towards a theoretical framework for the analysis of 
reward management and HRM in project-intensive organisations in the future.  
 
10.3.2 Theoretical contributions 
The thesis makes three major contributions to the existing literature on PFP, reward 
management and HRM (see the relevant literature in Chapter 3). First, this research 
explored the content and context changes of PFP practices in China after the economic 
reforms in 1978 to present, regarding  the importance of PFP in the current pay system, 
PFP design and performance measurement (see Table 10.3). The findings support and 
further extend academic understanding of relevant theories in each area. Specifically, 
research question 1 explored the content changes of PFP in the pay system regarding 
proportions, pay norms and pay structures and enterprises’ autonomy, and the context 
changes regarding factors that influence the enterprises’ adoption of their PFP. Research 
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question 2 identified content changes of PFP plans regarding the diversification of PFP 
forms adopted by the firms, and the contextual factors other than the state (which was 
critical) which influenced PFP adoption. Research question 3 discussed the content changes 
of PA elements and functions, and demonstrated the context factors that affected PA 
implementation and functions in the case firms.  
 
In general, PFP in China has undergone significant changes. In particular, it is now evident 
that Chinese firms are becoming much more receptive to performance-oriented rewards and 
welcome performance measurement and learning and development opportunities. Internal 
and external forces (e.g. managerial, institutional and cultural variables) have led to 
changes in PFP design and implementation, but challenges in PFP practices come also from 
contextual variables, such as ownership, nature of work – project intensification, 
organisational culture and management style, etc. In addition, though with limited 
generalisability due to the sample size, the cases suggest that when we discuss PFP we 
cannot simplistically categorise PFP practices by ownership forms and assume that Western 
MNCs are more progressive than domestic Chinese firms, although this study does indicate 
that ownership does make difference in PFP practices. Instead, it is rather visible that the 
emergence of a diverse range of management practices in which ownership forms, nature of 
work, regional variations, industrial sectors, product market, and relatedly, the type of 
employees they seek to employ, all play an important role in PFP. Management outlook 
and leadership style are also important determinants.  
 
More broadly, in recent years, enthusiasm in promoting what are perceived to be advanced 
Western HR techniques has run high in China. HR initiatives are embraced by some firms 
without questioning the suitability for their firm. For instance, the balanced score card was 
adopted by POE3 and JV2 where there was a lack of systems and procedures in PFP 
because of the poor state of HRM in the firms. Managers reported that their balanced score 
card was in name only. Therefore, the researcher argues that adopting Western HR 
techniques to make HRM more systematic and procedural is necessary, but implementing 
them in a feasible way that is embedded with the characteristics of the firm is also essential. 
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Table 10.3: Content and context changes in PFP practices in China 
What’s measured 
and analysed? 
What has been changed in PFP since the economic reforms? Change level Theories  
Importance of PFP in the pay system 
A Proportion of 
PFP; 
Pay determinants; 
pay structures. 
PFP proportion:  
- bonuses and piece rate were 3.1% of total wage for all industries in 
1978; 
- bonuses and piece rate were 24% for all industries in 1984; 
- Currently PFP was 10-60% of total cash income for employee groups. 
Pay structure:  
- Unified 8 rigid graded structure in 1978; 
- Firms encouraged to design their pay structures under state guide in 
1980s;  
- Graded and broad-banded pay structures which were closely related to 
jobs and organisational structures, were adopted in the case firms. 
Enterprise autonomy of pay: from less to full  
Pay norm: from seniority and moral based to performance based. 
Institutional 
Managerial 
Pay mix and 
pay structure 
(Armstrong , M 
& Murlis, 
2004) 
 
 
 
B Reasons for PFP 
adoption 
- No enterprises’ input in PFP before 1978; 
- Firms followed the state guide for PFP in 1980s; 
- Institutional and motivational reasons were for adopting PFP in the case 
firms. 
Institutional  
Managerial 
Agency, equity 
& expectancy, 
institutional 
theories 
PFP plans design 
A PFP plans adopted 
for the four 
critical employee 
groups 
- Bonuses and piece rate for all industries in 1980s; 
- Payment-by-results, performance schemes and financial schemes found in the 
case firms for each employee group. 
Managerial Reilly (2005) 
B Contextual factors 
that impact on 
PFP 
- State influenced pay in 1980s; 
- Environmental and organisational factors influenced PFP in the case firms. 
Institutional 
Managerial 
Ding 2006 
PFP implementation 
A PA elements and 
functions 
- PA practices changed in all elements of measurement 
- PA functions extended from determining pay to determining promotability, 
identifying strengths and weakness, goal achievement etc. 
Managerial 
B Challenges in PA 
implementation 
and functions. 
Factors that influenced PA practice changes were ownership types, managers’ 
input, HR’s role, cultural issues etc.  
Cultural 
Managerial 
Institutional 
Cooke (2007) 
Cleveland 
(1989) 
 
Note: A: Content; B: Context. Source: Developed for the thesis. 
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Second, this research contributes to the theoretical application of reward management 
models in the context of China, specifically the resource based view and institutional theory 
within the contingent perspective, which were used as two theoretical lenses for this study 
(see Chapter 3, Section 3.4.3). Resource-based view approaches to rewards aim for 
sustained competitive advantage by adding value in a way that is rare and difficult to 
imitate, whereas institutional approaches strive for parity with other organisations in the 
business environment (Gerhart et al., 1996).  
 
The researcher argues that institutional theory might better explain the situation of PFP 
practice in the context of China because the case firms respond to institutional pressures in 
their environments to conform to accepted ways of designing and implementing PFP. For 
instance, it was common for the case firms to determine employee pay ranges within their 
pay structures from market-wide pay surveys done by Mercer or Watson Wyatt – the 
international HR consultancy firms. Case firms (POE1, MNC3, MNC4) mimicked and 
benchmarked with other organisations, particularly those that appeared to be more 
successful in the industry. In PFP design, all case firms were subject to institutional 
pressures. It was also evident that the main drivers for management to adopt PFP were 
following the desire for market practice and imitating the practices of others firms, 
especially practices that were normatively acceptable to respond to institutional pressures in 
the business environment. Moreover, which PFP plans were adopted in the case firms also 
depended on the organisations’ particular institutional environment (see Figure 10.2).  
 
A similar situation was found in PFP implementation practices. Some POEs imitated 
policies and PA practice tools from MNCs. All these activities by management indicated 
that firms employed a lower-risk approach for choosing and implementing their PFP to 
respond to pressures from their business environment. Seeking synergetic benefits as the 
resource-based view claims was not their initial motivation. However, the data was not 
enough to make conclusions about the mechanisms by which organisational practices such 
as PFP practice come to be institutionalised. In summary, external fit (i.e., the fit between 
HR and elements outside of HR, such as business strategy and environmental conditions) 
were emphasised more than internal fit (i.e., the synergy among HR features such as 
practices, HR strategy, or company culture) in PFP practices in the case firms. This specific 
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situation regarding PFP in the case firms supports institutional theory more than the 
resource-based view approach, which frequently involves internal fit.    
 
Third, this study contributes to the convergence and divergence debate in HRM (see 
Chapter 3 for details). The results provided evidence for a move away from traditional 
reward practices – strong state led in PFP and a move towards more Western-style, more 
performance-related rewards. A sign of some convergence in PFP practices was the 
recognition of PFP as a strategic management tool, the predominance of performance norm 
in pay structures, types of PFP plans adopted, PA techniques, risk sharing between 
organisations. The reasons for the convergence were globalisation and some trend towards 
universalistic management because investment, IT and pharmaceuticals were extremely 
internationalised industries.  
 
Nevertheless, there were also some divergence signs in the plans of PFP, the PA system, 
and line managers’ understanding of pay for performance. Factors that determined the 
divergence were ownership forms, firm size and organisational culture (see Chapter 7 and 
8). For example, compared with larger IT firm (MNC4), smaller firms (POE2, POE 3 and 
POE5) tended to pay more attention to the utilisation of employees’ competence, had lower 
demands for, and expectation from, the PA system. In addition, appraisal outcomes in 
POEs were more heavily influenced by the subjective impression of the superior, whereas 
the intervention of subjectivity was better avoided in MNCs.  
 
It is interesting to note that Chinese traditional cultural values did not seem to have a 
profound and enduring influence throughout PFP design and implementation practices, nor 
in line managers’ understanding and perception of their PFP system in the case firms. This 
can be explained by the fact that the sample firms were non-public sector, no single SOE 
was involved. MNCs and JVs are not so deeply embedded in Chinese cultural traditions, 
and POEs are likely to promote more commitment focused organisational cultures, which is 
identified by Tsui et al., (Tsui et al., 2006). Therefore, the case firms were more sensitive to 
the institutional environments than to Chinese traditional cultural values. 
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10.3.4 Methodological contributions 
The majority of PFP studies have taken predominantly quantitative approaches, such as 
quantitative hypothesis testing (see the discussion in Chapter 3, section 3.7). Wei and 
Rowley (2009) also note that in the existing research on rewards in Asia, there is a need for 
more exploratory and theory building research. This study provides a multiple case study 
approach to fill this methodological gap by exploring PFP practices in the context of China, 
in order to examine issues that might be special in China but which may not exist in other 
contexts. Two methodological considerations were adopted: (1) Data triangulation. Data 
from the following sources were used: documents such as brochures, open letters, internal 
newsletters, books or papers: field notes (minutes from observations with assumptions and 
ideas written directly after the field work); transcripts of interviews, media release etc.; (2) 
The triangulation among the researcher, interviewees and HR consultancies and local 
practitioners. Apart from managers interviewed in the case firms, other HR experts from 
top HR consultancies, such as Mercer, Watson Wyatt and Shanghai local HR practitioners 
were all involved in the pilot, and first and second runs of field work. The feedback from 
them made valuable contributions both to the research and also to evaluations by the 
researcher.  
 
10.3.3 Managerial implications 
This study not only contributes to the development of PFP, reward management and HRM 
theory, but also has a number of practical implications for Chinese managers, HR 
practitioners and policy makers, as well as for foreign managers and companies who are 
doing, or are intending to do, business in the Chinese market.  
 
This research studied PFP in knowledge-intensive industries, including 
investment/marketing research, IT and pharmaceuticals, where employees are some of the 
best-trained and best educated and where a large human capital investment in research, 
development and sales is required. This thesis provides insights about PFP plans adopted 
for the critical employee groups – top management, sales and marketing, professionals and 
junior staff, and how the performance of those employee groups were measured. Therefore, 
the findings of the study could be a predictor of current PFP programmes and further 
reward trends for knowledge-intensive work in China, and offer implications about how 
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management could retain good performers and enhance individual and organisational 
performance via PFP in a global context.   
 
The research contributes further consideration of the definition of PFP for academics and 
practitioners. According to the common themes in the existing definitions of PFP 
(Armstrong and Murlis, 2004, Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998, Belcher, 1996), this 
thesis defined PFP as the payment that is in addition to base pay and the payment that is 
tied to performance measure at individual, group and firm level (see Chapter 3 for details). 
However, this definition excludes skill-based/development based pay which provides 
incentives for learning rather than for performance, which is the key for human capital in 
knowledge-intensive firms.  
 
This research explored the issue that cognitive learning and further development was 
critical in knowledge-intensive industries, especially for professionals. However, the main 
type of PFP plans for professionals had almost no significant difference for those for sales 
and marketing people, which also would not induce further learning for professionals. 
Therefore, the researcher argues that the definition of PFP in knowledge-intensive firms 
should include the dimension of linking pay to learning and potential skill development. 
Instead of pay for performance, management should probably be thinking more about 
rewards for performance.   
 
Moreover, Gerhart and Rynes (2003) and Pfeffer and Sutton (2001) note that two 
significant barriers must be overcome in order to effectively design and implement PFP 
programmes: barriers to linking pay to performance, and barriers to linking performance to 
effort (see Section 3.6.1). This research discovered characteristics in PFP design and 
implementation in the case firms which improves our understanding of some ways to 
overcome the barriers above. Four types of important conditions for PFP practices that were 
somehow missing in the case firms were observed by the researcher. It is argued that these 
conditions could make PFP especially managerially desirable or feasible, which may also 
apply far beyond the selected industries in the research.  
 
First, managerial discretion in strategic design of PFP plans for different employee groups 
is critical. Current PFP plans were rather result and short term orientated. However, 
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environmental uncertainty can make this type of PFP hard to implement because of the 
difficulty for management in determining how much measured results reflect employees’ 
efforts versus factors outside their control. Therefore, PFP plans require pay systems and 
managers to encourage certain selected behaviours and reward differentially the resulting 
outcomes. The intelligent design of PFP is highly contingent on the ability to measure these 
differences and the willingness of managers to apply rewards differentially.  
 
Second, PFP must have effective, credible and validated PA systems that are capable of 
supporting pay and other personnel decisions. Attempts to facilitate design and 
implementation with the use of other mechanisms that typically accompany the 
introduction of PFP plans are needed, particularly formal communication and training and 
development programmes.  
 
Third, a strategic role for HR departments is important in PFP design and implementation. 
Most of the HR departments in the case firms emphasised the specialised functional aspects 
of their work, such as pay, benefits, recruitment, training, etc. Nevertheless, the level of 
HRM sophistication varies across POEs, JVs and MNCs.  
 
Fourth, the strong influence of project intensification was identified as the major factor to 
impact on the relationship between HR and the line, as well as the involvement of the line 
in PFP. Also, line managers mostly follow project logic rather than the management logic 
of HR. A lack of specific managerial knowledge and skills regarding PFP plans among line 
managers in the case firms was observed. Therefore, types of line managers’ buy-in are 
central to their active involvement in PFP, such as conceptual understanding of the 
rationale for their involvement; commitment in believing in the value of their involvement 
in PFP, and HRM; and implementation effectiveness through their HR role clarity and 
capability.  
 
Finally, this study provides useful insights for companies in designing their reward strategy 
past the 2008 global financial crisis. A very recent survey by Mercer (2009) indicates that 
the majority of respondents (73 percent) are now likely to reduce salary increases from 
those originally budgeted. Some 60 percent expect to reduce bonus payouts based on 2008 
performance, and make changes to PFP programmes. Some 28 percent of respondents 
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representing investment/banking companies said their company plans to change or develop 
new PFP programmes, which is almost twice as high as the level overall (15 percent). 
Therefore, the findings and discussions of this research may offer helpful information for 
management to review and re-design their PFP programmes in practice.  
 
10.4 Limitations of the thesis 
Like any other research, this thesis is also subject to certain limitations that may suggest a 
number of avenues for future research. First, this research focused on the characteristics of 
design and implementation practices in PFP. The consequence of PFP plans, successes or 
failures, including the plan’s impact on individual and/or organisational performance and 
functioning, were not included. At the same time, this research was from a management 
perspective only. The interviewees were senior managers, HR managers, and line managers, 
employees were not covered. Therefore, employees’ views on PFP and the effectiveness of 
PFP to employees were not considered. 
 
Second, the limitation of the focus on a narrow research scope does restrict the 
generalisation of the findings. As an exploratory study and in order to maintain focus, the 
researcher concentrated on a single HRM practice, the PFP system, and the characteristics 
of PFP design and implementation issues. Given the complexity of the process of design 
and implementation, the thesis did not examine the process of PFP design, such as who 
designed PFP plans, how these were introduced, and how feedback was provided etc. 
Nevertheless, the researcher dealt with the key part – PA only in PFP implementation. 
Therefore, PFP was treated in isolation, rather than as a part of the HRM system. Other 
HRM practice bundles were not included in the thesis, which might restrict the 
understanding and application of the findings.  
 
Third, the sample of the thesis was mainly from companies in investment/marketing 
research, IT and pharmaceuticals; other knowledge-intensive industries, such as law firms, 
consultancy firms, etc. were not included. The research site was only in Shanghai – the 
country’s financial centre only. As China is such as big country, the location does impact 
on rewards systems (Ding et al., 2006). Therefore, research on PFP practices of knowledge-
intensive firms in other cities in China might discover some differences from the findings 
here. In addition, the relatively small sample of firms could be another restriction. This 
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thesis selected 12 firms and three ownership types - POEs, JVs and MNCs, a sample 
suitable for a case approach. Interviewees in the thesis covered top management, HR and 
line managers. However, most of the interviewees were not selected randomly by the 
researcher, but by the case companies. With possible limitations noted earlier, further 
research can expand both the sample size and ownership types and/or industries.  
 
While making the above statement, it is acknowledged that: (1) the thesis can not be 
expected to include everything; and (2) the limitations listed above were recognised before 
and during the study. Indeed, methods were applied to overcome and limit those 
disadvantages as discussed in Chapter 5 – Methodology.  
 
10.5 Future research directions 
Directions for future research that emerge from this study are summarised below. First, 
employees’ views need to be considered in further studies of PFP design and 
implementation issues. Future studies could examine how far employee preferences and 
orientations figure in the development of PFP strategies that are designed to support 
business strategies, explore the inconsistency between the adoption and implementation of 
PFP strategies and further examine whether this disparity impacts on employee HR 
satisfaction, such as trust, commitment and involvement.  
 
Second, this research explored the characteristics of PFP plans adopted and the 
performance measurement. Future studies can focus on the effectiveness and / or success of 
PFP plans implemented, and the extent to which those PFP plans influence individual and 
organisational performance. For instance, PFP for directors and CEOs has been paid much 
attention in the context of China (Wei and Rowley, 2009). Future studies may identify the 
relationship between top management’s PFP and organisational performance. The reasons 
for unsuccessful PFP plans can also be studied. PFP advocates argue that the value of a PFP 
system lies in the clear differentiation in rewards obtained by high performers compared to 
low performers. Even if low performers are unhappy with the PFP, high performers are not, 
the argument goes, and they are the ones who contribute most to organisational 
performance. Could it be that the PFP plans introduced did not differentiate sufficiently 
enough between high and low performers and/or managers listened to the wrong voices?  
Those types of issues can be examined in the future. 
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Third, this research can be replicated in other contexts, such as other sectors, Asian 
countries or elsewhere. Furthermore, other ownership types such as SOEs can be included. 
For instance, a comparative study of PFP among SOEs, POEs and FIEs could be an 
interesting topic. Moreover, some replication of fieldwork at a later date can also be done in 
more firms to provide a longitudinal picture of PFP design and implementation.   
 
Fourth, the link between PFP and culture was not fully considered in this research and can 
be another direction for the future. For instance, the transferability of PFP plans and PA in 
MNCs was discussed in the study, but the cultural applicability was not. While research 
question 4 explored line managers’ understanding of PFP, the cultural issues were not well 
discussed. One can argue that the culture in people’s minds certainly affects their 
understanding of PFP. Therefore, future studies could further discover how national culture 
influences PFP design and implementation.  
 
In addition, the existing comparative studies on rewards between Asia and the West have 
widely applied Hofstede’s theories (1980, 1984) on culture (Wei and Rowley, 2009). 
Hofstede’s empirical study of national culture identified differences between Eastern and 
Western cultures and provides strong support for the notion that management theories and 
practices are culturally bound (Hofstede, 1980a, Hofstede, 1980b, Hofstede, 1984, Hofstede, 
1991, Hofstede, 1993). However, such theories about culture can be misleading. Culture 
can be something that ‘is’ and something that an organisation ‘has’. The researcher argues 
that theories other than Hofstede, such as theories on organisational culture by Huczynski 
and Buchanan (2001) and Martin (1992), can be applied to this type of study, which pays 
more attention to cultural value measures and diversity at regional, organisational and 
individual levels of reward management.  
 
10.6 Conclusion 
This chapter concluded the whole thesis by outlining its theoretical contributions, 
methodological contribution, managerial implications, limitations and future research 
suggestions. This thesis attempted to provide a new possible explanation of the underlying 
dynamics of PFP design and implementation issues from the management perspective in 
the non-public sector knowledge-intensive industries of China.  
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It can be concluded that the thesis explored PFP practices in four major areas, namely the 
importance of PFP in the pay system, PFP design issues, performance measurement and the 
line managers’ role in PFP. Empirically, the thesis contributes to the research gap in PFP 
and the devolvement of HRM in the context of China. Theoretically, the thesis contributes 
to extending certain academic understanding of content and context changes of PFP in 
China, the application of reward management models – institutional theory, and the HRM 
debate – convergence/divergence issues of PFP to the context of China.  
 
Scholars, practitioners and policy makers may learn from this study and consider whether 
the insight provided here is useful to them in pursuit of their own specific academic or 
national interests. It may also be used in aiding the setting up of an organisational agenda in 
relation to designing and implementing effective PFP or other reward strategies to motivate 
and retain best performers, which are highly engaged in the strategic positioning of reward 
management in knowledge-intensive and any other types of industries.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 5.1: Background and market context of the case firms 
POE1 (Shanshan enterprise) 
A great figure (No. 297) on the list of China’s 520 enterprises of key projects, POE1 has 
the Number One Brand in domestic clothing line, five parts of its business including 
clothing, High Technology, trading and biochemistry which is forming a flourishing 
tribe of multifaceted and specialised industries. For instance, its Shanshan group co., 
Ltd, is one of its fashion industrial group establishing on the base of the manufacturers 
of clothing, adornment, textile, etc. It now has grown into the most remarkable leading 
group in Chinese clothing line with largest scale and highest standard. 
 
POE2 (W-Ibeda high Tech. Develop Co., Ltd) 
Specialises in the research development of software, its business has now covered with 
fields such as information security products, engineering software, system integrating, 
software outsourcing and so on. It has also set up 10 branches in different cities and 
provinces of mainland China, including Beijing, Zhejiang province, JiangSu province, 
GuangZhou, ChengDu, Xinjiang province, AnHui province, Fuzhou, Jinan and JiangXi 
province. The “R&D centre” was awarded by Shanghai government as “Top Enterprise 
Technology R&D Organisation” in 2003. 
POE3 (Amarsoft Shanghai) 
Amarsoft is a leading provider of banking information systems and services in China. 
Amarsoft works with commercial banks, trust companies and other financial institutions 
to accelerate their informationalization to optimize risk management, lending practice 
and relationship management. Amarsoft is the leader in its field. The expertise made 
Amarsoft the thought leader and the most prominent among our peers. The company 
shares over 60% national market in credit risk management solutions and 70% in trust 
fund management solutions. The cutting-edge technology and industry knowledge let 
Amarsoft develop the most flexible and adaptable products, and the high quality team 
and unique project management methodology guaranty Amarsoft’s fast implementation 
capability and high quality service.  
Amarsoft’s focus and dedication has secured its close and long-term relationships with 
many of China's largest commercial banks and trust companies. Near 2/3 of the top 30 
largest banks are now Amarsoft’s long-term clients, while it constantly provides high 
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quality services to financial institutions in more than 40 cities around China. Amarsoft’s 
excellent outlook and amicable corporate culture has attracted near 200 talents to join 
them, among who are distinguished consultants, technology experts and renowned 
scholars. Together, Amarsoft has the ambition to challenge the future. 
POE4 (Shanghai World-East Commercial and Industrial Co., Ltd.) 
Founded in 1994, and mainly focused on medical device sales and manufacturing as 
well as international trading with its head office in Shanghai and sales network all over 
main land China.   
 
JV1 (Shanghai Yueda Investment Co., Ltd) 
It’s founded by Jiangsu Yueda group (55% share) and Newzland Real Estate developer. 
Jiangsu Yueda group has been one of the top 520 SOEs in China since 1996, and it was 
awarded as no. 118 on the top 520 SOEs list in 2003, 2004 and 2005. Yueda Investment 
has been the second top qualified real estate developer in Shanghai, which focuses on 
residential, official and commercial building investment and development. 
 
JV2 (Roche China) 
For more than 110 years Roche has played a pioneering role in healthcare. Today, as 
world leader in in-vitro diagnostics, Roche supply a wide range of diagnostic 
instruments and tests for rapid and reliable disease detection and monitoring by doctors, 
laboratories or patients themselves. In the therapeutic field, Roche has brought many 
highly effective drugs onto the market in the last few years. Its daily work focuses on 
disease areas where medical needs are great. These include cancers, viral infections, 
metabolic and central nervous system disorders and inflammatory diseases. Roche is the 
world’s leading supplier of prescription drugs for cancer treatment. Roche invests 
heavily in the research and development of new drugs and diagnostic products and 
complements its own worldwide research activities with a wealth of cooperation 
agreements with universities, research institutes and biotech companies.  
 
MNC1 (AstraZeneca China) 
AstraZeneca International, one of the world’s leading pharmaceutical companies, with a 
broad range of medicines designed to fight disease in important areas of healthcare, 
founded AstraZeneca China in 1993 when China became its top priority among all 
emerging markets. AstraZeneca China was one of the first multination companies to 
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conduct large-scale international multi-centre trials and establish a clinical research unit 
in China. It has conducted 37 clinical research projects with over 600 local institutions 
and around 15,000 patients enrolled since 1996. And it was awarded as the fastest 
growing MNC in 2003 and No.1 Rx company in 2004 in China. AstraZeneca China has 
its own world class manufacturing plant in Wuxi, which is the largest manufacturing 
investment of AstraZeneca in Asia with both the China and EU GMP certification, 
authorised to export products to EU and other countries adopting EU standards. 
 
MNC2 (Sanofi-aventis, Shanghai China) 
Sanofi-aventis, a leading global pharmaceutical company, contributes to improving life 
by providing a broad offering of medicines, vaccines, and integrated healthcare 
solutions adapted to local needs and means. With the goal of offering new therapeutic 
strategies that improve the life of every patient, Research and Development teams at 
sanofi -aventis take a global approach to diseases. The Group invested 4.6 billion euros 
in R&D in 2008, The R&D structure at sanofi-aventis promotes a culture of sharing 
expertise and experience among multicultural teams. 
 MNC3 (Gambro, Shanghai China) 
Gambro is a global medical technology company and a leader in developing, 
manufacturing and supplying products, therapies and services for In-centre Care and 
Self Care Hemodialysis, Peritoneal Dialysis, Renal Intensive Care and Hepatic Care. 
For decades, Gambro has led the market in renal care development and has been first to 
market with many groundbreaking innovations. Gambro is the only clinic-independent 
company and by designing and delivering complete solutions to dialysis clinics and 
intensive care units, Gambro offers not just improved treatment quality, but also 
improved efficiency. Gambro was founded in 1964 and has more than 8 000 employees, 
production facilities in 11 countries, sales subsidiaries in more than 40 and sales in more 
than 100 countries. 
 
MNC4 www.infosys.com 
Infosys Technologies Ltd. (NASDAQ: INFY) was started in 1981 by seven people with 
US$ 250. Today, we are a global leader in the "next generation" of IT and consulting 
with revenues of over US$ 4 billion. Infosys defines, designs and delivers technology-
enabled business solutions that help Global 2000 companies win in a Flat World. 
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Infosys also provides a complete range of services by leveraging our domain and 
business expertise and strategic alliances with leading technology providers. Infosys' 
offerings span business and technology consulting, application services, systems 
integration, product engineering, custom software development, maintenance, re-
engineering, independent testing and validation services, IT infrastructure services and 
business process outsourcing. Infosys pioneered the Global Delivery Model (GDM), 
which emerged as a disruptive force in the industry leading to the rise of offshore 
outsourcing. The GDM is based on the principle of taking work to the location where 
the best talent is available, where it makes the best economic sense, with the least 
amount of acceptable risk. Infosys has a global footprint with over 50 offices and 
development centres in India, China, Australia, the Czech Republic, Poland, the UK, 
Canada and Japan. Infosys has over 103,000 employees. Infosys takes pride in building 
strategic long-term client relationships. Over 97% of our revenues come from existing 
customers. 
 
MNC5 www.nielsen.com 
Founded in 1923 by Arthur Charles Nielsen, Sr., ACNielsen introduced consumer 
marketers to many innovative research methods and techniques that today are standard 
industry practice, including the first objective and reliable methodology for measuring 
retail sales and competitive market shares. Mr. Nielsen also founded our sister company, 
Nielsen Media Research, the global leader in television audience measurement and 
other media research services.  
 
ACNielsen tailors research solutions to individual client needs.  For common research 
needs ACNielsen has a suite of internationally recognised proprietary research products 
and methodologies providing powerful comparative and normative data. Other research 
requirements are idiosyncratic and depend on a particular organisation’s prerogatives 
and strategic goals. In this case specific, ad hoc research may be necessary, designed to 
address a particular market issue or set of issues.  Often a combination of the two is 
necessary.  
All ACNielsen research is conducted and delivered by a team of research and client 
service professionals with specialised industry, business issue or methodological 
expertise. Aside from providing market data, ACNielsen endeavours to add value to 
client’s business by translating the data into actionable market and business insights.  
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Appendix 5.2: Case study protocol 
1. Research questions and issues 
The purpose of the research is to explore how PFP is designed and implemented in the 
non-public sector knowledge-intensive industries of China. The research will be 
undertaken at 12 case firms in investment/marketing research, IT and pharmaceuticals. 
Research questions identified are: 
 
Research Aim 
 To explore PFP design and implementation practices 
in China’s non-public sector knowledge-intensive industries 
Research focus Research questions 
Q1. Significance of PFP 
in the present pay 
system 
1a: To what extent is PFP adopted? 
1b: Why do firms use PFP? 
Q2: PFP plans and 
design 
2a: What types of PFP plans are adopted?  
2b: What are the contextual factors that impact on the 
adoption? 
Q3: PFP implementation 3a:  How is performance measured?  
3b: What functions does PA serve? 
Q4: Line management in 
PFP 
4a: How do line managers understand their PFP? 
4b: What are the key supports and barriers to line  
     Managers’ involvement in PFP? 
 
2. Statement of purpose  
Level of analysis 
This research is a multi-case approach from the management perspective. Level of 
analysis includes: (1) Organisational level: Case firms in Shanghai, units in other cities 
of China are not included: (2) Management level: Interviews of top managers, HR and 
line managers. 
 
Methodology and case study design 
1. Multiple-case design • Altogether 12 cases, each case follows a standard protocol • Each case is to be summarised individually; • A standard format for pattern mating, themes and implications are to be 
established.  
2. Interviews • Site visiting, interviewing top managers, HR and line managers; • Visiting and interviewing HR and reward management specialist of HR 
consultancies; 
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3. Pilot case studies • Undertake with close, accessible managers from the pilot case firms.  • Use the result of pilot to refine data collection and analysis plan. 
4. Collecting evidence • Interview data – main source • Documentation: firms’ brochures, financial reports, employee handbook, HR 
records and relevant books published by the firms and media press. • Establishing data base including interview note, documentation, relevant HR 
reports, magazines of HRM (published in China), consultancy reports etc.  
Data analysis • Pattern matching • Thematic analysis • Data contradiction • Data validity • Data reliability 
Theory building:  
Case study report favourite   
Time table 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
 262
Appendix 5.3a: Interview Guide and Record Form 
 
1. Company: 
 
 
2. Department: 
 
 
3. Interviewee Name: 
 
 
4. Position: 
 
 
5. Date: 
 
 
6. Time Start: Time Finish: 
 
7. Location 
 
 
   
 CHECKLIST  
1. Research overview………………………………………… 
 
2.  Thanks for participating…………………………………… 
 
3. Confidentiality…………………………………………….. 
 
4. 
 
Contact details…………………………………………….. 
 
5.  
 
Permission to tape…………………………………YES                  NO 
                                                                                                       
   
 PERSONAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
1. What is your current position with the firm? 
 
2. Briefly outline your current responsibilities. 
 
3. How long have you done this job? 
 
4. How long have you been at this company? 
 
5. What positions have you held at the firm? 
 
6. What is your overall general experience in this industry? 
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Appendix 5.3b: Interview questions 
Sections Questions 
Section A – 
Importance of 
PFP in the pay 
system 
1. Please introduce your current pay package and explain each 
component you have.   
2. Is PFP included in your pay package? If so, is it an important 
income to you? Please describe.  
3. Please introduce your pay structures. How does your company 
provide pay to different employees?  
4. How does the company decide employee pay levels? Please 
indicate the important factors that determine your pay? 
5. Why does your firm use PFP? Or why do you think PFP 
should be or shouldn’t be used in your company?  
6. As a manager, do you concern PFP as necessary or important 
at work? If not, what do you think of it? 
Section B – 
PFP design 
7. Please check the definitions of PFP plans provided here and 
indicate if the PFP plans in your company have different 
meanings.   
8. Please describe the PFP plans in your company if know.  
9. What PFP plans are offered to you and why? E.g. what 
performance measurement level is it for your PFP plans? How 
long have you had this?  
10. How would you describe the advantages and disadvantages of 
your current PFP plan? 
11. Do you get involved in PFP plans design? If so, how, please 
give examples.  
12. What are the major determinants of those PFP plans?  
Section C – 
PFP 
implementation  
13. Is there a formal PA system in your company? If yes, describe 
the process please.  
14. Does your firm use 360 degree appraisal? If not, why or why 
do you think it works or it does not? 
15. How does your company appraise your performance? 
16. How do you evaluate the performance of your staff? 
17. Do you get involved in PA? If so, how? 
18. Please give the rank for functions of PA. Let me know if any 
item seems unclear to you. 
Section D – 
Line 
management in 
PFP 
19. How many staff do you have in your department or team? 
20. How would you describe the relationship between HR and you 
as a line manager? 
21. Please use your own words to describe the job tasks or 
activities in which you are regularly engaged?  
22. What do you think your responsibilities are in PFP?  
23. Please give three positive and negative points on your PFP 
system as a whole. 
24. How the top management and HR provide supports to you in 
PFP? Please give examples. 
25. What kind of difficulties have you had in PFP? Please give 
examples. 
Others Any additional comments do you have on your rewards system, PFP, 
and performance appraisal, line managers’ role etc.? 
Source: Developed for this thesis. 
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Appendix 5.3c: Functions of performance appraisal 
Use of performance appraisal factor 
绩效考核使用 
5 
Very high 
impact 
影响极大 
4 
High 
impact 
影响大 
3 
Medium 
impact 
中等影响 
2 
Little 
impact 
较少影响 
1 
No 
impact 
没有影响 
Between individuals ˄针对不ৠ雇员˅ 
1. Salary administration 
工资管理 
     
2. Promotion 
升职 
     
3. Retention or termination 
继续或㒜ℶ雇佣 
     
4. Recognition of individual 
performance 
认可个人业绩 
     
5. Lay-offs 
解除雇用 
     
6. Identifying poor performance 
确认不良业绩 
     
Within-individuals ˄针对单个雇员˅ 
7. Identifying individual training 
needs 
确认个人培䆁需求 
     
8. Performance feedback 
表现反馈 
                       
9. Determining transfers and 
assignments 
决定内部调整和升迁 
     
10. Identifying individual strengths 
& weaknesses 
确定个人的优势和缺点 
     
System maintenance ˄系统维ᡸ˅ 
11. Personnel planning 
      人事计划 
     
12. Determining organisational 
training needs 
决定公司培䆁需求 
     
13. Evaluating goal achievement 
目标达៤评估 
     
14. Evaluating personnel systems 
人力资源系统评估 
     
15. Reinforcing authority structure 
增强权力结构 
     
16. Identifying organisational 
development needs 
确定公司发展需求 
     
Documentation ˄文档功能˅ 
17. Criteria for validation research 
作Ў有效研究的依据 
     
18. Documenting personnel 
decisions 
人事决定存档 
     
19. Meeting legal requirements 
核定法规要求 
     
Source: Adopted from Cleveland et al. (1989b) 
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Appendix 5.3d: Interview questions – Research Issue Matrix 
No. Interview questions 
 
RQ1a RQ1b RQ2a RQ2b RQ3a RQ3b RQ4a RQ4b 
1 Please introduce your current pay package and 
explain each component you have.   
X X       
2 Is PFP included in your pay package? If so, is it an 
important income to you? Please describe.  
X X       
3 Please introduce your pay structures. How does 
your company provide pay to different employees? 
X X X      
4 How does the company decide employee pay 
levels? Please indicate the important factors that 
determine your pay? 
X X  X     
5 Why does your firm use PFP? Or why do you 
think PFP should be or shouldn’t be used in your 
company?  
X X  X   X X 
6 As a manager, do you concern PFP as necessary or 
important at work? If not, what do you think of it? 
X  X X   X  
7 Please check the definitions of PFP plans provided 
here and indicate if the PFP plans in your company 
have different meanings.   
  X      
8 Please describe the PFP plans in your company if 
know.  
  X      
9 What PFP plans are offered to you and why? E.g. 
what performance measurement level is it for your 
PFP plans? How long have you had this?  
  X X     
10 How would you describe the advantages and 
disadvantages of your current PFP plan? 
  X X X    
11 Do you get involved in PFP plans design? If so, 
how, please give examples.  
   X  X   
12 What are the major determinants of those PFP 
plans?  
X   X X    
13 Is there a formal PA system in your company? If 
yes, describe the process please.  
    X X   
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No. Interview questions 
 
RQ1a RQ1b RQ2a RQ2b RQ3a RQ3b RQ4a RQ4b 
14 Does your firm use 360 degree appraisal? If not, 
why or why do you think it works or it does not? 
    X X  X 
15 How does your company appraise your 
performance? 
    X X   
16 How do you evaluate the performance of your 
staff? 
    X X   
17 Do you get involved in PA? If so, how?      
 
 X X 
18 Please give the rank for functions of PA. Let me 
know if any item seems unclear to you. 
     X X  
19 How many staff do you have in your department or 
team? 
      X X 
20 How would you describe the relationship between 
HR and you as a line manager? 
      X X 
21 Please use your own words to describe the job 
tasks or activities in which you are regularly 
engaged?  
      X  
22 What do you think your responsibilities are in 
PFP?  
      X  
23 Please give three positive and negative points on 
your PFP system as a whole. 
      X X 
24 How the top management and HR provide 
supports to you in PFP? Please give examples. 
       X 
25 What kind of difficulties have you had in PFP? 
Please give examples. 
       X 
26 Additional comments 
 
X X X X X X X X 
Source: Developed for the thesis. 
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Appendix 5.4 Interview cover letters 
Sir John Cass 
Business School 
106 Bunhill Row 
London EC1Y 8TZ 
T +44 (0)20 7040 8600 
F +44 (0)20 7040 8880 
www.cass.city.ac.uk 
 
A School of City University London 
Formerly City University Business School 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
I am a PhD candidate in the Faculty of Management at Cass Business School, City 
University, London. I am currently undertaking an important research project on human 
resource management regarding reward management. This project is associated with our 
Centre for Research in Asian Management and supervised by Professor Chris Rowley, 
who is a very well known figure in the area and the founding director of the Centre 
(http://www.cass.city.ac.uk/faculty/c.rowley/). 
 
In particular, this project is on performance management systems in China and how 
good performers are retained and rewarded. It involves an exploration and analysis of 
the issues involved in such systems in term of the current schemes of employee rewards, 
the implementation of employee pay-for-performance policies and the role of the 
management. 
 
As a case study method is used in this research it would be of great assistance if your 
company could cooperate in this research by providing access for myself. This will need 
you to share the background of your company with me, and let me interview HR and 
some other managers. All information will be treated in the highest confidence and can 
be presented anonymously if needed. At the end of case investigation we would offer 
your company an executive summary of our finding and recommendations, and we 
would do hope that by reviewing you current practices and sharing your experiences 
with us you will obtain some valuable information that benefits your human resource 
management practices and inspiration on how to reward employees more effectively.  
 
Thank you very much for your co-operation. 
Yours faithfully,  
 
Qi Wei 
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Sir John Cass 
Business School 
 
106 Bunhill Row 
London EC1Y 8TZ 
T +44 (0)20 7040 8600 
F +44 (0)20 7040 8880 
www.cass.city.ac.uk 
 
A School of City University London 
Formerly City University Business School 
 
尊敬的女士／先生， 
៥是伦敦城市大学商学院管理专业的博士研究生，目前ℷ在做关于中国人力资源
管理中奖励机制的研究。该项目是本学院Ѯ洲管理研究中心组㒛的，并由该中心
创始人在Ѯ洲人力资源管理研究方面颇有知ৡ度的 Chris Rowley 教授亲自指导. 
(http://www.cass.city.ac.uk/faculty/c.rowley/). 
本项目从员工表现管理研究入手，讨论企业如何有效地奖励和保留表现出色的员
工。Џ要涉及员工奖惩机制，绩效管理策略和管理层从中所起的作用各方面的调
查和分析。 
由于本项目使用案例分析的研究方法，所以需要贵公司尽可能给本人提供学习和
研究的方便。例如提供一ѯ公司的背景资料，并允许៥采访一ѯ管理层工作人员
等。所有相关的信息将以高级机密处理，如果需要可以在未来的研究᡹告中以匿
ৡ的方式出现。调研结束ৢ，៥们将提供一份总结和建䆂᡹告给贵司，衷心希望
通过回顾和检验贵公司在奖励机制方面的政策和实践，能够有效地Ў你们提供目
前运作的៤绩和不足，并对未来贵司的人力资源管理给予一ѯ参考和启发，从而
进一步完善奖励和绩效管理机制，有效地控制人力资源៤本，保留出色的员工。 
非常感谢您的大力合作。 
项目研究人， 
 
 
韦  琪 
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Appendix 5.5: Secondary Data Documentation List 
Secondary data from the case firms 
Firm Documents 
POE1 Brochure, media press, two books about the owner, salary policies and 
performance appraisal forms, annual reports. 
POE2 Brochure, employee handbook, salary and bonus documents and 
performance appraisal forms, annual reports.  
POE3 Salary policies and performance appraisal forms, annual reports 
POE4 Brochure, information on website, salary and performance appraisal 
policies, annual reports 
POE5 Brochure, information on website, HR documents, annual reports. 
JV1 Brochure, information on website, salary and bonus documents, 
performance appraisal forms, annual reports 
JV2 Brochure, HR documents, employee handbook, annual reports 
MNC1 Brochure, training materials, performance appraisal forms, annual reports. 
MNC2 Brochure, performance appraisal forms, training documents, annual 
reports 
MNC3 Brochure, performance appraisal forms, annual reports. 
MNC4 Brochure, HR documents, annual reports. 
MNC5 Brochure, HR documents, annual reports. 
Source: From the field work. 
Secondary data from other resources 
1. 2005 salary survey annual – accounting 
2. 2006 salary survey annual – IT industry 
3. Reward system design and management by Beijing Xinhuaxin management 
consultancy 2007 
4. Reward management consultancy report by H&J vanguard research and 
consulting LTD. 
5. Linking pay to performance 2007 by Zuoyue management consultancy 
6. 20 reward elements in China 2007 
7. Shanghai salary survey report 2000-2004 by Sunshine consultancy 
8. Spot check paper of Shanghai salary 2006  
9. Spot check paper of Shanghai salary 2008  
10. 2007-08 reward management conference in Beijing 
11. Shanghai IT and pharmaceutical salary survey report 2008 
12. China annual salary report 2007 and 2008 
13. Pay and performance discussion by reward management specialists 
14. Salary survey annul – manufacturing industry 
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Appendix 5.6: Themes/patterns and codes list 
Themes/patterns and codes list for RQ1a 
Themes/Patterns Codes Themes/Patterns Codes 
Pay Mix Pay range determinants 
Base pay PM1 Market rates PRD1
PFP PM2 Competitor PRD2
Allowances PM3 Job evaluation PRD3
Benefits PM4 Qualification PRD4
Compulsory benefits     PM4C Experience PRD5
Additional benefits PM4A Pay consultant PRD6
Total cash income PM5 Firm revenue PRD7
Pay structure Pay progression determinants 
Graded structure PS1 Firm revenue  PPD1
Broad-banded structure PS2 Individual performance  PPD2
Informal graded PS3 Cost PPD3
 Inflation rate PPD4
 Skill/competence PPD5
 Service length PPD6
 
 
Themes/patterns and codes list for RQ1b 
Themes/patterns Codes Themes/patterns Codes 
PFP as a motivator MO Best practice BP
Retaining staff RS Competitive advantage CA
Promoting business strategy PBS Following competitors FC
Effective management tool EMT Recruiting good performer RGP
Good communication tool GCT Encourage certain behaviour ECB
Market practice MP Distinguishing performances DP
 
Themes/patterns and codes list for RQ2a 
Themes/patterns Codes Themes/patterns Codes 
Commission plans CP Performance schemes PS
Year-end bonus YEB Stock options SO
Cash profit sharing CPS Discretionary bonuses DB
Project based bonus PBB Chinese returnees CR
Group based bonus GBB Additional allowances AA
Stock options SO Non-financial rewards NFR
Payment-by-result schemes PBR  
 
 
Themes and codes list for other research questions are available upon request.   
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Appendix 6.1a: Graded pay structures in the case firms 
 
Graded pay structure in POE2 
RMB1,000 
Grade Group Basic annual salary 
1 Top management 100-250 K 
2 Masters plus 72-80K 
3 Undergraduates 42-60K 
4 Colleges students 18-30K 
5 Others  12-15K 
Source: From interviews. 
Graded structure in POE3 
RMB 1,000 
Grade Group Basic annual salary 
1 Top management 100-250 K 
2 Undergraduates 18-22K 
3 Colleges students 16-17K 
4 Others  14.5-15.5K 
Source: From interviews. 
Graded pay structure in POE4 
RMB 1,000 
Grade Group Basic annual salary 
1 CEO 600-750 K 
2 General managers 240-360k 
3 Middle managers 120-150k 
4 Undergraduates 18-22K 
5 Colleges students 16-17K 
6 Others  14.5-15.5K 
Source: From interviews. 
Graded pay structure in POE5 
RMB 1,000 
Grade Group Basic annual salary 
1 CEO 620-750 K 
2 General managers 280-400k 
3 Middle managers 150-250k 
4 Undergraduates 22-30K 
5 Colleges students 16-20K 
6 Others  14.5-15.5K 
Source: From interviews. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
 272
Graded pay structure in JV1 
RMB1,000 
Grade Position Basic annual salary 
A - Directors Deputy directors 
VP 
Deputy VP 
Chairman of board of directors 
Secretary of board of directors 
250-300 
300-400 
200-300 
200-300 
200-300 
B - Senior 
management 
Controllers 
VP assistant 
150-250 
140-200 
C – Department 
managers 
Project development 
Project management 
Sales management 
Administration management 
120-180 
120-180 
100-140 
100-150 
D  Supervisors 80-120 
E   Line manager assistants 60-120 
F Project development officers 60-120 
G Project engineers 36-108 
H – Marketing & 
sales 
Marketing officers 
Sales 
48-80 
(24-54) + commissions 
I Junior officers 36-60 
J Others 20-48 
Source: From HR documents of JV1 (12/2005) 
Graded pay structure in MNC1                   
RMB 1,000 
Grades Jobs Pay range 
Grade 1 to 3 Junior staff 25 – 40 
Grade 4 Assistant 36-60 
Grade 5 and 6 Professionals 50  – 120 
Grade 7 and 8 Senior professionals/team leaders 150– 350  
Grade 8 Entry level managers, line managers 120 – 280 
Grade 9 Function manager, senior managers 200 – 380 
Grade 10 and 11 Top managers 600 and above 
Source: From interviews. 
Graded pay structure in MNC4                   
RMB 1,000 
Grades Jobs Pay range 
Grade A Junior staff  
Grade B1-B2 IT software engineer  
Grade C1-C2 Senior software engineer  
Grade D1-D2 Line managers  
Grade E1-E2 Senior managers  
Grade F1-F2 Top managers  
Source: From interviews. 
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Appendix 6.1b: Broad-banded pay structures in the case firms 
 
Broad-banded pay structure in POE1 
RMB1,000 
Band Position Annual base pay 
A Senior management A1 VP 
A2 Managing director 
A3 Deputy VP 
A4 Financial controller 
A5 VP assistant 
100-110 
80-110 
80-110 
60-90 
60-90 
B Management B1 Director 
B2 Deputy director 
B3 Senior supervisor 
B4 Supervisor 
B5 Financial controller 
(expatriating to 
subsidiaries) 
80-120k 
60-80K 
48-60K 
15-50K 
30-96K 
 
C Junior staff C1 
C2 
C3 
C4 
C5 
33.6K 
31.2K 
30.0K 
27.6K 
21.6K 
D Others D1 
D2 
12K 
36K 
Source: From HR documents of POE1 (2006). 
Broad-banded pay structure in JV2 
RMB 1,000 
Band Position Salary 
G1-G4 General staff 50-140K 
P1-P4 Professional 122-200K 
M1-M4 Management 166-600K 
Source: From interviews. 
Broad-banded pay structure in MNC5 
RMB 1,000 
Band Position Basic annual salary 
Band 1 Level 2 
Level 1 – entry level 
 
Band 2 – professionals P3 – secretary, receptionist 
P2 - officer 
P1 – Supervisor 
 
Band 3 - Management M4 – Assistant managers 
(management entry level) 
M3 – Middle manager 
M2 – Senior manager 
M1 – Directors, VP, CEO. 
 
Source: From interviews and HR documents. 
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Appendix 6.2a: Pay ranges for HR in case firms 
Role Experiences Qualifications Scope of role Pay 
range/RMB 
HR 
supervisor 
2-4 yrs Bachelor degree 
in HR 
management 
Deal with recruitment, C&B, training etc. Strong 
communication skill. 
62,000-99,840
HR 
specialist 
(Trainer) 
3+ yrs Associate degree 
+ 
Liaising with Dept. managers. Rate training needs, choose 
training source internal or external. Analyse training course. 
Good presentation skill.  
66,114-99,840
HR 
specialist 
(Recruiter
) 
3+ yrs Major in 
HR/Psychology 
Responsible for job designing, search, screening, interview, 
recruitment etc. Good command of English. Strong 
communication skills.  
66,144-
110,500
HR 
specialist 
(C&B) 
4+yrs Associate degree 
+ major in 
accounting 
C & B management, including survey, updating salary 
structure, benefits scheme and etc; Leaving Statistics. Good 
command of English. Accounting background. 
65,000-
119,340
Training/ 
supervisor
/manager 
5+yrs Major in 
HR/Psychology 
Education background. In charge of planning, 
implementation, evaluation of project management. Group 
training needs assessment, course design, implementation 
& evaluation for onsite employee training. Proficient 
English & presentation skills 
87,620-
170,625
HR 
manager 
6+yrs Bachelor degree 
– HR 
Establish policy and procedure of termination, discipline 
and labour contract. Plan and organise the “Performance 
Appraisal”. Interface with local government. Lead the HR 
team to implement the entire HR infrastructure, supervision 
of HR department. Proficient English & communication 
skills.  
163,410-
200,800
HR 
manager/ 
Director 
8+yrs MBA HR 
direction 
advantageous 
Overall responsible for HR system and benefits 
administration; Initiate HR policy and procedure design, 
improvement and implementation. Provide HR consultancy 
services to functional managers at all level; Work with 
management, conduct training needs, assessment and 
propose the training plan; Enhance management and 
employee communication, build well company culture. 
Excel in HRM, strategic management. Proficient English & 
communication skills.  
245,700-
420,000
Source: From HR documents. 
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Appendix 6.2b: Pay ranges for sales and marketing in case firms 
Role Experiences Qualifications Scope of role Pay 
range/RMB 
Sales 
representati
ves  
1-3 yrs + Associate 
degree + 
Outgoing personality. Capable travel. Able to 
develop new markets and distributor supervision. 
42,000 -
84,500
Marketing 
executive 
1-3 yrs + Associate 
degree + 
Customer budgeting and sales forecasting, 
controlling of investments and ROI by category using 
customer contribution statements.  Manage marketing 
spending flawlessly. Familiar with media, 
promotional activities, in-store promotion and 
seminars. Excellent presentation skills. 
32,500 - 
65,000
Sales 
supervisor 
3 yrs + Associate 
degree + 
Sales channel management. Supervise sales 
representatives.  Key account management. Excellent 
presentation skills. 
52,000 - 
84,500
Senior 
sales 
coordinator 
5 yrs + Bachelor degree 
+ 
Ensure that all merchandising and marketing setup is 
consistent with company’s image. Ensure proper 
procedures are followed for all pre-sales and post-
sales serving by the front-line sales team. Oversee 
subordinates.  
91,000 -
156,100
Promotion 
supervisor 
5 yrs + Bachelor degree 
+ 
Implement programmes. Consolidate evaluation 
reports for promotion activities. Business planning 
and planning of promotions with the customer and 
reviews to achieve the targets. Negotiation of Trading 
Terms, promotion and listings.  
76,700 -  
100,100
Senior 
marketing 
manager 
7 yrs + Bachelor degree 
+ 
Manage business of the region. Develop business and 
marketing plans with the marketing members of the 
company. Regular discussion on reviewing business, 
highlighting issues, introducing new products and 
proposing marketing plans and other major duties. 
Managing customer account & sales channel and 
looking for business opportunities. Good command 
of English.  
100,100 – 
163,800
Source: From HR documents 
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Appendix 6.2c: Pay ranges for professionals in the case firms 
Role Experiences Qualifications Responsibilities Pay range/RMB 
Project 
engineer 
2-4 yrs University graduates 
engineering qualified 
Research and develops new projects and 
improvement designs for assigned projects.  
78,000-104,000
Project 
manager 
2-5 yrs Bachelor degree/Ms 
MBA advantageous 
Supervise assistant engineers. Deliver the project 
as a turnkey solution.  
156,000-234,000
Senior project 
manager 
2-8yrs Bachelor degree  
/MBA advantageous 
Detail oriented with strong business writing 
skills. Overall control of cost and budget. 
Negotiate with sub-contractors. 
218,400-300,000
Assi. Engineer 
(hardware and 
software) 
0-2 yrs Degree in computing 
science 
LAN set up and software installation. Hardware, 
software and network troubleshooting.  
27,550-54,660
Web designer 1-2 yrs Associated degree Graphic, flash designing, creation. 31,200-65,000
IT engineer 2-5 yrs Bachelor degree in 
computing science 
Provide IT operation services and initiate the 
right solutions to technical problems, positively 
and professionally. 
61,000-101,400
IT supervisor 2-4 yrs Bachelor degree in 
computing science 
Experiencing in handing and maintaining 
systems. Responsible for administrative 
functions related to operations and budgeting of 
local area network and wide area network.  
62,400-110,500
IT manager 8 yrs + Bachelor degree/ 
MSc in computing 
science 
IT management, project and service 
management. Proficiency English.  
175,500-325,000
IT director 10 yrs + Bachelor degree/ 
MSc in computing 
science 
Manage IT budget and expenditure. Initiate IT 
projects and oversees project execution with 
methodology.  
286,000-520,000
Source: From HR documents. 
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Appendix 6.2d: Pay rages for administration in the case firms 
Role Experiences Qualifications Pay range/RMB 
Junior receptionist 0-2 yrs Associate degree 19,550-39,000
Clerk 0-2 yrs Bachelor degree 26,000-45,500
Junior Secretary 0-1 yr Associate degree + 17,550-26,520
Secretary 1-2 yrs Associate degree/secretarial major 26,000-45,500
Senior receptionist 2-4 yrs Associate degree + 32,500-45,500
Senior clerk 3 yrs Associate degree 49,400-71,500
Secretary 3-5 yrs Bachelor degree/secretarial major 59,800-91,000
Driver 5-20 yrs High school + 30,000-45,500
Translator 
Interpreter 
1-4 yrs TEM 8 45,500-110,500+
Senior translator/ 
Interpreter 
5 + yrs Bachelor degree or master degree 104,000-260,000
Senior secretary 5-8 yrs Bachelor degree/ secretarial major 89,700-156,000
Executive secretary/ 
Personal assistant 
8+ yrs Bachelor degree 120,000-162,500
Administration 
manager 
5+ yrs Bachelor degree in Business Administration 106,600-169,000
Administration 
director 
10 + yrs Bachelor  
MBA preferred 
130,000-260,000
Source: From HR documents 
 
 
